FIVE FIREFIGHTERS KILLED IN TRUSS ROOF COLLAPSE AT AUTO DEALERSHIP FIRE – HACKENSACK, NEW JERSEY – JULY 1, 1988

Five Firefighters Killed in Truss Roof Collapse at Automobile Dealership Fire – Hackensack, New Jersey – July 1, 1988 – New Jersey Bureau of Fire Safety Firefighter Fatality Investigation Report & NFPA Summary Investigative Report

On July 1, 1988, Hackensack New Jersey Fire Captain Richard Williams, Lieutenant Richard Reinhagen and Firefighters William Kresja, Leonard Radumski and Steven Ennis died while fighting a fire at an automobile dealership when a wood bowstring truss supported roof assembly suddenly collapsed. Three of the firefighters were struck and killed by roof debris in the middle of a service area after the truss roof and heavy plaster and wire lath ceiling collapsed. The two other firefighters were trapped in a rear storage room and radioed for help. They died before anyone could get to their position because rescuers were blocked by roof collapse debris and heavy fire conditions. Fire investigators determined that the fire originated in the attic area above the service area and that the probable cause of the fire was accidental, however the investigation was unable to determine the precise cause and the case remains open. The tragic event led to significant operational and equipment changes that have made the fireground a safer environment for today’s firefighters. The incident remains one of the largest losses of firefighter lives during a structure fire in the state of New Jersey.

The structure involved in the incident was located at 320 River Street in a commercial area of the city along the banks of the Hackensack River occupied by a full-service automobile dealership, Hackensack Ford. The structure was built in 1948 and was of Type III Ordinary construction with masonry block exterior walls and interior walls that were constructed of both wood frame and masonry. The outside dimensions of the building were 100 feet wide by 225 feet deep and 22 feet high and had an irregular layout.  The total square footage of the ground floor was 18,000 square feet. The area over the showroom contained a small second-floor office.

The service area of the building was approximately 10,000 square feet. The roof over the service area was supported by five wood bowstring trusses that were spaced about 16 feet apart and spanned the 80-foot width of the service area. The trusses were supported by a steel beam on Side Delta and steel columns on Side Bravo. The top chord of each truss was comprised of eleven 2 x 4-inch wood members and the bottom chord was made up of ten 3 x 6-inch wood members. Air spaces were present between the members making up the top and bottom chords. The web members were 2 x 6-inch lumber. The truss assemblies were joined together with steel plates and bolts.

A storage area was constructed in the attic above the service area. 2 x 10-inch wood purlins spanned the bottom chords of the trusses, and a heavy wire lath and cement plaster ceiling was fastened to the underside of the members. The finished ceiling extended into the service area addition and the distance from the concrete floor to the finished ceiling was estimated to be 12 feet. Plywood flooring had been placed on the attic floor and the area was used for storage of auto parts and janitorial supplies. Access to the attic storage area was via two ceiling hatches at the east and west sides of the service area and a stairway accessed from the parts area on the west end of the building. There were several overhead entry doors to the service area. A tool room was located at the east end of the service area and a body shop area was located on the east end of the building isolated from the service area by an interior masonry wall.

There were no fire alarm detection devices in the building, and it was not equipped with an automatic fire sprinkler system. The structure had been renovated in 1973 that extended the service bays, renovated the parts department, and replaced the attic stairs. Under building and fire codes in effect at the time of the renovation, the use of the attic space for storage could only be permitted if the area had a fire suppression system. Records show that the occupancy should have been subject to annual fire inspections according to the New Jersey Uniform Fire Code, however, no such inspections had been performed by the Fire Prevention Bureau of the fire department.

Hackensack is a city in Bergen County, New Jersey and serves as the county seat. Located in the northeastern portion of the state along the western bank of the Hackensack River, the city is located about ten miles northeast of Midtown Manhattan, New York City. The 4.35 square mile city is a mixture of residential, commercial and light industrial occupancies. It had a population of 36,039 residents at the 1980 U.S. census, however, the daytime population swelled to more than 100,000 during the daytime working hours with several county government offices located in the city.

At the time of the incident the city was protected by the Hackensack Fire Department which had 97 career members including 1 chief, 5 battalion chiefs, 5 captains, 16 lieutenants, and 70 firefighters divided into 4 shifts. Operating from 4 fire stations, the apparatus complement was 4 engine companies, 1 tower ladder company, 1 rescue company and 1 battalion chief/shift commander. In addition, there was 1 unstaffed reserve engine and 1 unstaffed reserve aerial ladder truck. When a working fire required additional resources, a recall of 1 shift of off-duty firefighters was requested by the shift commander to supplement on-duty staffing. On the day of the incident, there were 22 fire personnel on duty including the 2 firefighters assigned to the fire dispatch center operated by the department. Tower Ladder 314 was at the city garage for repairs and the reserve aerial ladder, Truck 307, was placed in service.

At the time of the incident, the department training requirements for fire recruits included an eight-week orientation program consisting of on-the-job training under the direction of the recruit’s engine or truck company officer. All recruits were then required to complete their training at the county fire academy which consisted of a 69-hour Fire Fighter Level I course. All line fire personnel participated in in-house training consisting of drills and seminars. No formal advanced training was required of firefighters or fire officers. The training records of the department were incomplete when examined by New Jersey Division of Fire Safety (NJDFS) investigators.

On the day of the incident, the weather conditions were reported as cloudy with a temperature of 68 degrees F with winds from the northwest at 12 to 22 miles per hour. Note: Research by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has shown wind speeds on the order of 10 to 20 mph are sufficient to create wind-driven fire conditions in a structure with an uncontrolled flow path [Madrzykowski and Kerber, 2009]. The NJBFS and NFPA reports both mentioned weather, particularly the winds, as being a significant factor in fire development and the outcome of this incident.

On Friday, July 1, 1988, at about 2:50 p.m., a hose from the vehicle exhaust system in the attic above the service area at Hackensack Ford fell burning to the floor. It was extinguished by an employee using a portable extinguisher. At about the same time, a parts department employee entered the attic storage area and discovered a heavy smoke condition. The employee then alerted other employees that there was a fire in the attic. The initial report to the fire department came from a woman across the street at a recreational facility who saw smoke and flames coming from the roof of the dealership.

At 2:59 p.m., Engine 304, Engine 301, Truck 307, and a battalion chief staffed by 10 firefighters responded. Note: Rescue 308 was staffed by one firefighter that normally would have responded to the structure fire alarm but was on special assignment and did not respond until later in the incident at 3:19 p.m. The first-due engine company, Engine 305, was committed to another fire emergency so it was replaced by Engine 304.

Engine 304 and Truck 307 arrived within one minute. Engine 304 arrived first on Side Delta near the first overhead door to the service area and the crew stretched a hoseline to the attic stairs. Engine 304 Captain Richard Williams first reported that heavy smoke was at the rear portion of the roof. The crew further observed light smoke coming out from under the open overhead door. Truck 307 took a position just behind Engine 304. Engine 301, positioned at a hydrant on River Street and advanced a supply hoseline to Engine 304.

Engine 304 Captain Williams investigated the source of the smoke and attempted to locate an access point to the attic from which the smoke from the interior appeared to be coming. The Engine 304 crew advanced a 1.5-inch hoseline into the service area. Captain Williams attempted to gain access to the door at the top of the stairs to the attic but was unable to open it. He then directed the crew to back the hoseline out after determining that the fire could be attacked via the scuttle hatches in the finished ceiling in the service area. Meanwhile, the crew from Truck 307 had laddered the building and was making an assessment of conditions on the roof.

Battalion Chief Sandy Williams arrived on scene at 3:03 p.m. and received a report of the conditions and initial actions taken by the first arriving firefighters. The decision was made to continue the strategy to attempt an attack on the fire in the attic via the scuttle hatches in the service area ceiling.

In the process of gaining access to the roof, the truck crew reported heavy smoke in the roof area. The crew, equipped with ventilation tools, moved along the roof to a position toward the rear of the building. The truck company officer checked for signs of intense heat or indications of structural weakness such as tar bubbles or spongy roof sections. He did not observe any of these indications and led the crew to a point in the rear portion of the roof where a 48-inch attic ventilation fan was located. The ventilation fan was positioned at the midpoint of the service area roof where the arch-shaped roof sloped to meet the body shop’s flat roof. The fan was enclosed by a wood housing which projected beyond the sloping roof. The truck crew confirmed that the roof level smoke that was initially observed was coming from the ventilation fan.

As the ventilation operation on the roof proceeded, the fire in the attic space intensified. The two engine companies were attempting to access the attic space via the ceiling hatches but were encountering difficulty opening the hatches due to storage above them. Based on these conditions, Battalion Chief Williams ordered a second alarm for additional manpower at 3:06 p.m. Engine 302 with three firefighters was dispatched to the scene. Truck 307 was also ordered to ventilate the roof at this time.

The truck crew began to open the roof on the top portion of the ventilation fan housing. Using a circular blade power saw, the crew was able to open a ventilation hole and reported moderate smoke coming from the opening. The truck crew decided to enlarge the original hole by cutting into the sloped portion of the arch-shaped roof. The crew experienced difficulty in expanding the hole because the saw kept binding on an estimated ¾-inch layer of tar on the roof. The enlarged ventilation hole seemed to effectively vent the build-up of hot, dense gases in the attic area.

While the roof was being opened by the truck crew, the officer on Engine 302 was ordered to bring his crew and an additional 1.5-inch hoseline into the service area to assist in the ongoing effort to gain access to the attic. This effort involved firefighters working from a ground ladder placed below the scuttle located at the east portion of the service area. One firefighter at a time climbed the ladder and attempted to open the hatch. The hatch was eventually partially opened, and a hoseline was advanced up the ladder to extinguish the fire that was burning materials adjacent to the opening. A second scuttle at the west end of the service area was reported to firefighters as not being blocked, and a crew was sent to its location. Firefighters working at the west scuttle were able to open and partially enter the attic but were driven back by the intense heat. This crew observed brown smoke in the attic but did not observe fire as they directed their hoseline through the scuttle opening.

After venting the roof, the truck company crew, positioned on the flat portion of the roof over the body shop, advanced a 1.5-inch hoseline to the roof to prevent the lateral spread of fire on top of the roof. These efforts continued for approximately 20 minutes until the truck crew reported fire emitting from the vent hole at 3:22 p.m. During the next several minutes an additional engine, Engine 305, which was returning to fire headquarters from another emergency, was called to the scene and Rescue 308, with one firefighter, arrived at the scene. Battalion Chief Williams also requested a recall of an off-duty shift of city firefighters to staff the reserve engine. Tower Ladder 314, at the city garage for repairs, was also instructed to report to the fire scene. At about 3:27 p.m., Battalion Chief Williams began to prepare for a defensive attack on the fire. Truck 307 was relocated to the Bravo Side of the building for master stream operations, and Engine 305, in route to the scene, was ordered to supply water to Truck 307.

Battalion Chief Williams made several direct observations of conditions within the building and verbally communicated with the operating crews. Further, he made several observations of the roof conditions. Due to continued growth of the fire and the lack of progress by the hoselines, at 3:34 p.m., Battalion Chief Williams ordered the attack crews inside the building to back out their hoselines. At this time, the battalion chief was positioned at the east scuttle along with six other firefighters, and three firefighters were working in the area of the west scuttle. There was no evidence of an extensive amount of heat or smoke build-up below the finished ceiling in the service area, but there was an indication of fire and intense heat above the ceiling.

At 3:35 p.m., the truck crew reported heavy fire breaking through the rear of the roof and Battalion Chief Williams was summoned to the exterior of the building by Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos, who had arrived at the scene for an assessment of the fire. Soon after the conditions report from the roof crew, the roof and ceiling in the area of the east scuttle collapsed on the six firefighters who were working in the area. This occurred 35 minutes after the initial units arrived. Note: Just seconds before the collapse, there was an indication that the finished ceiling was sagging. This observation apparently was not able to be communicated to or was not observed by the battalion chief. The collapse trapped Captain Richard Williams, Firefighter William Kresja, and Firefighter Leonard Radumski under burning debris. Two firefighters, Lieutenant Richard Reinhagen and Firefighter Steven Ennis, were in the vicinity of the collapse and were able to retreat to an adjoining tool room but this was not immediately known to rescuers. Those firefighters working at the west scuttle were only partially affected by the collapse and escaped unharmed from the building. The truck crew left the roof by way of a ground ladder.

After the partial roof and ceiling collapse, the fire engulfed the rear portion of the service area. One firefighter initially trapped by the collapse and engulfed by the fire managed to spot an opening in the rubble and scrambled to the outside of the building. His protective clothing was burning as he reached the exterior, and firefighters quickly extinguished the fire by rolling him on the ground. He was fully utilizing his protective clothing and was not injured. The five other firefighters were now trapped inside the building which was now heavily involved with fire.

Battalion Chief Williams witnessed the collapse and feeling that all the firefighters did not have time to carry out his order to evacuate, he ordered a general alarm and ordered hoselines from locations on Sides Bravo and Delta to be directed toward the area of collapse. The hoselines were not advanced into the structure for fear of further collapse and firefighter injury. Further, a full recall was ordered for the department’s remaining off-duty personnel, and all apparatus were requested to the scene.

Approximately three minutes after the collapse, a radio message was transmitted by portable radio from Lieutenant Reinhagen who reported that he and Firefighter Ennis were trapped inside the rear of the building. Apparently due to the initial confusion that occurred on the fireground following the collapse and the sounding of tones for the recall over the only radio channel available for fireground use, the initial calls for help from the trapped firefighters were not acknowledged. After approximately three minutes, and with the help of radio messages relayed from fire headquarters to the fireground, it was realized that at least two firefighters had survived the collapse and were now trapped inside the building. During the next 11 minutes, radio transmissions continued with one of the trapped firefighters who was attempting to communicate their position. The best information that could be obtained was that the trapped firefighters were in the right rear of the building and in a closet.

While hoselines were being directed from the Bravo and Delta sides of the building towards the area of collapse, firefighters also advanced hoselines through the door opening between the body shop and service area and were able to search the rooms adjacent to the corridor, but they were unable to locate the trapped members. Firefighters then attempted to advance the hoseline into the service area but were driven back by the intensity of the fire.

After this rescue attempt, it was decided that firefighters would breach the masonry wall of the body shop in an attempt to locate the missing firefighters. Tool chests and other heavy equipment had to be moved from their stored location against the wall before the breach could be started. The location of the breach attempt was based on the best estimate of where the missing firefighters might be located. Battering rams were used to make an opening. Firefighters described the conditions found on the other side of the wall as a furnace. During the rescue attempt, the remaining trusses and roof collapsed, and the entire service bay area was destroyed by fire.

Following the collapse, master streams and large caliber hoselines were employed to extinguish the remaining fire and protect the area where the missing firefighters might be located. The recall brought additional staffing to the scene, and with the assistance of mutual aid companies, the fire was eventually brought under control.

After the fire was extinguished, rescue crews were able to enter the building to locate and remove the bodies of the trapped firefighters. Captain Richard Williams, Firefighter William Kresja, and Firefighter Leonard Radumski were located north of the east scuttle and were pinned by the weight of the cement and plaster ceiling and other debris. The remaining two firefighters, Lieutenant Reinhagen and Firefighter Ennis, were found in the tool room in the rear of the service area.

The Bergen County Medical Examiner’s Office reported that all five firefighters died as a result of multiple burn injuries and smoke inhalation. Carboxy hemoglobin levels ranged from 6 to 47 percent.

Investigators from the Bergen County Prosecutors Office have determined that the probable cause of the fire was accidental, however the investigation was unable to determine the precise cause and the case remains open. There was some evidence that a malfunction in an exhaust fan may have been involved in the ignition of the fire, but the facts were inconclusive. Investigators determined that the fire originated in the attic area above the service area. This area contained an abundant amount of stored combustible materials representing a substantial fuel load that was significant in the growth and spread of the fire. The combustible material included not only automobile parts, partitions, wood ceiling and roof purlins, but also the combustible wood truss members. There were no automatic fire detection or suppression systems in this unoccupied attic area to aid in the early detection or suppression of the fire. As a result, the fire burned undetected for a significant length of time and was likely to have been well advanced soon after the arrival of the fire department members. The stored materials likely affected the structural integrity of the truss assemblies because of the additional load they imposed and because of the degradation of the truss caused by the rapid burning of the materials.

Three building factors contributed to the collapse of the bowstring truss supported roof assembly:

• Alterations consisting of a heavy ceiling of cementitious material on wire lath to the ceiling of the service bay area.
• Auto parts storage in the attic.
• The fire burned for a significant length of time and was well advanced prior to detection.

Soon after the smoke cleared and the fallen firefighters were laid to rest, the battle over how the fire was fought began, with particular scrutiny paid to the question of whether the loss of life could have been prevented. A series of reports were issued by several local, state and national agencies, including the NFPA, the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) union and the New Jersey Bureau of Fire Safety, pointing out various deficiencies in command decisions, equipment, training and planning by the Hackensack Fire Department.

One report was especially scathing. In September 1988, the IAFF issued a report that drew largely on the conclusions of David Demers, a nationally known independent fire investigator. A summary of the report stated that the command decisions made on the day of the fire were “highly ineffective both before and after the collapse of the roof,” the sudden failure of which led to the deaths of the five firefighters. The report itself also took department leadership to task for failing to train firefighters and its officers about the dangers of bowstring truss roof building construction.

Poor radio communications were also cited as a major factor in the loss of life, noting that Battalion Chief Sandy Williams’ order to retreat from the building was never properly heard. Communication difficulties also contributed to the deaths of the two firefighters who were trapped after the collapse and who subsequently ran out of air.

About the overall performance of the fire department officers on the day of the fire, the report sternly concluded: “If proper procedures and training had been provided, the five firefighters would not have been needlessly killed trying to save property that was insured and will be replaced.”

Following the disastrous fire, changes were made within the Hackensack Fire Department. According to the fire department’s website, “This fire, the worst tragedy to befall this department, caused sweeping changes in many aspects of firefighting not only in Hackensack, but the whole country. The memory of these nine brave men will live in our hearts forever.”

Among the factors cited in the incident were a failure of the command structure, insufficient and ineffective radio communications, a lack of manpower, failure to recognize the truss roof/building construction and a lack of radios for the members on duty (a separate fireground frequency had been requested before the fire).

Changes that were made immediately after the fire included:

• Personal alert safety system (PASS) alarms were issued. These were donated by a local business.
• A building construction course was given to all members.
• A citywide survey and catalog of all truss-roof buildings was completed and put into an early computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system.
• The department created a formal standard operating procedure (SOP) and safety committee.
• A safety officer position was established on an as-needed basis.
• A first-generation safety officer was sent to the National Fire Academy.
• The city hired civilian dispatchers to free up firefighters.
• Training and implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) was instituted at all incidents.
• Members met the need for increased training by attending conferences and training courses. Several members were sent to the National Fire Academy for advanced incident training.
• A fund-raising seminar taught by FDNY Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn was held.
• An officer was assigned to the rescue. Previously, the rescue operated as a second section of the ladder company.

In the mid-1990s, more changes were made as the department:

• Issued portable radios to all on-duty members.
• Implemented an accountability system. The tag system consisted of three levels — Level I, Level II (collected at working fires) and Level III (utilized at hazardous materials incidents and team searches).
• Printed daily riding assignments.
• Purchased new 4.5 self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) masks and cylinders.
• Established a full-time training officer.
• Issued personal SCBA facepieces.
• Assigned a full-time safety/training officer, weekdays only.
• Implemented the rapid intervention team concept.

Members of the Hackensack Fire Department killed in the line of duty during the Hackensack Ford fire on July 1, 1988:

• Captain Richard Leroy Williams, age 53, was a 24-year member of the Hackensack Fire Department. Appointed on July 1, 1964, Williams was promoted to lieutenant nine years later and on July 1, 1984, he was promoted to captain. He was survived by his three sons, Craig, Charles and Anthony, and a daughter, Lisa Williams Gonella; and his sister, Delores Stewart. His funeral was held on July 7 at Holy Trinity Church in Hackensack. Burial was at Calumet Park in Merrillville, Indiana.
• Lieutenant Richard Robert Reinhagen, age 48, was a 23-year member of the Hackensack Fire Department. Appointed in 1964, he was promoted to lieutenant in October 1981 and was a member of the Hackensack Fire Officers Association He was survived by his wife, Margaret Picariello Reinhagen, and his two children, Keith and Julie; his parents, Raymond and Elizabeth Reinhagen; and his three brothers, Raymond, Robert, and Ronald. His funeral was held on July 5 at Holy Trinity Church in Hackensack with a large contingent of city and area firefighters on hand. Interment followed at Hackensack Mausoleum in Hackensack.
• Firefighter William Kresja, age 51, was a 24-year member of the Hackensack Fire Department. He was appointed on July 1, 1964. He was a member of the Knights of Columbus of Maywood Council 3426 and the Hackensack Democratic Club. He was survived by his wife, Clara and three daughters, Diana Atwood, Ann Marie and Joanne; and his mother, Gussie Dahse Mehrtens, and his sister, Gail Denman. His funeral was held on July 6 at St. Francis Church in Hackensack. Following the service, a motorcade brought the casket of the fallen firefighter to George Washington Cemetery in Paramus, New Jersey for the interment ceremony.
• Firefighter Leonard Radumski, age 38, was a 14-year member of the Hackensack Fire Department. Appointed in 1974, he was a life-long resident of Bayonne, New Jersey and a U.S. Marine Corps veteran. He was survived by his parents, Stella and Leon Radumski and his daughter, Nichole; his sister, Barbara; and his two brothers, Edward and Thomas. His funeral was held on July 6 at Mount Carmel Church in Bayonne. Following the service, the motorcade brought the casket of the fallen firefighter to Holy Cross Cemetery in North Arlington, New Jersey for the interment ceremony.
• Firefighter Steven H. Ennis, age 30, was a 5-year member of the Hackensack Fire Department. Appointed in March 1983, Ennis was a member and shop steward for the Hackensack IAFF local. He was survived by his wife, Donna, and his son, Matthew; his parents, George and Joan Westwood Ennis; three brothers, George, Kevin, and Patrick, and two sisters, Kathleen and Elizabeth; and his maternal grandfather, Harry Westwood. The couple were expecting their second child later that year. His funeral was held on July 6 at Holy Trinity Church in Hackensack with a procession from the funeral home to the church by hundreds of area firefighters. Following the service, a motorcade brought the casket of the fallen firefighter to George Washington Cemetery in Paramus, New Jersey for the interment ceremony.

Thousands of firefighters from across the nation attended the funerals of the five fallen firefighters.

A memorial to the fallen firefighters is located in Fairmount Park in Hackensack. The memorial consists of five granite columns soaring towards the sky to honor each of the fallen members. Each year on the anniversary of the fire the members of the Hackensack Fire Department hold a remembrance service at the memorial in honor of the five lost firefighters.

The names of Captain Richard Leroy Williams, Lieutenant Richard Robert Reinhagen and Firefighters William Kresja, Leonard Radumski and Steven H. Ennis have been inscribed on the 1988 plaque displayed at the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial on the campus of the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

The site of the fatal fire remains in use today as an auto sales lot for a nearby Toyota dealership. There is no memorial marker at the site.

Commentary on Bowstring Trusses from Glenn Corbett:

The need for large, open floor areas, without the inhibiting presence of columns, is one of the most appealing reasons why building owners select trusses for their buildings. Supermarkets, bowling alleys, and automobile repair shops often use trusses, and, in particular, bowstring trusses. Bowstring trusses are named for obvious reasons. The shape of their curved tops chords and horizontal bottom chords resemble an archer’s bow and string. Two-by-fours are the minimum size for members of wooden bowstring trusses. To join them together, “split ring” connectors – metal plates embedded in the face of the truss through which bolts are passed to hold the truss together- are often used.

Beyond the normal fire hazards of trusses in general, one of the most dangerous aspects of a wooden bowstring truss is the large area in which smoke and heat from a fire can collect while still maintaining a “clear” fire/smoke condition at floor level below it. With the attachment of a ceiling to the bottom chord (as was the case in Hackensack), a heavy fire condition can be totally obscured from firefighters operating below.

It is of vital importance to firefighting operations at a building constructed with bowstring trusses that the presence of the truss is identified and that this information is relayed to the commanding officer and other firefighters on the fireground. Preplanning will greatly assist in this endeavor.

Determining the extent of truss involvement in fire is also very important. This determination in many cases will be guided by firefighters operating on the roof, rather than firefighters operating underneath the roof. Even without a ceiling attached to the bottom chord of a truss, smoke will often obscure the fire involvement of exposed trusses to the view of firefighters operating below.

Rapid failure and absence of forewarning typify this type of construction under fire conditions. Interior firefighting operations involving bowstring trusses require close coordination of companies, monitoring fire involvement in the trusses, and close observation of progress made by these companies by the fireground commander. A thorough discussion of firefighting operations in bowstring truss buildings is contained in Vincent Dunn’s Collapse of Burning Buildings and in Frank Brannigan’s Building Construction for the Fire Service, Second Edition. These should be consulted for complete information.

Commentary:

It is difficult to justify a long duration firefighting operation inside a structure with a timber truss roof. Firefighters should anticipate early collapse of the roof and subsequent failure of one of the masonry walls. One characteristic of long span timber trusses is that when they fail they often give no indication of impending collapse such as a spongy feeling in the roof surface or notable sagging of the bottom chord. Firefighters who have survived the collapse of a timber truss roof have reported that there was no warning and the failure was sudden and catastrophic. It is important to note the collapse times of notable long span timber truss fires. The Brooklyn Waldbaum’s supermarket roof collapsed 32 minutes after units arrived, the Hackensack Ford dealership roof collapsed 35 minutes after units arrived, and a 2010 fire in a former commercial laundry facility in Chicago collapsed approximately 16 minutes after dispatch. While collapse times can vary based on conditions, long span timber truss roofs fail catastrophically due to their size and nature. Although 35 minutes can seem like a lot of time, think about how long into the operation this really is. This means that at 20 minutes, progress could not have been substantial enough to warrant continued roof and interior offensive operations, which is now the rule of thumb for many departments in operational progress.

Long-span heavy timber truss roof systems have caused many firefighter deaths and injuries across North America during fire suppression operations:

• Nine firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a theater fire in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1894.
• Three firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in a partially vacant armory in Camden, New Jersey in 1906.
• One firefighter killed and another fatally injured in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in automobile dealership in San Rafael, California in 1950.
• Three firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in an automobile dealership in Chicago, Illinois in 1958.
• Two firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in an automobile dealership in Highland Park, New Jersey in 1958.
• Three firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in a bowling alley in Louisville, Kentucky in 1960.
• Five firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in a bowling alley in Cliffside Park, New Jersey in 1963.
• One firefighter killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in an automobile dealership in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1963.
• One firefighter killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in an automobile dealership in Eugene, Oregon in 1966.
• One firefighter fatally injured in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in a bowling alley in Chicago, Illinois in 1968.
• One firefighter killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in automobile dealership in Chicago, Illinois in 1975.
• One firefighter killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in a bowling alley in Lockport, Illinois in 1976.
• Six firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a supermarket fire in Brooklyn, New York in 1978.
• Two firefighters killed by the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in a synagogue in Valley Stream, Long Island, New York in 1979.
• One fire officer killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a warehouse fire in Yonkers, New York in 1984.
• Five firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in an auto dealership Hackensack, New Jersey in 1988.
• One firefighter killed in a backdraft collapse of a long span timber truss roof in a former iron foundry building in Baltimore, Maryland in 1995.
• Two firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in an automotive tire shop in Chicago, Illinois in 1998.
• One firefighter killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a warehouse fire in Lyndonville, Vermont in 1998.
• One firefighter killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in a commercial building in Los Angeles, California in 1998.
• Two firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in a commercial building in Moulton, Alabama in 2006.
• Two firefighters killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a fire in an abandoned commercial laundry building in Chicago, Illinois in 2010.
• One firefighter killed in the collapse of a long span timber truss roof during a theater fire in Abbotsford, Wisconsin in 2012.

There have also been numerous firefighter injury and near-miss incidents during fires involving buildings equipped with long span timber truss roof assemblies.

Although the lives of five firefighters were lost that day, we believe that their loss has not been entirely in vain. The Hackensack Ford Fire became a turning point for the North America Fire Service that has led to significant operational and equipment changes that have made the fireground a safer environment for today’s firefighters. Several legislative changes were enacted in New Jersey including a new law that required all buildings, except one- and two-family private dwellings, equipped with truss building components to display standardized retro-reflective truss recognition placards. Besides the passage of the state law requiring warning signs on buildings with truss construction, another 1991 state law required the state Bureau of Fire Safety to investigate all fires in which a firefighter dies or is seriously injured. Improvements in firefighting strategies, command and control procedures, radio equipment and protocols, and increased recognition of the hazards of truss construction are just a few of the improvements in the fire service that can be traced to this terrible event. The incident remains the largest loss of firefighter lives in a structure fire in the state of New Jersey.

We have attached photos and diagrams from the incident. Also, the link to a video documentary on the incident:

https://youtu.be/Sfb-D6-ALh8   

Link to the NJ Bureau of Fire Safety report:

https://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/dfs/reports/hackensack.pdf

Link to the NFPA report: http://web.archive.org/web/20110825181900/http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files//PDF/Research/DealershipHackensack.pdf

Link to Glenn Corbet’s 1988 Fire Engineering magazine article:

https://www.fireengineering.com/firefighting/fire-engineering-vault-hackensack-ford-fire/

We have also included the link to a video produced by Fire Engineering magazine with group members Paul T. Dansbach and retired Hackensack Deputy Chief Steve Kalman on the dangers of bowstring truss roofs: https://youtu.be/4dpou439s0g

We have also included the link to a recent BCFS Question of the Week article on long span timber truss roofs: https://www.facebook.com/groups/192218352449074/permalink/1540727084264854/

Thanks to multiple media sources of the content of this article.

Honor the service of Captain Richard Williams, Lieutenant Richard Reinhagen and Firefighters William Kresja, Leonard Radumski and Steven Ennis by touring and identifying occupancies in your local response district that have truss roof and floor assemblies with your crew members today.

Remember Fallen Brothers.

Get Out There And Know Your Local!!!