FIRE CHIEF KILLED BY BRICK PARAPET WALL COLLAPSE DURING AUTO REPAIR SHOP FIRE – TEAGUE, TEXAS – JULY 5, 2008

Fire Chief Killed by Brick Parapet Wall Collapse During Auto Repair Shop Fire – Teague, Texas – July 5, 2008 – NIOSH Firefighter Fatally Report F2008-21 & Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office Firefighter Fatality Investigation Report FY08-02

On July 5, 2008, City of Teague, Texas Volunteer Fire Chief Robert Knight was killed when he was struck by a collapsing brick parapet wall during a commercial structure fire in an automotive repair and upholstery business. The fire department was operating at the scene of a grass fire prior to being alerted to the structure fire. Chief Knight and two firefighters responded directly to the scene while two other firefighters went to the nearby station to pick up a structural engine. Upon arrival of the engine, Chief Knight stretched and operated an exterior hoseline on Side Alpha of the structure. Less than five minutes after arrival of the engine, a brick parapet wall collapsed, striking the Chief and burying him under brick debris. Rescuers quickly uncovered him, and medical treatment was started immediately. Chief Robert Knight, still conscious, was transported to a trauma hospital where he died several hours later. The area of origin of the fire was determined to be in the rear of the structure in the automotive painting area. The structure was filled with various automotive parts, upholstery, gasoline, oil, paint, solvents and other highly flammable materials that contributed to the fuel load. The fire quickly spread throughout the structure resulting in total involvement.

The structure involved in this incident was a one-story, Type V Wood Frame construction commercial structure containing a business that performed various automotive upholstery and repair work. The structure was built in the 1930s and had been renovated a number of times over the years. The structure was non-sprinklered and in a state of disrepair. It was constructed of wood framing covered by sheet metal on three sides. The structure measured approximately 40 feet wide on Side Alpha and extended approximately 140 feet back from the street. The structure contained an L-shaped addition of 34 feet by 40 feet on Side Charlie. The front wall was covered with a brick façade approximately 20 feet high that extended several feet above the peaked ridgeline, forming a parapet.  The structure was estimated to measure 12-15 feet from floor to roofline. The parapet wall was connected to the structure by metal bolts approximately 12 inches long.  The floor was a concrete slab. A rain awning extended out from the front wall approximately 36 inches and was supported from above by steel rods connected to the brick facade. The roof was a peaked roof constructed of sheet metal over traditional roof rafters.

The involved structure was located between a four-bay metal automotive shop building to the west, single-family residences to the east and south across Elm Street, and commercial buildings across an alley to the north. Multiple vehicles awaiting repair were located within the building, in front of the building parked at the curb, and adjacent to the west side of the building near the metal automotive shop. The fire and subsequent building collapse damaged or destroyed many of these stored vehicles. The City of Teague previously initiated code enforcement actions on the facility dealing with abandoned autos, rubbish, and general building condition.

Teague is a city located in the central part of Texas about 100 miles south of Dallas. At the time of incident, the city was protected by the Teague Volunteer Fire Department that served a population of approximately 6,000 residents in an area of approximately 144 square miles. The response area consisted of the City of Teague with approximately 4,500 residents as well as suburban, ranch and woodland properties. The fire department had 30 volunteer members including the Chief, an Assistant Chief, two captains, a lieutenant and a safety officer. The fire department operated two engines, two tankers, a heavy rescue vehicle, a brush truck, a utility truck, and a HazMat trailer from one station. The department responded to 254 total incidents in 2007 and 265 total incidents in 2008. Many members were out of town for the holiday weekend at the time the incident occurred, which limited the number of members available to respond.

At the time of the incident, the State of Texas allowed anyone over the age of 18 to become a volunteer firefighter. Specific training requirements were determined by each fire department. The Teague Volunteer Fire Department required Texas basic firefighter certification as part of the requirements for being a firefighter. The State of Texas offered state firefighter certification, roughly equivalent to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Level II Fire Fighter certification, through a number of accredited programs at universities and colleges across the state. Additional training provided by the department involved mostly hands-on training in basic firefighting operations, tactics, and procedures.

Chief Robert Knight had extensive fire service training including Fire Fighter I and II training from Texas A&M University; state certification as a volunteer, intermediate, and advanced volunteer firefighter; HazMat Technician certification; Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and Paramedic certification; and Texas Fireman’s and Fire Marshal’s Association 167-hour basic firefighter certification. The Chief had participated in a long list of training subjects including structure fires, ground cover fires, thermal imaging camera (TIC) operations, weapons of mass destruction, helicopter safety, landing zone security, hybrid vehicle extrication, tunnel rescue, fire behavior, origin and cause, and many other topics. Knight had 19 years of firefighting experience having joined the department in 1989 and became the Fire Chief in 1999.

At the time of the incident, weather conditions in the area included a temperature of 95 degrees F and a relative humidity of 30 percent. The sky was partly cloudy with light winds blowing from the southwest at approximately nine miles per hour. The weather conditions did not appear to be a significant factor in the fatal incident.

On Saturday, July 05, 2008, at approximately 1714 hours, the Teague Volunteer Fire Department was dispatched to a grass fire. Chief Robert Knight along with four firefighters responded in Tanker 96 and Brush Truck 97. They arrived at a grass fire of about ¾ of an acre in size at 1726 hours. Due to the holiday weekend, the availability of volunteer responders was limited. The grass fire was quickly brought under control and Chief Knight radioed Dispatch at 1730 hours that the fire was under control. As the crews were mopping up the grass fire, the fire department was dispatched to a reported structure fire at a local automotive repair business located at 509 Elm Street at 1805 hours. Chief Knight radioed Dispatch that Tanker 96 was enroute to the structure fire at 1806 hours with himself, a lieutenant and one firefighter onboard. Brush Truck 97 would not start and so was delayed in leaving the scene of the grass fire.

While enroute to the structure fire, Chief Knight radioed Dispatch and requested that the closest mutual aid department be dispatched. Three career EMS personnel, who were also trained firefighters, were on duty at the local career EMS department and responded to the scene in an ambulance, arriving first on-scene at 1809 hours. They did a size-up and reported to Dispatch that heavy smoke and fire was showing on Side Charlie and the entire structure was fully involved. They reported that several exposure buildings on Side Charlie were being threatened. It was unknown if this size up report had been heard by Chief Knight.

A firefighter was at the station waiting for the crews to return from the grass fire when he heard the dispatch for the structure fire. Another firefighter soon arrived at the station, and they departed to the structure fire in Engine 91 at approximately 1810 hours. The Engine 91 crew could see thick dense black smoke as they departed the station. They heard the EMS crew report over the radio that the fire was burning on Side Charlie. They drove past a hydrant located at the next corner west of the structure and decided not to connect to this hydrant as they would have to stretch their 5-inch supply line across the street which was one of the main north-south routes through town. The Engine 91 crew observed fire showing on Side Charlie as they pulled into an empty lot adjacent to Side Bravo of the burning structure. The three EMS personnel helped the Engine 91 firefighters stretch two 1¾-inch hoselines towards Side Charlie of the burning building.

One firefighter took the nozzle of one 1¾-inch hoseline down the alley to Side Charlie and protected the exposure buildings using tank water. Two of the EMS crew members began evacuating the exposure buildings due to the fire. One EMS crew member continued clear around the block while the other EMS member assisted with stretching the second hoseline to the rear. Note: Radio traffic suggests this took place in the time frame of 1818 to 1820 hours. It is unknown whether Chief Knight heard this radio traffic or knew that Engine 91 was on-scene.

The Tanker 96 crew with Chief Knight could see dense black smoke from the burning structure while enroute. The crew drove one block north of the structure fire as they originally thought the burning structure was a boarding house located on another street. They turned right and south one block then turned west to reach the front of the burning structure. At approximately 1815 hours, Chief Knight instructed the lieutenant and firefighter to return to the station, approximately five blocks away, on Tanker 96 to obtain an engine and structural firefighting gear. The Chief stated that he was going to do a 360-degree size-up of the structure that contained an automotive repair and upholstery business.

The lieutenant and firefighter observed that Engine 91 was on scene after they turned north on a side street as they drove to the station. They obtained Engine 92 and returned to the fire ground. The engine drove east passing a hydrant on the street in front of the burning structure. The lieutenant dismounted Engine 92 to connect the supply line to the hydrant while the firefighter positioned the engine on Side Alpha of the burning structure, facing east. Note: The rear portion of the structure along Side Bravo was not visible from the front. A number of items including trees, brush, vehicles, and other items restricted the view along both sides of the structure so that Chief Knight likely could not see the area where Engine 91 was positioned, and the Engine 91 firefighters likely could not see Chief Knight at the front. The Engine 91 crew was unaware that Tanker 96 had driven past the front of the building and dropped off the Chief.

A firefighter, who was the regular driver on Engine 91, arrived on scene in his privately-owned-vehicle and observed the lieutenant making the hydrant connection. The lieutenant instructed the firefighter to assist the Engine 91 crew as he took over pump operations so that the second 1¾-inch hoseline could be charged to knock down a grass fire that was threatening the exposure buildings across the alley.

Meanwhile, Chief Knight grabbed an SCBA from the engine and pulled a 1¾-inch hoseline to the front door, assisted by another firefighter who had just arrived on scene. The driver immediately engaged the pump, and the Chief began spraying water through the front door near the Alpha/Bravo corner of the structure. The water was briefly shut down when the supply line was connected and the hydrant opened, then Chief Knight resumed spraying water at the front of the structure. Note: It is not clear how much of a size-up was conducted. The Engine 91 crew and the EMS crew reported that they never observed Chief Knight on Sides Bravo or Charlie of the structure. They never spoke with the Chief on scene and were not aware of the Chief’s presence until after the wall collapsed.

Chief Knight and a firefighter discussed a possible entry into the structure. The Chief instructed the firefighter to don an SCBA, so she went to Engine 92 and quickly began to don an SCBA. An EMS crew member walked up to Engine 92 to tell the pump operator of the fire conditions on Side Charlie. Note: The pump operator and EMS crew member reported that they could feel the heat of the fire at the pump control panel. Another firefighter also reported that flames were visible above the parapet wall at this point. As soon as the lieutenant finished making the supply hose connection to the hydrant, he walked toward Engine 92 to grab an SCBA and assist Chief Knight. The lieutenant sized up the parapet wall as he approached the engine, and he did not detect any threatening conditions. The fire department photographer was walking past the front of the structure taking photographs. The photographer and another firefighter also reported looking at the parapet wall without detecting any signs of pending collapse. A photo examined later suggests full involvement and partial roof collapse at the time the photo was taken. Note: The fire had been burning for at least 18 to 20 minutes at this point.

At approximately 1822 hours, less than five minutes after Engine 92 arrived on scene and shortly after a water supply was established, the brick parapet wall at the front of the structure collapsed, just as the photographer and the lieutenant were walking past the side of Engine 92. Note: Chief Knight had shut off the nozzle and was facing Engine 92 waiting for a firefighter to return to the hoseline. He was positioned approximately 5-10 feet from the doorway. Chief Knight was struck by the collapsing wall, which buried him under brick debris. The collapse was witnessed by three firefighters, one EMS crew member and several civilian bystanders. Rescuers quickly uncovered Chief Knight and medical treatment was started immediately. Chief Knight, still conscious, was transported via ambulance to a nearby landing zone at approximately 1833 hours where he was transferred to a helicopter and flown to a trauma hospital. He died several hours later during surgery.

According to the County Coroner’s report, the cause of death for Chief Robert Knight was blunt force trauma to the chest, abdomen, and pelvis.

The area of origin was determined to be in the rear of the structure in the automotive painting area. This was based on the statements of witnesses who discovered the fire and the conclusions of the scene examination, and the determination is consistent with the extent of destruction of the structural components in this area. The mechanism of ignition could not be determined. The structure was filled with various automotive parts, upholstery, gasoline, oil, paint, solvents and other highly flammable materials that contributed to the fuel load. Fuel loads also included seven vehicles in various stages of repair or storage and many car parts, including plastics and foam materials. Small pathways were reportedly the means to walk through the building among the various materials and contents. The fire quickly spread throughout the structure resulting in total involvement.

NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the fatality:

• Failure to conduct a full 360-degree size-up of the incident site.
• Failure to recognize potential collapse hazards.
• Inadequate staffing to effectively and safely respond to a structure fire.
• Inadequate fireground communications.

Fire Chief Robert Leland Knight, age 42, was a 19-year veteran of the Teague Volunteer Fire Department and had served as Fire Chief since 1999. Robert began volunteering as a firefighter soon after graduating from Texas A&M University in 1988 and moved back to his hometown of Teague‚ where he worked as a railroad engineer and later a safety coordinator for Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad. He was also a licensed paramedic. He is survived by his wife‚ Teri; son‚ Trent and daughters‚ Layla and Laura; his brother‚ Lloyd and his wife Caprice; three nephews, Clay Knight of College Station and Casey & Corey Riggs both of Teague; mother-in-law, Sue Richards and father-in-law, Jerry Richards & wife Karyn all of Fairfield; one aunt, Elsie Rosseau of Tulia; two uncles, Jim Welborn & wife Helen of Mt. Home, Arkansas and Bob Welborn of Steamboat Springs, Colorado; his grandmother-in-law, Dell Terry of Fairfield; sister-in-law, Kathy McSwane & husband Will and their children Maysel and Cam of Teague; numerous other cousins and many, many friends. Funeral services for Chief Robert Leland Knight were held on July 9 at the First Baptist Church in Teague. Interment followed at Greenwood Cemetery in Teague.

Chief Knight was the driving force behind the construction of the new fire station built in 2006‚ which has since been named in his honor and is now called Robert’s House. A memorial statue has been placed in front of the station in his honor.

The name of Chief Robert Leland Knight has been inscribed on the 2008 plaque displayed at the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial on the campus of the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

Commentary:

One of the primary responsibilities of an incident commander is to maintain situational awareness of the fire and how it is affecting the structural integrity of the building. This process starts with conducting a proper 360-degree size up of the structure upon arrival. This examination should include the construction type of the building, the position of the exposures, the location and extent of the fire, and any unusual construction features or hazards. In this incident, if a proper size up of the building had been conducted, the height of the unsupported brick parapet facade on Side Alpha may have been recognized as a collapse hazard. While the NIOSH and state investigation reports make little mention of any occupants present in the structure, the level of involvement and arrangement of the flammable contents would have precluded conducting an interior primary search of the structure. At that point, defensive operations conducted outside the potential collapse zone should have been initiated.

We have attached photos of the incident and also the links to the NIOSH report and the investigation report from the Texas State Fire Marshal:

https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/163612

https://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/fire/documents/fmloddteague.pdf

We have also attached the link to an article by group member Sal Ancona on parapet wall failure published in Fire Engineering magazine:

https://www.fireengineering.com/fire-prevention-protection/firefighters-and-construction-parapet-wall-failure/

And we have also attached the link to a BCFS Question of the Week article posted on this group page on parapet walls: https://www.facebook.com/groups/192218352449074/permalink/1481729573497939/

Thanks to multiple media sources for additional information for this article.

Honor the service of Chief Robert Leland Knight by reviewing parapet wall collapse hazards and by touring any buildings in your local that feature unsupported parapet walls with your crew members today.

Remember Fallen Brothers.

Get Out There And Know Your Local!!!