TWO FIREFIGHTERS DIE AND EIGHT FIREFIGHTERS INJURED IN SILO EXPLOSION AT LUMBER COMPANY – NEW KNOXVILLE, OHIO – OCTOBER 1, 2003 – NIOSH FIREFIGHTER FATALITY REPORT F2003-32

Two Firefighters Die and Eight Firefighters Injured in Silo Explosion at Lumber Company – New Knoxville, Ohio – October 1, 2003 – NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Report F2003-32

On October 1, 2003, New Bremen Ohio Firefighters Kenneth Jutte and John Garman were fatally injured in a silo explosion at a lumber company. The firefighters responded to a mutual aid call from the New Knoxville Fire Department already on the scene at the silo fire. Prior to the explosion, firefighters had opened some exterior hatches at the base of an oxygen-limiting silo and were flowing water through the hatch openings with a piercing nozzle. Firefighters were also flowing water into the top of the silo via an aerial apparatus. At the time of the explosion, one firefighter was standing on top of the silo and the other firefighter was in the aerial basket positioned beside the top of the silo. Eight other firefighters were injured during the explosion, two requiring hospitalization. Firefighters Kenneth Jutte and John Garman were transported to regional hospitals via ambulance where they were later pronounced dead.

The silo involved in the incident was located at the Hoge Lumber Company at 701 South Main Street in New Knoxville, Ohio. The facility employed 60 full time employees and produced various wood products including hardwood flooring for bowling lanes, architectural millwork, roof trusses and brooms. The silo was constructed in 1986 and was used to supply recycled waste wood material to an electrical boiler. The concrete silo was originally designed as an oxygen-limiting silo but was later modified. The silo was approximately 70 feet high and was 20 feet in diameter. The base of the silo had two doors, one on each side, to access the auger pit. The auger was used to unload the silo. The silo was normally filled with wood chips and sawdust from the plant. The roof of the silo had two round openings each measuring about two feet in diameter. The silo was filled pneumatically as wood chips were blown through a tube into the top of the silo through the center opening. The other opening had a cover that was not in place. On the day of the incident, the silo was filled to a depth of 21 feet with wood chips. The local fire department had conducted annual pre-planning for the facility and routinely responded to 1-2 calls per year to this facility. These calls included three fires in adjacent silos and small fires in the dust collection system. There were no previous fires in the incident silo.

There were two local fire agencies that were involved in this incident. The local fire agency was the New Knoxville Fire Department which had 23 personnel that served a population of approximately 2,300 to 2,500 within a rural area of about 45 square miles. The department served the community from a single station and received the majority of its funding through the township. The mutual aid agency, the New Bremen Fire Department, had 30 personnel that served a population of approximately 3,500 within a residential and industrial area of about 17 square miles. The department also served the community from a single station and received its funding through the city and township. Both fatally injured firefighters were members of the mutual aid department.

Area weather conditions on the morning of the incident included an air temperature of 38 degrees F and a relative humidity of 86% with a southwest wind at 8 mph under fair skies. The weather did not appear to be a significant factor in the outcome of the incident.

At 0650 hours on Wednesday, October 1, 2003, a lumber company supervisor directed a plant employee to check the silo because there was an odor of smoke in the vicinity. The employee went to the silo auger pit and quickly discovered the source of the odor when he opened the access door. The auger pit was filled with light smoke and there was a red glow seen within the silo through the auger port. He quickly exited the pit, shutting the access door on his way out, and reported to his supervisor that the silo was on fire

At 0657 hours, the lumber company called 911 to report that one of the silos was on fire. At 0701 hours, New Knoxville Engine 744 was in route with an officer and four firefighters. Engine 744 arrived at the lumber company at 0703 hours. Equipment Truck 743, Engine 745, and Tanker 742 also arrived within two minutes. (Note: The local fire station was less than a mile from the lumber company). Upon arrival, firefighters observed light white smoke coming from the top of the silo and moderate white/gray smoke through the bottom of the access doors. Engine 744 was positioned in the parking lot on the east side of the silo and the crew pulled a 1.75-inch hoseline to the northeast side of the silo. The crew of Engine 745 was put on standby to act as a backup.

The crews from Engines 744 and 745 entered the silo auger pit from the east. Two firefighters with a 1.75-inch hoseline inspected the auger pit and found some aerosol cans and a LP gas tank that they removed. Next they shut off the circuit breakers for the electric powered auger motor. The auger access door had warped opened due to heat and water was sprayed into the opening. Two other firefighters stood on standby on the east side with a charged 1.5-inch hoseline. Conditions within the auger pit were heavy smoke, little visibility and high heat. The metal auger access door was glowing red from intense heat and firefighters were successful in cooling down the metal. Burning wood chips began to fall from the auger access door and pile up on the pit floor.

Command was concerned that the fire would spread to other areas of the lumber company by burning embers and wanted to aggressively extinguish the fire. Command also wanted to inspect the fire conditions from the top of the silo. Since the silo did not have a cage on the external ladder, he determined that it would be unsafe for firefighters to climb to the top. At 0725 hours, Command requested an aerial apparatus, Aerial 6642, as mutual aid from the neighboring New Bremen Fire Department.

At 0728 hours, New Bremen Aerial 6642 was in route with an officer and five firefighters. When the aerial unit arrived at 0736 hours, the crew observed minimal white/gray smoke coming from the top and moderate smoke from the bottom doors of the auger pit. Command directed the aerial to position next to the silo on the north side. Command and two mutual aid fire officers (Note: Another mutual aid fire officer had previously arrived on scene via POV at 0725 hours) had a brief discussion and decided to extend the aerial to determine the structure of the top of the silo and the conditions within the silo. New Bremen Firefighters Ken Jutte and John Garman and a New Knoxville firefighter went to the top of the silo in the aerial basket and examined the silo’s condition for several minutes. The basket was brought down, and the firefighters had a conference with Command and reported that they could not see any flame or the surface of the woodchips within the silo due to the smoke.

At the same time the aerial was at the top of the silo, several firefighters attempted to unload burning wood chips from the auger pit using shovels and small baskets. Two positive pressure ventilation (PPV) fans were placed on the west side auger pit doors to remove heavy smoke coming from underneath the silo. The fans were blowing smoke out so entry could be made from the east. The manual unloading and use of PPV fans was abandoned after several minutes due to the lack of progress. The auger and other equipment at the base of the silo could not be used to unload the silo since the drive belt had been damaged by fire and the metal was warped from the intense heat. (Note: The electrical supply to the silo’s auger had also previously been shut off).

At 0815 hours, Command requested New Bremen Equipment Truck 6643 as SCBA air cylinders were beginning to run low. Truck 6643 had a cascade system for refilling air cylinders and arrived on scene at 0824 hours with four firefighters. Upon arrival, Command ordered Truck 6643 to park on the east side of the silo in the parking lot.

Command used a thermal imaging camera (TIC) to locate hot spots on the exterior concrete surface of the silo. Hot spots were identified on the east and west sides about 15 feet from the ground and were beginning to grow in size. Command decided to flow water into the top of the silo via the aerial. Engine 744 supplied water to the aerial with a 3-inch hoseline and Firefighter Jutte, Firefighter Garman, and a New Knoxville firefighter went to the top of the silo in the aerial basket. Jutte and the New Knoxville firefighter exited the basket onto the top of the silo. Garman remained in the basket. Jute made the hose connection to the platform water supply and ran a 50 foot section of 1.5-inch hose with a 1.5-inch distributing nozzle around the top of the silo. The New Knoxville firefighter lowered the hoseline into the access hole just as it was being charged. They sprayed water for about 5 to 10 minutes, and it is estimated that less than 1,500 gallons were pumped into the silo.

At the base of the silo, firefighters had opened a small exterior side hatch. They were pulling wood chips from the hatch and inserting a piercing nozzle supplied by a 1.75-inch hoseline from Engine 744. The hatch was located below a large hot spot observed with the TIC. A firefighter was using a pike pole to make a path for the piercing nozzle and another firefighter was inserting the 10-foot piercing nozzle into the hatch up through the wood chips. A third firefighter was assisting with the hoseline. Firefighters were alternating positions during this operation. Another firefighter was behind them manning a charged 1.75-inch hoseline as a backup.

Command instructed the aerial crew to change the nozzle to a straight bore and spray water in the southeast section of the silo based on the growing hot spots. Firefighter Garman shut the water off and the New Knoxville firefighter started pulling the hoseline out of the silo. He later recalled that the smoke was yellowish and remembered hearing a whooshing sound followed by a loud boom. At the base of the silo, a sudden burst of wood chips and smoke came out the hatch. This was described by firefighters as “like a jet engine taking off.” Other firefighters on scene reported hearing a “sucking” sound or a strange “expanding like” rush. Firefighters on the ground closest to the silo felt a concussion and the ground shake. Several firefighters at the base of the silo near the hatch were thrown to the ground from the force of the blast.

The explosion occurred in the silo at approximately 0850 hours. The top of the silo blew off and landed to the west. Firefighter Jutte, Firefighter Garman and the New Knoxville firefighter were thrown from the top of the silo and aerial basket and fell approximately 70 feet to the ground. Firefighter Jutte was found near the basket of a front end loader parked at the base of the silo. Firefighter Garman was found at the base of the west side of the silo. The New Knoxville firefighter fell into a garbage-filled dumpster which helped break his fall. Debris rained down on the scene, injuring eight other firefighters and two lumber company employees. After the debris had settled, firefighters recall hearing multiple personal alert safety system (PASS) alarms. Command ordered an accountability check and radioed for rescue units to come to the scene. Firefighters on the scene immediately began administering first aid to the injured.

Firefighter Ken Jutte and Firefighter John Garman were transported to regional hospitals via ambulance where they were later pronounced dead. A helicopter transported the New Knoxville firefighter who fell from the silo and another firefighter injured by falling debris to a regional trauma center. The New Knoxville firefighter who fell from the top of the silo was hospitalized with a broken arm and leg. The New Knoxville Fire Department had one firefighter hospitalized with a broken foot and four firefighters were treated and released from the emergency room. Two other firefighters from New Bremen were seen and released in the emergency room. Two plant employees from the lumber company were also hospitalized. According to the county medical investigator’s findings, the cause of death for both firefighters was multiple blunt force injuries.

According to the State Fire Marshal’s report, the origin and cause of the fire was heat generated from the friction of a belt on a pulley at the base of the silo’s auger, which ignited the combustible wood chips. The fire smoldered for several hours prior to the arrival of firefighters. The Fire Marshal concluded that the explosion in this incident was a combination of events that included “at a minimum a backdraft with ignition of the fire gases and a dust explosion of some degree.”

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

• Train officers and firefighters on the hazards associated with different types of silos and the appropriate firefighting tactics.
• Develop and implement standard operating guidelines (SOGs) for fighting oxygen-limiting silo fires.
• Ensure that pre-emergency planning is completed for silos within their jurisdictions.

Additionally,

• Facilities with oxygen-limiting silos should ensure the proper operation and maintenance of their silos.
• Municipalities should consider requiring an exterior placard with specific silo information for use during firefighting efforts.
• Silo manufacturers and research organizations should consider researching the causes and mechanisms of silo fires involving wood products and developing engineering approaches to reduce the risks to firefighters.

Members of the New Bremen Fire Department killed in the line of duty at the silo explosion at the Hoge Lumber Company in New Knoxville, Ohio on October 1, 2003:

• Firefighter Kenneth J. Jutte, age 44, was 19-year member of the New Bremen Fire Department. Ken was involved in the Rope Rescue Team and the HazMat Team. He was also involved in the New Bremen Rescue Squad for a number of years. He was a supervisor in charge of distribution at Crown Equipment Corp., New Bremen. He was survived by his wife, Martha; three children, Kyle, Kari, and Corey; his parents, August and Betty Hemmelgarn Jutte; four brothers, Jerry, Joe, Ed and Dave; and two sisters, Connie Dilbone and Jean Rammel. His funeral was held on October 4 at the Church of the Holy Redeemer in New Bremen with interment following at the German Protestant Cemetery in New Bremen.
• Firefighter John August Garman, age 40, was a 10-year member of the New Bremen Fire Department. He also served as the coordinator for fire prevention programs for the department and had conducted numerous fire safety presentations in the local schools. He was employed as a machine operator at Crown Equipment Corp. in New Bremen where he worked second shift. He was unmarried but survived by a large family of his parents, Charles and Erline Garman; two brothers, Tim and Keith; and three sisters, Sandy, Janet, and Amy; 16 nephews and niece; and was a companion to his dog, Pooka J. His funeral was held on October 6 at the Church of the Holy Redeemer in New Bremen with interment following at the German Protestant Cemetery in New Bremen.

In 2013 on the 10th anniversary of the silo explosion, a section of State Route 66 through New Bremen was renamed the Kenneth Jutte – John Garman Memorial Highway. At a ceremony attended by family, friends, firefighters, and municipal officials, a sign honoring the fallen firefighters was unveiled on the highway as it comes into New Bremen.

In 2018, a bronze statue of a firefighter was placed on the grounds of the historic Lock One of the Maimi and Erie Canal in the village of New Bremen to honor the two fallen firefighters, and all past, present and future volunteer firefighters and emergency personnel in recognition of the sacrifices they make in service to their communities.

The names of Firefighters Kenneth J. Jutte and John August Garman have been inscribed on the 2003 plaque displayed at the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial on the campus of the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

Commentary:

While many suburban and urban firefighters may never directly deal with a fire in an agricultural silo, there are plenty of industrial and manufacturing occupancies in all types of settings that have dust and air-borne particle collection systems that are vulnerable to similar types of fires and explosions. All firefighters should be aware of the hazards while operating at such occupancies. The recent tragic outcome of the fire and resulting explosion in a silo at a Searsmont, Maine lumber mill is evidence of need to train firefighters in the hazards of silo fires: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/firefighters/programs/pdfs/f202607.pdf

The United States Fire Administration, in cooperation with Federal Emergency Management Agency, issued a publication, warning officials on the dangers of fighting silo fires and offering educational tips to safely extinguish them. Since 1985, the USFA said in its 1998 report at least six firefighters have been killed in silo emergencies; three that were killed in a silo explosion in Marshallville, Ohio, two in a silo explosion in Georgia and another was asphyxiated in a grain storage facility in Iowa. We have attached a link to the report:

https://ocgov.net/sites/default/files/E911/Agriculture%20Emergencies/SiloFires-USFA.pdf

The link to the NIOSH report on the incident is here: https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/163744

Thanks to multiple media sources for additional information for this article.

Honor the memory of Firefighter Kenneth J. Jutte and Firefighter John August Garman by reviewing the report and recommendations of the USFA report and identifying silo and dust collection systems in your local response district with your crew members today.

Remember Fallen Brothers.

Get Out There And Know Your Local!!!