Conflagration Sweeps City Killing At Least 16 Persons Including 11 Firefighters – The Great Fire of 1872 – Boston, Massachusetts – November 9, 1872
Submitted by Rick DeGroot
On Saturday evening, November 9, 1872, a devastating fire destroyed a large portion of downtown Boston, Massachusetts. The conflagration ranks among the costliest fire-related property losses in American history. The Great Fire of 1872 began at 7:20 p.m. in the basement of a commercial warehouse at 83–87 Summer Street. The first alarm was sounded from Box 52 was followed by numerous additional alarms and calls for assistance to towns throughout New England. Much of the financial district of the city was destroyed causing $73.5 million in damages (equivalent to $1.436 billion in 2019). The destruction to the buildings was valued at $13.5 million and the personal property loss was valued at $60 million. The devastation also killed at least sixteen people who died in the inferno, including 11 Boston area firefighters. Seventeen additional firefighters were injured during the fire which destroyed 930 buildings over 64 acres in an 18-hour period. Close to 1,700 firemen manning 100 pieces of apparatus from 30 towns in five states battles the blaze. Five civilians were also killed. the fire was believed to have started from an unknown origin in the basement of a warehouse on the corner of Kingston Street and Summer Street and spread rapidly to the combustible mansard roof which showered embers across the surrounding dry wooden rooftops of adjacent warehouses.
Boston at the time of the fire was the commercial and financial center of New England. The downtown area of the city had undergone rapid development in the years after the Civil War, but improvements, especially water mains, had not been upgraded during these years. Thousands of businesses of all types had quartered their operations in the downtown in the old city where the streets were narrow, and buildings were spaced closely together. In 1872, there was no strictly enforced building code in Boston. Many of the buildings were too tall for fire department ladders to reach the upper levels, and the water pressure from the small water mains was often insufficient for firefighters to extinguish flames on the roofs of the buildings. Thus, fires could easily spread from rooftop to rooftop, and across narrow streets. Many of the affected buildings were made of brick and stone, but with wooden interior framing. Also, wooden mansard roofs were a common architectural trend of the time period. The steep pitch of a mansard roof allows for more storage in the upper levels of a building. However, these roofs were flammable due to their wooden construction. Additionally, the warehouses of downtown Boston commonly stored dry materials in the eaves of the roofs, increasing the hazard. Merchandise stored in the attics of warehouses was not considered taxable inventory under the municipal code. Building owners in Boston had few incentives to implement fire safety measures. Structures were often insured above value or at full value. Arson to gain insurance money was common.
In 1852, Boston became the first city in the world to install telegraph-based fire alarm boxes. The boxes served as a fire warning system. If the lever inside of the alarm box was pulled, the fire department was notified, and the alarm could be traced back to the box via a coded signal so that firefighters were dispatched to the correct location. All of the fire alarm boxes were kept locked from when the system was installed in 1852 until after the Great Fire of 1872 to prevent false alarms. A few citizens in each area of Boston were given a key to the boxes, and all other citizens had to report fires to the key holders, who could then alert the fire department. In 1872, witnesses watched the fire spread before the area’s key holder was found and could unlock the alarm box to alert the fire department. Twenty minutes after the fire was first noticed, firefighters arrived on the scene.
In 1872, the apparatus of the fire department was comprised of 21 steam fire engines, each with a hose reel or “jumper”, 10 independent hose companies, 7 hook and ladder carriages, and 3 extinguisher companies. The companies were staffed by a force of about 475 men, 90 of which were permanent firemen that staffed the companies full time. The steamer companies were comprised of an engineer, fireman, and driver. The hook and ladder companies, the hose companies and the extinguisher companies were assigned drivers. The balance of the force were “call men,” that is members who responded from their homes or places of business upon the alarm of fire. The fire department used horses to pull their fire engines, hose wagons, and ladders. At the time of the 1872 fire in early November, the northeast United States was experiencing an epizootic equine flu that affected and weakened the horses. When John Damrell, Chief Engineer of the Boston Fire Department at the time, heard of the horse sickness, he preemptively hired an additional 500 men to replace the horsepower that would typically haul the engines and other equipment to the sites of fires. After the fire, the city commission in charge of investigating the fire concluded that the response time of the fire department was only delayed by a few minutes in the absence of the horses.
Chief Damrell had also told Boston officials that the existing water infrastructure in the downtown district was inadequate. He was told not to “magnify the needs of his department” after requesting funding for water infrastructure repairs. The existing water main pipelines were old and leaky, making the pressure in the mains lower than acceptable. The pressure was so low that the pipes could not produce enough force to reach the top floors and roofs of newer tall buildings. Also there were not enough hydrants throughout the city to adequately cover the surrounding buildings. As the fire spread, firefighters struggled to find hydrants with adequate water pressure. Also, the fire hydrant couplings were not standardized within Boston, making it more difficult for firefighters to connect their hoses and related equipment.
In the year before the Boston fire, Chicago suffered massive destruction and an estimated 300 casualties in the Great Chicago Fire. Chief Damrell, along with fire chiefs from various large cities, traveled to Chicago after the fire in an attempt to learn from the city’s mistakes. Like Boston, Chicago buildings were made primarily of wood and building codes were not enforced, making the densely developed neighborhoods susceptible to fire. General Phil Sheridan, in charge of military relief in Chicago post-fire, did not condemn the city’s use of gunpowder to blow up buildings to create firebreaks. In theory, a firebreak creates a gap in flammable material that serves as a barrier where the fire will run out of “fuel” to spread any further. However, many fire chiefs from Southern cities were firmly opposed to gunpowder-created firebreaks after having seen the destruction they caused in the Civil War. Chief Damrell returned to Boston and continued to request funding for improved water infrastructure and fire equipment.
It is believed that the fire began in the basement of a warehouse on the corner of Kingston Street and Summer Street, at approximately 83–85 Summer Street shortly after 7:00 p.m. In this particular area, most of the buildings were dedicated to retail or used as warehouses. The warehouse that first caught fire housed dry goods. From the basement, the flames spread to the wooden elevator shaft in the center of the building and moved up the floors, fueled by the flammable fabrics in storage. Finally, the building’s wooden mansard roof caught on fire and the flames were able to spread from rooftop to rooftop down the street. The heat become so intense that stone facades shattered. The fire spread through most of Boston’s financial district which later became known as the “burnt district.” The fire spread rapidly, creating its own energy or firestorm, due to the tremendous heat generated. Although many buildings were made of brick or stone, the window frames and other fixtures were made of wood, thus allowing the fire to communicate to nearby structures. The glow of the fire was noted in ships’ logs by sailors off the coast of Maine.
At 7:24 p.m., the first alarm was received from Box 52 at the corner of Summer Street and Lincoln Street. The first engine to arrive was Engine Company 7 from a station at 7 E Street. The first water on the fire came from Hose Company 2 of Hudson Street. By 8 p.m., all of Boston’s twenty-one engine companies were fighting the fire. Telegraphs were sent to surrounding towns requesting help, but the messages were delayed due to most telegraph offices already having closed for the night. Some cities sent steam engines by railroad, with many coming great distances, including from New Haven, Connecticut. Chief Engineer John Damrell was in command at the fire, but his attention was frequently interrupted by city officials seeking meetings to discuss strategy and the political impact of the fire. Eventually, support arrived from fire departments in every state of New England, except Vermont. Of these were two Amoskeag steamers from Manchester, New Hampshire. One was the first Amoskeag ever constructed (serial number 1), owned by the Manchester Fire Department; the other was the first self-propelled Amoskeag that the manufacturer sent down. Boston purchased the self-propelled steamer after the fire, impressed with its performance. The self-propelled steamer was the first one in use in the country.
During the fire, the narrow streets of Boston were packed with firefighters and their equipment as well as crowds of people. As building owners raced to retrieve valuables from their burning properties, looters ran in after them to collect whatever was left behind. Because the affected area was mostly commercial and not residential, spectators came from residential neighborhoods to watch the fire spread. Some historians estimate that over 100,000 bystanders watched the fire spread. The firefighters had to both extinguish the flames and keep people back from danger. Gas supply lines connected to streetlamps and used for lighting in buildings could not be shut off promptly. The gas still running through the lines served as fuel to the fire. Many of Boston’s gas lines exploded due to the fire.
As the fire spread, citizens asked Mayor William Gaston to authorize the use of gunpowder to blow up buildings in the path of the fire to create a firebreak. Mayor Gaston approved the creation of firebreaks and groups of citizens began packing buildings with gunpowder kegs. However, the firebreaks were not effective. Instead, they caused injury to the citizens involved and the flaming debris from the exploded buildings spread to surrounding buildings. Eventually, Chief Engineer Damrell had to force citizens to stop using gunpowder.
Citizens and firefighters alike worked to stop the fire. Along Washington Street, wet blankets and rugs were said to have been used to cover buildings to prevent the fire from spreading to the Old South Meeting House, the church in which the Boston Tea Party was planned. Some citizens and firefighters climbed to the roof of the meeting house to put out sparks. Most accounts of the fire credit the Kearsarge Engine 3 of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, with saving Old South Meeting House. A fixture since colonial days, the building was and remains an important symbol of Boston’s heritage and every effort was made to save it. The efforts to save this historic landmark finally halted the fire at the corner of Washington and Milk Streets, around midday on November 10.
Eleven Boston area firemen were known to be killed along with several civilians with the total deaths numbering between 13 and 20, depending on the source. Chief Damrell was heavily criticized and much of the blame for the fire was directed at him, despite his record of having sought improvements in the city’s fire safety infrastructure. Following the fire, a citizen-formed committee urged Boston to restructure the layout of roadways in the damaged areas. Boston officials approved of this proposal, and many downtown streets were re-established to be wider and straighter. Most notably, Congress Street, Federal Street, Purchase Street, and Harley Street were widened. The restructuring allotted space to establish Post Office Square at the intersection of Milk, Congress, Pearl, and Water Streets. Some of the rubble from destroyed buildings was moved into the harbor to expand Atlantic Avenue. Because over-insurance of buildings was common, many businesses had enough insurance money to begin rebuilding soon after the fire. In less than two years, Boston’s financial district was rebuilt.
In the rebuilding that followed the fire, land values of the “burnt district” increased, according to a study in American Economic Review in 2017. The forced reconstruction of the financial district brought about widespread, simultaneous building upgrades and updates, and many properties were rebuilt to suit the commercial nature of the district. The widening of roads and reassembly of land plots into larger parcels also contributed to the rise in land values.
A new committee, the Fire Commission, was established to oversee the Boston Fire Department and investigate the fire of 1872. John Damrell resigned from his position as chief engineer in 1874 in the wake of the Fire Commission’s investigation. He had served as chief engineer for eight years and worked as a professional firefighter in Boston since 1858. In 1874, Boston began replacing and repairing its water mains, one of Damrell’s main causes during his career. Damrell continued his career in firefighting and public safety. In 1873, he founded the National Association of Fire Engineers (NAFE, now called the International Association of Fire Chiefs, IAFC) and became the organization’s first president. He also served as a building inspector for the City of Boston.
While Damrell served as president of NAFE, the association published a list of eight fire safety concerns in building construction:
- Flammable and combustible building materials.
- Excessive height buildings, beyond the reach of ground ladders.
- Fire escapes.
- Water supply.
- Space between buildings.
- Corridors and open stairways.
- Fire alarms.
- Fire department.
Ironically, all of these fire safety concerns continue to be the focus of our fire prevention and protection efforts to this day.
In 1877, Damrell was appointed Boston’s building commissioner. He served the Department of Building Inspection for 25 years, until his son succeeded him. At the 20th Annual Convention of NAFE in 1892, Damrell is credited for Boston’s formally established limits of building height and area. At the time, Boston was the only American city with these limitations. In 1884, Damrell petitioned the association to create a more formalized building code during his presentation of Building Code Report at a NAFE convention. In 1891, The National Association of Commissioners and Inspectors of Public Buildings (NACIPB) was established by Damrell, and he served as the first president. He served a second term as president when he was re-elected at the organization’s annual conference in 1894. A standardized building code wasn’t established until 1905, the year of Damrell’s death, when the National Board of Fire Underwriters published its National Building Code.
Among the known dead firefighters were:
Boston Fire Department
- Foreman William Farry, age 37, was a member of Hook & Ladder Company No. 4 who was killed by falling walls during the fire. He was survived by his wife, Mary and was buried at Old Village Cemetery in Dedham, Massachusetts.
- Assistant Foreman Daniel Cochrane, age 41, was a member of Hook & Ladder Company No. 4 who was killed by falling walls at 168 Washington Street. He was married but burial details are unknown.
- Volunteer Firefighter Henry Alonzo Rogers, age 17, was a member of Engine Company No. 6. He was survived by his father, George A. Rogers, and his brother, James L. Rogers and was buried at Holy Cross Cemetery in Malden, Massachusetts.
- Volunteer Fireman Albert C. Abbott, age and burial details unknown.
Cambridge Fire Department
- Volunteer Firefighter Frank D. Olmstead, age 18, was a member of Engine Company No. 1. He was injured by a wall falling from the adjoining building striking him on the head. He was taken to Massachusetts General Hospital on a stretcher where he died. He was buried at Mount Auburn Cemetery in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Volunteer Firefighter William S. Frazer, age unknown, was a member of Hook & Ladder No. 1. His body was never recovered and a death certificate was never filed.
Charlestown Fire Department
- Firefighter Martin Turnbull, age unknown, was a member of Hose Company No. 3. His burial details are unknown.
- Volunteer Firefighter Albert C. Abbott, his age and burial details are unknown.
Malden Fire Department
- Firefighter Walter S. Twombly, age 21, was a member of Hose Company No. 2. He was a laborer by trade and was survived by his parents, Sims and Betsy J. Twombly. His burial details are unknown.
West Roxbury Fire Department
- Firefighter John Connelly, age 29, was a member of Hook & Ladder Company No. 1. He was survived by his wife, Margaret, and three young children, John, Honora and Nora. He was buried at Mount Calvary Cemetery in Roslindale, Massachusetts.
Worcester Fire Department
- Firefighter Thomas Maloney, age 20, was a member of Hook & Ladder Company No. 1. He was a machinist by trade and was survived by his parents, David and Julia Maloney. The entire fire department of the city turned out in uniform for his funeral held at St. Anne’s Church. The procession, which had escorted the hearse to the church, was again formed, and under the escort of the Worcester National band, accompanied the remains part way to St. John’s Cemetery, when part of the department turned back to be on duty in case of fire, while the members of Hook & Ladder Company No. 2, and delegations from other companies, followed to the gravesite.
The names of the eleven Boston area firefighters killed in the Great Fire of 1872 have been honored at the Massachusetts Fallen Firefighters Memorial located on the grounds of the State Capitol in Boston. The memorial features a larger-than-life bronze statue of three firefighters in search and rescue mode, weighing approximately 3,000 pounds and standing 10 feet tall. The statue is mounted on a marble Maltese cross and is surrounded by the Ring of Honor, where fire departments, associations, and families can honor deceased firefighters. The memorial also includes granite pavers engraved with the names of fallen firefighters, walkways, gardens, a water feature engraved with the Firefighter’s Prayer, and a ceremonial bell. Each year an annual ceremony is held on September 11 to honor the fire community and unveil the names that have been added that year.
Commentary:
Major conflagrations swept many of the cities and towns in North America during the mid-1800s to through the 1900s. Including the Chicago fire in 1871, conflagrations occurred in Portland, Maine in 1866, Vancouver, British Columbia in 1886, Seattle in 1889, Spokane in 1889, Jacksonville, Florida in 1901, Baltimore in 1904, San Francisco in 1906, Chelsea, Massachusetts in 1908 & again in 1973, and Atlanta in 1917. With the dawn of the American Industrial Revolution, many cities experienced rapid growth as the previously agrarian-based economy transitioned to a commercial base. This resulted in large mills, factories, foundries and warehouses being constructed in the center of cities along with commercial, mercantile, and warehousing occupancies and residential housing to serve the workforce population. Little thought was given to fire protection by city planners resulting a closely spaced structures, often constructed with combustible elements on narrow winding streets that made access for fire equipment difficult. Development often outpaced the capacity of the local water system. It is certainly no wonder given the right combination of dry weather conditions and high winds that vast sections of communities would be destroyed in fast moving blazes that quickly overwhelmed the often-meager local firefighting forces.
It is also telling that in many cases such as the Great Boston Fire of 1872 that fire leaders had warned well in advance of the likelihood of a catastrophic fire event in their jurisdictions. It was only after tremendous human and financial losses that North American society finally recognized the problem, and regulations and standards were adopted to guard against fire spread within our cities and towns. And it was only through the efforts of early visionary fire leaders like Boston’s Chief Engineer John Damrell that we today enjoy a reasonably fire safe environment in many of our structures. The battle, however, continues as new methods, materials and configurations of building construction must continue to be scrutinized to gauge the potential of uncontrolled fire spread in the built environment. It’s up us, the fire service leaders of today, to continue the legacy of our predecessors.
We have attached photos and maps of the incident. We have also attached a short video clip on the fire: https://youtu.be/e843NBIWjO8
Thanks to multiple media sources for the content of this article.
Remember Fallen Brothers.
Get Out There And Know The History Of Your Local!!!
