TWO FIREFIGHTERS DIE AFTER BECOMING DISORIENTED AND RUNNING OUT OF AIR DURING SHIP FIRE – NEWARK, NJ – JULY 5, 2023

Two Career Land-Based Firefighters Die After Becoming Lost and Running Out of Air During Marine Vessel Fire in Port – Newark, New Jersey – July 5, 2023 – NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Report 2023-10

 On July 5, 2023, Newark New Jersey Firefighters Augusto Acabou of Engine 16 and Wayne Brooks Jr. of Ladder 4 died after becoming disoriented and running out of air while conducting a fire attack during a marine vessel fire in port. At 07:00 hours, a large cargo vessel that transported vehicles commenced vehicle loading operations while dockside in Port Newark. At 21:00 hours, port workers and vessel crew members noticed a vehicle on deck 10 was on fire. Crew members immediately employed portable fire extinguishers and a shipboard water hoseline but were unsuccessful in controlling the fire. At 21:22 hours, after evacuating the cargo decks and activating the emergency ventilation stop, the vessel’s fixed carbon dioxide system was discharged for 10 minutes into cargo decks 6 to 11. The vessel’s crew members then formed fire teams and deployed hoselines to fight vehicle fires and conduct boundary cooling. At 21:25 hours, city fire department units were dispatched to a reported fire aboard the vehicle transport vessel. Four engine companies, three ladder companies, one rescue company and three chief officers responded on the initial alarm. The incident commander conferred with the vessel’s Chief Mate to obtain an update on the situation. Firefighters from Engine 27 and Ladder 4 entered decks 11 and 10 to assess the fire situation and report findings. They encountered heavy smoke conditions on deck 11 and active fire on deck 10. Firefighters discovered their fire department hose did not connect to the vessel’s hose stations and used the vessel’s hoses to extinguish vehicle fires on deck 10.

At 22:14 hours, Ladder 4’s captain noticed structural damage, including a twisted/warped steel I-beam, and left the deck to provide an update on the conditions. At 22:17 hours, Engine 16’s captain and Firefighter Acabou entered deck 10 and assisted Ladder 4 Firefighter Brooks with extinguishing multiple vehicles fires. Conditions rapidly deteriorated and all three firefighters were ordered to withdraw. While evacuating, Engine 16’s captain realized he was no longer in contact with the other firefighters. At 22:23 hours, a Mayday was called by a firefighter stating they were lost. Ladder 5 and Rescue 1 were deployed to deck 10 to search for the missing firefighters. Engine 16 Firefighter Acabou was located by Ladder 5 and Rescue 1 at 22:40 hours. From 22:41 to 23:58 hours, firefighters from several companies rotated in and out on deck 10 to facilitate the rescue of the trapped firefighter who was pinned between two vehicles. Mutual aid resources were requested and began to arrive on-scene. Ladder 4 Firefighter Brooks was located on deck 10 at 02:08 hours the next day, July 6, 2023. Both firefighters were removed from the vessel and pronounced deceased upon arrival to the hospital. At 06:40 hours, all onboard firefighting efforts ceased, and the vessel’s crew abandoned the ship. The fire was finally extinguished by a private team of salvors/marine vessel firefighters on July 10, 2023. Fire investigators determined that the fire started when the transmission overheated in a “pusher vehicle” that was being used to move inoperative vehicles onto the vessel. The fire then spread to other vehicles on the cargo deck.

The vessel involved in this incident was the Grande Costa D’Avorio, a 692-foot roll-on/roll-off (ro/ro) vessel that had a crew of 28, was built in 2011, and flagged in Italy. Ro/ro vessels are specially designed ships that carry automobiles and other vehicles. Their construction can include low overheads, numerous decks, and straight and flat sides. Ro/ro ships often carry containers on deck in addition to vehicles. On the day of the incident, the vessel was in port to load approximately 920 used vehicles for export, an approximately 15-hour process. The vessel regularly transported used vehicles via transatlantic crossings from ports on the East Coast of the United States to ports on the African West Coast. The vessel’s crew members were foreign nationals, and English was not their primary language. This language barrier posed a communication challenge throughout the incident.

The vessel had 12 decks. In the front half of the vessel, vehicles were stored internally on decks 1-5 and cargo containers were stacked in the open on deck 6 for transport. In the rear half of the vessel, vehicles were stored internally on decks 3-11, and in the open on deck 12 for transport. Vehicles were loaded using a rear/stern ramp that led up to deck 3. During this incident, responding firefighters accessed the vessel to the incident fire decks via:

• The rear/stern ramp from the dock to deck 3.
• Walking forward on deck 3 to the starboard ladderwell.
• Climbing the starboard ladderwell from deck 3 to deck 11.
• Exiting the starboard ladderwell at deck 11 and accessing an external set of stairs to deck 12. (necessary because the ladderwell did not extend to deck 12).
• Traversing from the starboard side across deck 12 to the port side.
• Accessing the port ladderwell and descending to decks 11 or 10 (incident fire location).

Firefighters were guided along this route by the vessel’s crew members. Vessel crew members directed use of the starboard ladderwell, instead of the port ladderwell, because this route was specified in the vessel’s fire control and safety plan as the fire emergency route. This route was specified because the starboard ladderwell was “blind,” absent of openings, onto decks 7-11. The lack of openings ensured that a door/hatchway could not be left open on those decks allowing smoke or fire to spread into the ladderwell. While this was a protected route, it required firefighters to travel a much longer distance to reach decks 10 and 11. The port ladderwell did provide direct access to decks 10 and 11 and was used during the fire department’s firefighting actions. The vessel’s steel structure impeded radio transmissions throughout the incident.

The vessel had a fixed, low-pressure, carbon dioxide fire suppression system. This type of system was used as an alternative to a water-based sprinkler system. Water-based systems release large amounts of water and may cause operational and stability issues if the water is not properly controlled by pumps. The carbon dioxide was stored in a liquid state in a refrigerated tank in a dedicated compartment in the mechanical space in the lower rear decks of the vessel. The carbon dioxide could be manually released when warranted via a network of piping and diffuser nozzles running throughout the vessel. The vessel was organized into six fire protection zones for the carbon dioxide suppression system. Zones A-C (cargo decks) were designed to have carbon dioxide discharged for 10 minutes to reach the intended concentrations for effective fire suppression. The remaining zones for the steering gear, engine, and separator rooms were designed to have carbon dioxide discharged for two minutes to reach the intended concentrations. The primary controls for the system were in the carbon dioxide room on deck 3 and controlled the discharge of carbon dioxide into any of the six zones. Secondary controls for discharge into Zone A-C were located behind the navigation bridge on deck 12, and secondary controls for discharge into the steering gear, engine, and separator rooms were located at the Cargo Control Room on deck 3. The decks where the fire was located were in zone C, which included decks 6-11 in the rear half of the vessel.

When released into a space, carbon dioxide displaces the oxygen, lowering the levels to a point where combustion can no longer take place. To achieve the necessary concentration of carbon dioxide in a space it must be sealed to prevent carbon dioxide from escaping and fresh air from entering. Within this vessel, this was accomplished by shutting down the ventilation system and closing the weathertight doors (WTDs) that provided access to the vehicle ramps and decks in the rear half of the vessel.

The vessel maintained a fire alarm system, fire pumps, and dry chemical fire extinguishers. The vessel’s crew members were trained in firefighting on the vessel. This included the use of boundary cooling tactics which is the process of flowing water from hoselines on the vessel’s hatchways, decks, and bulkheads to cool the steel to preserve structural integrity.

The cargo was comprised of used vehicles such as sedans, trucks, and vans. The vehicles were loaded using three methods based on their operational condition. Fully operational vehicles were driven directly onto the vessel by a port-based worker. Vehicles that were not fully operational, but with functional steering and braking, were pushed on the vessel using a “pusher vehicle.” These pusher vehicles were regular vehicles that were modified to add a push bar on the front. Vehicles that were not fully operational or lacked steering or braking were loaded with heavy equipment. The vehicles were loaded via the rear/stern ramp which led to deck 3. From there, they were driven up a series of ramps that connected the decks to the location where they were stored and secured for transport.

The City of Newark is the most populous city in New Jersey and the seat of Essex County. The city is part of the New York/New Jersey metropolitan area and is located about ten miles west of Manhattan. The city hosts Newark Liberty International Airport and is one of the nation’s major air, shipping, and rail hubs. Port Newark–Elizabeth Marine Terminal, a major component of the Port of New York and New Jersey, is the principal container ship facility for goods entering and leaving the New York metropolitan area and the northeastern quadrant of North America. Located on Newark Bay, the facility is run by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Its two components, Port Newark and the Elizabeth Marine Terminal (sometimes called Port Elizabeth) sit side by side within the cities of Newark and Elizabeth, New Jersey, just east of the New Jersey Turnpike and Newark Liberty International Airport. As of 2004, the facility was the largest on the U.S. East Coast and the second-largest in the country.

The city and the port area are protected by the Newark Fire Department that has a 25 square mile jurisdiction, serves a population of 300,000 residents, and annually responds to an average of 16,700 calls. The fire department’s jurisdiction consists of varying structures and occupancy types in a dense urban area. The response area also includes multiple waterways and one of the largest commercial shipping ports on the east coast. The fire department’s fire suppression division operates 16 engine companies, 8 ladder companies, and 2 rescue companies across 16 fire stations. Each company is typically staffed with four personnel with a minimum of three based on overall department staffing levels. The stations are organized into four battalions with each battalion supervised by a battalion chief and the overall shift under the leadership of a tour commander/deputy chief. Shifts operate on a 24-hour schedule followed by 72-hours off-duty.

Area weather conditions on the night of the incident included an air temperature of 84 degrees F and a relative humidity of 65% with variable winds at 8 mph with no precipitation under fair skies (Weather Underground 2023). Note: The NIOSH report did not indicate if the weather conditions were a factor in fire development or the outcome of the incident.  

On the morning of Wednesday, July 5, 2023, the Grande Costa D’Avorio arrived at the port in New Jersey. The vessel was scheduled to load approximately 920 used vehicles at this port location, in a process that would take approximately 15 hours. At approximately 07:00 hours, the vehicle loading operation began with port based workers loading the vehicles onto the vessel under the oversight of the vessel’s crew members. At 20:58 hours, a pusher vehicle, operated by a port-based employee, pushed an inoperable sedan steered by another port-based employee up the rear/stern ramp of the vessel. The worker operating the pusher noted that it started to operate erratically and created an unusual noise.

At approximately 21:00 hours, the pusher and the sedan arrived on deck 10. Upon arrival, several port workers and some of the vessel crew members began to yell that the pusher was on fire. The pusher operator witnessed flames coming from under the front half of the vehicle and the engine compartment. The operator exited the pusher and noticed that fire was “dripping down” onto the deck from the underside of the vehicle. The pusher operator retrieved a portable dry chemical fire extinguisher from the bulkhead of the vessel and attempted to extinguish the fire. The vessel’s fire alarm was then activated. The vessel’s Chief Mate and another crew member who observed the fire also started using portable dry chemical fire extinguishers to fight the fire. Crew members also employed a shipboard water hoseline but were unsuccessful at controlling the fire. At 21:22, after evacuating the involved cargo decks and activating the emergency ventilation stop, the vessel’s fixed carbon dioxide system was discharged for 10 minutes into cargo decks 6 to 11. The vessel’s crew members then formed fire teams and deployed hoselines to fight vehicle fires and conduct boundary cooling. The crew members attempted to secure the vessel’s four large hydraulically operated watertight doors (WTDs) but they were unable to secure one of the WTD doors due to a malfunction. The door was designed to secure Zone C on deck 12 at the top of the ramp coming up from deck 11. Crew members reported that there was heavy black smoke and heat coming out of the unsecured WTD. Further attempts at fighting the fire by the crew were ineffective and all port-based workers were withdrawn from the fire area.

At 21:24 hours, Dispatch received a call from the Port Authority Police Department advising there was a fire aboard the ro/ro vessel. At approximately 21:25 hours the fire department dispatched Engines 5, 14, 16, & 27, Ladders 4, 5, & 8, Rescue 1, Battalions 4 & 5, and Deputy 1 (tour commander). While the fire department units were responding to the scene, several conversations took place between Deputy 1, Dispatch, and the Port Authority. The Port Authority advised that there were 5-6 vehicles on fire. Dispatch requested the vessel’s cargo manifest from the Port Authority. Deputy 1 requested to have Engine 27 respond to the scene via Fireboat 2. However, Engine 27 (staffed with 3 personnel) arrived on the scene at 21:32 hours and did not respond with the Fireboat. Engine 27’s captain and a firefighter proceeded up the rear/stern ramp to deck 3. Engine 27’s driver/operator stayed with the apparatus.

Around this time, the majority of the vessel’s crew members were on deck 11 providing boundary cooling and on deck 12 fighting the vehicle fires. At the top of the ramp from the dock to deck 3, the Engine 27 firefighters were met by crew members and a Port Captain (a port-based worker who assisted with the loading operations) to discuss the operational details. The Port Captain escorted the Engine 27 firefighters to the starboard ladderwell and guided them up to deck 11. They were met by the vessel’s Third Mate at deck 11 for a status update.

At approximately 21:35 hours, Battalion 5 arrived on-scene and assumed Command of the incident. He staged at the top of the rear/stern ramp on deck 3. He made a request through Dispatch to have the vessel crew members bring the vessel’s manifest and blueprints to him. Battalion 5 then met with the Chief Mate who provided an update. The Chief Mate advised that the fire had started in vehicles on deck 10 and that the carbon dioxide suppression system had been discharged into the deck spaces. Language barriers between the crew members and Battalion 5 resulted in an inadequate exchange of information.

At 21:36 hours, Engine 27’s captain advised the Third Mate that they wanted to enter deck 11 to assess the situation. The Third Mate repeatedly advised that the carbon dioxide system had been discharged into the space and that an SCBA would be required to enter it safely. The Engine 27 firefighters donned their SCBAs and entered deck 11 on the starboard side just outside of the starboard ladderwell. They searched across deck 11 from the starboard to port side, walked up the vehicle ramp from deck 11 to deck 12, and then returned to deck 11 and the original point of entry. Engine 27’s captain noted that deck 11 was full of heavy smoke, but they did not identify any active fire. He reported this information via radio to Battalion 5. The Engine 27 firefighters moved up to deck 12 where the vessel’s crew had just finished extinguishing the vehicle fires on the deck.

At 21:41 hours, Deputy 1 arrived on-scene and assumed Command from Battalion 5. This transfer of command was communicated via radio traffic as Battalion 5 left the area and transitioned to deck 12 when Deputy 1 arrived. A crew member escorted Battalion 5 to deck 12, via the starboard ladderwell, and assumed command of operations. Once on deck 12, Battalion 5 met with and spoke to the Vessel Captain (VC) who advised that he had accounted for all the vessel’s crew members. The VC also advised Battalion 5 that the fire had originally started on deck 10 and that the carbon dioxide suppression had been released on decks 6-11.

At 21:42 hours, Engine 27’s captain reported to Battalion 5 that there was no fire on deck 11 and that the vehicle fires on deck 12 had been extinguished. This message was also relayed via radio to Deputy 1. At approximately 21:43 hours, Battalion 4 and Ladder 4 arrived on-scene and checked in at the rear/stern of deck 3. They were advised by Deputy 1 to report to deck 12. While traveling up the starboard ladderwell, Battalion 4 opened the hatchway on deck 6 to check the conditions. He was immediately overcome by the carbon dioxide coming out of the deck. He was able to shut the hatchway back and regain his breath before losing consciousness. He regained consciousness and was assisted away from this location.

Between 21:44 and 21:46 hours, Engine 27 firefighters used the port ladderwell located at the rear/stern of deck 12 to access deck 11 and noted that the conditions were unchanged since their last check. After this, they experienced low air in their SCBAs and returned to deck 12 to change out their SCBA cylinders. At 21:47 hours, Dispatch advised Deputy 1 that mutual aid resources, including a fireboat unit, was responding. Deputy 1 responded to Dispatch that they would not be needed and could be canceled. Dispatch confirmed the request and canceled all mutual aid resources.

At 21:49 hours, Battalion 5 provided an update to Deputy 1 via radio. He noted that he was with the VC on deck 12, the crew members had hoselines in place, and the fire was knocked down. Additionally, he noted that the fire started on deck 10 and that the compartments were sealed, and the carbon dioxide system was deployed. They were sending Engine 27 firefighters to check decks 11 and 10. Deputy 1 acknowledged and noted that he sent Ladder 4 to deck 10.

At 21:50 hours, Engine 27 advised Battalion 5 that the vessel crew members had multiple hoselines in operation on the top deck, but there was no active fire on that deck. Although the vessel crew members were conducting boundary cooling on decks 12 and 11 per their training, the Engine 27 firefighters did not understand this process, which caused confusion as to why they were flowing water without any active fire. Battalion 5 responded to Engine 27 and requested they check the conditions on deck 10. Engine 27 responded they could not because they were out-of-air and were going to change their cylinders out. Battalion 5 then radioed Ladder 4 and asked them to check deck 10.

Around this time, Battalion 4 reached deck 12 and conducted a face-to-face briefing with Battalion 5. They decided that Battalion 4 would station himself at the port ladderwell to lead operations on decks 10 and 11. Battalion 5 would remain at the staging area on deck 12 closer to where crews were coming out of the starboard ladderwell on deck 11 and then making the transition up to deck 12.

At 21:52 hours, Battalion 5 provided Deputy 1 with an update that the vessel held 5,000 vehicles, he had two confirmed fires, with the one on deck 10 not being verified. Deputy 1 acknowledged the update. At approximately 21:53 hours, Engine 27 traveled back down the port stairwell and opened the hatchway to access deck 10. At 21:54 hours, Engine 27 radioed to Battalion 5 that there was heavy smoke on deck 10. They entered deck 10 and started checking it for fire.

At approximately 22:00 hours, the vessel’s Chief Mate and Bosun reported to the WTD on deck 12. They determined that given the improvement in conditions and reports of no fire on deck 11, they could attempt to close the WTD. An attempt was made to close the door, but a fault/malfunction light appeared on the control panel indicating that the door would not operate. They decided to cease and consider other options.

At 22:04 hours, Engine 27 advised Battalion 5 that they had an active fire condition on deck 10 and they needed to get a hoseline in place for fire attack. During this timeframe, the hatchway from the port stairwell leading into deck 10 was left open allowing fresh air to flow into deck 10. Battalion 5 acknowledged the request and advised Engine 27 to secure a hoseline from one of the vessel’s teams operating on deck 12. Battalion 5 and Battalion 4 confirmed there was fire on deck 10 with Battalion 4 advising Deputy 1 that they had confirmed that there was fire on deck 10.

Between 22:06 and 22:12 hours, there were requests for firefighters to bring additional lengths of hoseline to deck 12. The original plan was to connect the fire department hose to the vessel’s hose station so that a hoseline could be extended from deck 12 to deck 10 for fire attack. Once the firefighters attempted to connect the fire department hose to the vessel’s hose station, they realized that the hose fittings were not compatible. The vessel’s hose was a 1½ metric diameter with an international coupling.

Due to the incompatibility, additional lengths of hose were then brought by vessel crew members and connected to a hoseline already in use from a hose station towards the rear/stern of deck 12. Working together, the firefighters and crew members deployed the operational hoseline to deck 10. Once there, Engine 27 firefighters deployed it into deck 10 and initiated fire attack on the original vehicles which had reignited. Once the fire was knocked down, they left the hoseline in place and exited deck 10 via the port ladderwell.

At approximately 22:14 hours, Battalion 4 ordered Ladder 4 to enter deck 10, follow the hoseline that Engine 27 left in place, and provide a status report on conditions. At this time, Battalion 4 was stationed in the port ladderwell at the entrance to deck 10. Ladder 4 followed the hoseline into deck 10 with the smoke conditions getting heavier as they advanced further into the deck. When they reached the nozzle, there were small pockets of fire left in the vehicles, which they extinguished. Ladder 4’s captain assessed the situation using a thermal imaging camera and noted that the steel I-beam directly above the fire’s location was twisted/warped and there was a significant amount of heat in the ceiling. Ladder 4’s captain tried to relay this information to Battalion 4 via radio, but the radio transmission failed due to interference from the vessel’s steel structure. Ladder 4’s captain noticed firefighters from Engine 16 in the vicinity, and he decided to follow the hoseline back to the deck 10 hatchway to alert Battalion 4 of the situation face-to-face. Ladder 4 Firefighter Wayne Brooks remained to ensure the fire was extinguished.

At approximately 22:17 hours, Battalion 4 ordered Engine 16’s captain and Firefighter Augusto Acabou to enter deck 10 and assist Firefighter Brooks as needed. They entered deck 10, followed the hoseline to the nozzle where they found Firefighter Brooks working to overhaul the burning vehicles. At approximately 22:18 hours, Ladder 4’s captain reached the deck 10 hatchway and reported on the warped I-beam and high ceiling heat level conditions. Battalion 4 relayed to Deputy 1 that there were multiple vehicles on fire, the fire had been knocked down, and they were mopping up. Deputy 1 acknowledged the report. Standing in the port ladderwell, Ladder 4’s captain realized that the soles of his fire boots had separated and that his feet were possibly injured. He advised Battalion 4 of the situation, who told him to evacuate back up to deck 12.

The other two members of Ladder 4 entered deck 10. They followed the hoseline, stopping several times along the way to straighten the hoseline, which was tangled up. They reached the area where Engine 16 and the other Ladder 4 firefighters were operating. They then worked to overhaul the burning vehicles. They observed no additional fire but recognized that the smoke and heat levels were rising. Concerned about their air supply, two of the Ladder 4 firefighters returned to the hatchway and provided Battalion 4 with an update.

At 22:19 hours, Engine 16’s captain advised via radio that they were on the hoseline with Ladder 4 and were going to push on as there was no additional fire at that time. At the same time, a Ladder 4 firefighter reached the hatchway and advised Battalion 4 of the deteriorating conditions. Hearing that the vessel’s structure had possibly been impacted by the fire and that smoke and heat conditions were deteriorating, Battalion 4 requested Engine 16 to withdraw from deck 10. Battalion 4 made multiple radio transmissions from 22:20 to 22:22 hours ordering Engine 16 to bring the hoseline back out. Engine 16 did not respond to any of these radio calls.

At 22:22 hours, Dispatch also attempted to reach Engine 16 with no response. While Battalion 4’s order to withdraw was not acknowledged on the radio, Engine 16’s captain heard one of the transmissions and advised Engine 16 firefighter and Ladder 4’s Firefighter Brooks to withdraw. Engine 16’s captain ordered the Ladder 4 firefighter, who was experiencing a low air alarm on his SCBA, to lead the group out followed by the Engine 16 firefighter. The group began following the hoseline back out of deck 10 in zero visibility conditions.

While waiting in the port ladderwell for the Engine 16 and Ladder 4 firefighters, an event occurred within the decks that forced heavy black smoke and heat out of the deck 10 hatchway and into the ladderwell. This caused the conditions in the ladderwell to rapidly deteriorate, forcing the firefighters there to evacuate. Some of the firefighters evacuated upward to deck 12 and others evacuated down the ladderwell. Battalion 4 left the port ladderwell and went to meet Battalion 5 on deck 12 to tell him what happened.

At 22:23 hours, Engine 16’s captain, who was verbally and physically guiding the firefighters out, realized that he was no longer in contact. At that time, he came to a loop/pile of hose and was struggling to maintain his orientation on the hose. He made a Mayday call alerting that he was separated from his firefighters and disoriented. Due to the steel structure of the vessel, this Mayday call was not captured by the radio communication system. A firefighter then made a Mayday call stating, “We cannot find our way out. We are lost.”

At 22:24 hours, Dispatch called Battalion 4 and Deputy 1 requesting confirmation that they heard the Mayday. Deputy 1 replied “Negative,” and Dispatch advised that a firefighter reported that he could not find his way back out. An additional radio transmission was made by Engine 16’s firefighter with the first part being inaudible and the final part being, “We are lost.” Engine 16’s captain, while disoriented on the hoseline, traveled in a constant direction, which he believed was the direction of the port ladderwell. He reached the port bulkhead and followed it back to the hatchway at the port ladderwell. He took the ladderwell back to deck 12 and alerted Battalions 4 & 5 of the situation. Dispatch then sounded the radio emergency alert tones to alert on-scene personnel of the Mayday. For the next several minutes, there were numerous radio transmissions made by firefighters and Dispatch to determine the details of the Mayday, and which firefighters needed assistance.

At 22:30 hours, DC1 requested a PAR (personnel accountability report), with the responses being:

• Engine 5, Engine 14, Engine 27, Ladder 5, Ladder 8, Rescue 1, Battalions 4 & 5 and Deputy 1 had PAR.
• Engine 16’s firefighter was missing.
• Ladder 4 was missing two firefighters.

Dispatch advised Deputy 1 that there were four firefighters, two from Engine 16 and two from Ladder 4, who were still missing. The two firefighters from Ladder 4, who were being reported as missing, had traversed down the port ladderwell when the smoke and heat rushed out into the ladderwell at 22:22 hours. They ultimately made their way down and out of the ladderwell onto deck 3. Those firefighters attempted to respond to the PAR via radio, and eventually one of them advised that they were evacuating and that Engine 16 Firefighter Acabou and Ladder 4 Firefighter Brooks were in distress on deck 10.

At 22:32 hours, Deputy 1 advised via the radio that Ladder 5 and Rescue 1 had been deployed as a Firefighter Assist and Search Team (FAST). Deputy 1 also requested a progress report on the fire from Battalion 5 and requested additional units from Dispatch. At 22:34 hours, Deputy 1 requested an update from Battalion 4 who advised that Ladder 5 was entering deck 10 following the hoseline in place and that he had a backup crew ready to go behind them. Deputy 1 acknowledged and advised that all personnel entering should use a rope. At 22:35 hours, Engine 10 and Engine 29 were dispatched. Deputy 1 advised Dispatch that he had the two missing Ladder 4 firefighters at the staging area. At 22:36 hours, Battalion 5 confirmed accountability with Deputy 1 that all personnel were accounted for except Firefighter Augusto Acabou of Engine 16 and Firefighter Wayne Brooks of Ladder 4.

At approximately 22:34 hours, two members of Ladder 5 entered deck 10 and began searching for the two missing firefighters. The other two members of Ladder 5 stood by in the port ladderwell. Conditions were heavy smoke with zero visibility, but there was no active fire on deck 10. They followed the hoseline to the nozzle. Once they reached the nozzle, they attached a search rope to one of the burned out vehicles and continued their search efforts. At that time, they heard a personal alert safety system (PASS) alarm sounding nearby. Using a thermal imaging camera to help navigate through the maze of vehicles, Ladder 5 moved towards the sound of the PASS. After traveling approximately 35-40 feet from where the search rope was secured, they located Firefighter Augusto Acabou of Engine 16 who was in an upright standing position, wedged between an SUV and truck. He was unconscious and did not respond to voice commands. His helmet was off and his facepiece was partially off of his face. Ladder 5 worked to remove the unresponsive Firefighter Acabou from between the vehicles. A member of Ladder 5 utilized a rapid intervention kit to place a facepiece on Acabou to provide an active air supply, but he remained unconscious and unresponsive throughout the process.

From approximately 22:37 to 22:40 hours, Battalion 4 requested via radio for Ladder 5 to withdraw from deck 10. Several inaudible transmissions were heard on the radio at that time. At 22:40 hours, Ladder 5 advised via radio that they located a firefighter and needed help. Between 22:41 to 23:58 hours, multiple firefighters from several companies rotated in and out on deck 10 to facilitate the rescue of Firefighter Acabou. The rescue teams were forced to cut the lashing straps holding the vehicles in place and utilize battery powered hydraulic extrication tools to move the vehicles enough to free the trapped firefighter. Throughout this rescue period, Firefighter Acabou was supplied breathing air via the rapid intervention kit. This was an extremely resource and labor-intensive operation due to the challenges of moving the needed equipment onto the vessel, to the staging area on deck 12, and to the rescue operations of deck 10. This was also a challenging rescue operation in terms of air management as the fire department utilized 30-minute SCBA cylinders. Multiple replacement SCBA cylinders were moved to the staging area on deck 12. The fire department’s mobile cascade was out-of-service during this incident.

During this period, the fire department focused all of its personnel and resources towards the rescue of Firefighter Acabou and did not carry out any firefighting operations anywhere on the vessel. While there was no active fire on deck 10, the fire continued to grow on deck 11. At 22:49 hours, there was an attempt to place a fire department aerial ladder to deck 12 to facilitate the removal of the missing firefighters once they were recovered. At 22:54 hours, based on the Mayday calls, Chief 1 self-dispatched and arrived on-scene and reported to deck 3 and spoke with Deputy 1. Chief 1 did not assume Command.

At 23:06 hours, the vessel’s crew members discovered that the fire was rapidly developing on deck 11, leading to vehicle fires reigniting on deck 12. The crew members continued boundary cooling and fire suppression activities. Boundary cooling resulted in water pooling on the surface of deck 12 which began to boil and produce steam to the point where personnel were sustaining burns. This forced the firefighters on deck 12 to seek refuge at locations out of the water, including taking shelter in or on top of the vehicles stored there.

At 23:17 hours, the VC discussed the option of discharging the carbon dioxide fire suppression system again in Zone C with Deputy 1 and Chief 1. Deputy 1 decided not to allow the discharge out of fears that it would negatively impact the search and rescue operations. Based on the inability to use an aerial ladder to reach deck 12 and the coming challenge of removing the missing firefighters from deck 10, they decided that a technical rope rescue operation was warranted.

At 23:13 hours, Chief 1 contacted Dispatch and requested the response of mutual aid resources, the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Rescue from a neighboring fire department. Chief 1 also requested a second rescue for rapid intervention. Based on this call, the rescue companies that made up the UASI Rescue, along with their Incident Management Team, began responding to the incident. A third alarm was dispatched at 23:18 hours for additional personnel and resources to support the search & rescue operations which included Engine 18, Ladder 6, Ladder 7, and Battalion 3. At 23:35 hours, Chief 1 requested an update on the responding UASI rescues and Dispatch advised that mutual aid resources from two fire departments were responding. Chief 1 requested the response of a rescue from an additional mutual aid fire department. Following this request, the first mutual aid resources arrived on-scene and reported to staging.

At 23:36 hours, Battalion 4 advised Deputy 1 that he had spoken to the vessel’s crew members, and he had confirmed that a crane on the forward/bow end of deck 12 on the starboard side could be used to lower the missing firefighters to the dock. At 23:41 hours, the first arriving mutual aid rescue company was sent to deck 10 to assist with the rescue operations. At 23:45 hours, Battalions 4 & 5 requested that the vessel’s ventilation system be turned back on. The intent was to remove smoke and heat from deck 10 to aid the search and rescue operations. The VC contacted the Chief Engineer and advised him to reopen the dampers and restart the exhaust fans. Battalion 5 also had a hatchway in the front/bow part of deck 11 on the starboard side opened. While these efforts did initially improve the smoke and heat conditions on deck 10, they ultimately fed fresh air to deck 11 which rapidly intensified and spread the fire.

At 23:47 hours, Deputy 1 confirmed the plan to use the crane to transport the firefighters and at 23:49 hours confirmed that there was fire on deck 11. Between 23:50 and 23:55 hours, a PAR was conducted with the following results:

• Engine 5, Engine 6, Engine 10, Engine 14, Engine 18, Engine 19, Engine 27, Engine 29, Ladder 5, Ladder 6, Ladder 7, Ladder 8, Ladder 11, Rescue 1, Battalions 1,4, & 5 had PAR.

At 23:57 hours, Battalion 4 advised Deputy 1 that the crane was ready for operations, and Firefighter Acabou was freed from between the vehicles at 23:58 hours. He was immediately carried up the ladderwell to deck 12. This labor-intensive process took approximately 10 minutes. When the unresponsive firefighter reached deck 12, he was placed in the bed of a truck to avoid the scalding water pooling on the deck. EMS crews, who had been forward staged on deck 12, attempted lifesaving procedures.

At 00:16 hours, a Mayday was called by Engine 10 for firefighters with the mutual aid rescue in the port ladderwell at deck 9. These firefighters ran out of air and were suffering from smoke inhalation. Members from another mutual aid rescue responded to the Mayday and began evacuating the firefighters down the port stairwell. This Mayday caused some confusion for Deputy 1, when it was cleared as some on-scene personnel believed this was the lost firefighter.

At 00:20 hours, calls were made by Battalion 5 to shut down the exhaust system. The exhaust fans were discharging smoke directly out onto deck 12, impacting all firefighters staged and operating there. The vessel’s crew members responded to those calls and shut the exhaust system down. At 00:30 hours, the UASI Rescue group requested assistance from an additional mutual aid fire department that had specialized personnel and equipment for technical rescue and marine vessel fires.

At 00:45 hours, firefighters carried the Engine 16 firefighter across deck 12 to the starboard side of the vessel and placed him into a stokes basket. The vessel’s crew members used the vessel’s provision crane to lower the Engine 16 firefighter to the pier where he was transported by EMS to the hospital and pronounced deceased.

At 00:49 hours, the search continued for the missing Firefighter Brooks of Ladder 4. Deputy 1 sent companies to the port and starboard ladder wells to search for possible areas of refuge. At 00:52 hours, Deputy 1 ordered all companies off the vessel to regroup. At 01:01 hours, Battalion 1 advised Deputy 1 that all personnel were off of decks 10, 11, and 12. From approximately 01:08 to 01:20 hours, a PAR was conducted with all units confirming PAR with the exception of Ladder 4.

At 01:14 hours, it was decided that the UASI rescue companies would serve as a rescue branch under the overall incident command. A UASI rescue branch command post was established on the dock. They began organizing the arriving UASI Rescues, ensuring that they were all issued UASI portable radios for common communications. They ensured that the companies, when possible, were utilizing 60-minute SCBA cylinders. They also ensured that personnel entered the vessel with search ropes. At approximately 01:15 hours, a mutual aid fireboat arrived on scene and stood by next to the vessel. At 01:27 hours, the first of the UASI Rescue companies entered the vessel with a Rescue Operations Chief and proceeded via the port ladderwell to deck 8 where a new staging area was established. From 01:30 to 01:45 hours, the vessel crew unsuccessfully attempted to use several different mechanical/physical techniques to close the WTD on deck 12. The crew members also continued to perform boundary cooling on deck 12 as the fire on deck 11 gained intensity.

From approximately 01:43 to 01:48 hours, the first UASI search operation occurred on deck 10 for the missing Firefighter Brooks. Throughout this search, rescue companies were staged as the rapid intervention company on deck 8. Rescue companies were able to search approximately 100 feet into deck 10. From approximately 01:48 to 01:58 hours, the second UASI search operation deployed two rope search lines, one closer to the port side and one closer to the starboard side. The search ropes were deployed approximately 150-200 feet, making it to about the mid-point of the deck. At the end of their search, an “explosion” occurred above them on deck 11, blowing debris down onto deck 10. After hearing the explosion, they evacuated deck 10.

Throughout the first two search operations there were no signs of Firefighter Brooks’ location. At this point, the UASI search operations had covered approximately the rear/stern half of deck 10. Throughout these search operations, the fire was burning on deck 11 pushing heat and smoke down onto deck 10. At no time during the search operations was there any fire on deck 10. At 01:59 a PAR was conducted for the UASI companies for which all personnel were accounted.

From approximately 02:00 to 02:09 hours, the third UASI search operation took place. They searched deck 10. UASI Rescue 5 split into two teams following the two search lines previously deployed. The team operating on the rope closest to the starboard side found a discarded firefighter flashlight. They took this as a possible sign that the missing firefighter could be in the area. When that team reached the end of the original search rope, they heard a PASS device sounding. They deployed an additional rope search line approximately 75 feet in the direction of where the PASS was sounding. At 02:08 hours, Rescue 5 located the missing Firefighter Brooks. He had his SCBA on, but his facepiece was not in place and he was unresponsive.

The Rescue 5 officer attempted to notify command via radio and activated the emergency alert button on his radio. However, he received no response. The Rescue 5 officer then followed the search ropes back to the port ladderwell where he provided the rescue operations chief with an update. Along with another rescue company, Rescue 5 started the process of removing the downed firefighter. Firefighter Brooks was initially placed in a stokes basket for removal, but the basket continued to get caught on objects as they tried to move. So, Brooks was carried by firefighters until they reached the area closer to the rear/stern of the vessel, and then he was placed back in the stokes basket. The removal process from deck 10 took approximately 15 minutes.

At 02:24 hours, additional mutual aid resources were taken out of staging at deck 8 and assigned to assist with the removal of Firefighter Brooks. A rope rescue mechanical advantage system had been rigged in the ladderwell to assist with the movement of the downed firefighter up from deck 10 to deck 12. At 02:35 hours, the Rescue Branch Operations Chief provided a progress report that the downed firefighter was being moved from deck 10 to 12 via a stokes basket using a manpower intensive operation. From 02:38 to 02:46 hours, the UASI Rescue Branch conducted PAR with all units being accounted for. At 03:01 hours, the Rescue Branch Operations Chief provided a progress report that the downed firefighter was being rigged for lowering by the vessels crane. At 03:06 hours, Firefighter Brooks was on the dock and turned over to EMS. He was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased.

Once the Mayday operations were cleared, all firefighting operations ceased on the vessel. The fire continued to grow on deck 11 and spread to decks 12 and 10 for the next several hours. At approximately 05:40 hours, the VC requested that the fireboat, which had responded via mutual aid, direct their master streams onto the vessel’s exterior and deck 12 for boundary cooling and fire extinguishment. All onboard firefighting efforts were ceased at 06:40 when the vessel’s crew abandoned the ship. The fire continued to burn out of control for the next five days, ultimately involving decks 7-12 in the rear half of the vessel. The fire was finally extinguished by a private team of salvors/marine vessel firefighters on July 10.

The origin of the fire was determined by the ATF National Response Team to have been from the deck 10 pusher vehicle. The vehicle had been used throughout the day to push disabled vehicles onto the vessel. The ATF investigation determined that the transmission in the vehicle overheated, which resulted in the release of flammable transmission fluid. Several witnesses described fire “dripping down from under the vehicle” consistent with this finding. The fire was ruled as accidental. At approximately 21:00 hours, the fire initially developed in the pusher vehicle and then transitioned to the vehicle that was being pushed. The fire then spread primarily upward via:

• Direct flame contact that traveled through the lashing holes in the deck ceiling/floor.
• Convection traveled through the lashing holes in the deck ceiling/floor and up the vehicle loading ramps from deck to deck.
• Conduction as the steel structure was heated and the heat was transferred to the combustible/flammable components of the vehicles.

Throughout the Mayday search and rescue efforts from approximately 22:23 to 03:00 hours, the fire grew and spread through the vehicles on the deck 11. There were no efforts made by the responding fire departments to extinguish the fire on deck 11, which raised the temperature of the floor on deck 12 to a point where personnel could no longer stand on the deck for any period of time without the risk of sustaining burns.

NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the fatalities:

• Pre-planning for marine vessel fires.
• Training on marine vessel firefighting.
• Coordination with marine vessel fire response efforts.
• Request and use of mutual aid resources.
• Unified command with marine vessel representatives.

According to the Coroners’ report, the cause of death for Firefighters Augusto Acabou and Wayne Brooks was industrial fire injuries which included smoke inhalation with high levels of carboxyhemoglobin, heat exposure, and severe pulmonary edema, pulmonary congestion, and edema.

The NIOSH report made several recommendations:

Fire departments should:

• Recommendation #1: Develop and maintain a comprehensive pre-fire plan for marine vessels per NFPA 1405, Guide for Land-Based Fire Departments that Respond to Marine Vessel Fires.
• Recommendation #2: Train fire officers and firefighters in marine vessel firefighting.
• Recommendation #3: Coordinate with marine vessel crew members and fire teams.
• Recommendation #4: Request and utilize mutual aid resources for all marine vessel incidents, such as fires, as early in the incident as possible.
• Recommendation #5: Establish and maintain unified command with marine vessel representatives throughout the incident.

A preliminary investigation by the Coast Guard and NIOSH indicated that the Newark Fire Department “had little to no maritime firefighting training, experience or familiarization with cargo ships of any type,” according to a Coast Guard safety alert issued on November 20, 2023. Commander Christian Barger, chief of inspections and investigations for the Fifth Coast Guard District, said witnesses will testify during hearings, which ran through January 2024. Those who testified included crew members from the ship, dockside cargo handlers, and firefighters.

“This incident is a stark reminder of the significant hazards faced by first responders and maritime personnel every day,” Commander Barger said. He said the hearings aim “to meticulously examine the circumstances surrounding the causes of the fire and the subsequent deaths of Firefighters Acabou and Brooks so that we can help prevent future incidents and make the shipping and port communities safer.” While seeking the cause of the fire, the inquiry will not seek to affix blame to anyone, Barger said. It will instead issue safety recommendations beyond those included in a November alert. That guidance recommended that local fire departments and ports establish regular shipboard firefighting education and training, including language translation capabilities for non-English-speaking crews.

Members of the Newark Fire Department killed in the line of duty at the Grande Costa D’Avorio ship fire on July 5, 2023:

• Firefighter Wayne M. “Bear” Brooks Jr., age 49, was a 16-year member of the Newark Fire Department assigned to Ladder 4. Born on June 3, 1974, in Glen Ridge, New Jersey and raised in Irvington until his family relocated to Newark, he graduated from St. Benedict’s Prep in 1992. Wayne was an exceptional student and a successful athlete. He was a member of the first minority Sabre fencing team, “The Gray Bees,” to make it to the Junior Olympics, representing St. Benedict’s. In his early years, he went on to pursue a career at Continental Airlines, now known as United Airlines, where he worked for over 29 years. In those years he held many positions, with his current position as a member of the Move Team. His life goal was to serve his community. Wayne made the decision to take the Newark Firefighter and Police examinations, where he achieved top scores in both, making him a sought-after recruit for both departments. After much consideration, knowing he had family members serving in law enforcement, he decided to make the brave decision to become a professional firefighter, graduating first in his class. Wayne was known for his culinary skills throughout the Newark Fire Department, where he often prepared large meals for his colleagues that were Top Chef worthy. Wayne was a devoted family man, leaving behind his wife, Michele Brooks; children, Taylor Brooks and Dasia Vaughn; mother, Linda Brooks; brother, Jason Brooks; sister, Tiffany Brooks; nephew, Kaiden Brooks; and niece, Skylar Davis. His funeral was held on July 14, 2023, at the Cathedral Basilica of the Sacred Heart in Newark. Thousands of area firefighters attended the service to pay their respects to their fallen comrade. Cremation was private.
• Firefighter Augusto Domingos “Augie” Acabou, age 45, was 10-year member of the Newark Fire Department assigned to Engine 16. Augie was a lifelong resident of Newark, born and raised in the Ironbound section. He graduated from East Side High School in 1996. Augie found employment with HMH JFK Hospital in 1997, first in the linen department and later transitioning into a security officer position, which he held until his death. In 2013, Augie graduated with Class 43 as a Newark firefighter, settling into a position with Engine 16. He was posthumously promoted to captain. Acabou was the devoted and loving son of Manuel and Maria (Da Cunha) Acabou; beloved brother of Joao Acabou and his wife, Marlie, and Miguel Acabou; cherished uncle of James Acabou; loving grandson of Augusto Da Cunha. He is also survived by his life partner, Cynthia Gulics, and her daughter, Gillian; uncles, aunts, cousins, friends, and fellow firefighter brothers. His funeral was held on July 13, 2023, at the Cathedral Basilica of the Sacred Heart in Newark. Thousands of area firefighters attended the service to pay their respects to their fallen comrade. Entombment that followed was private.

Two city firehouses in the Ironbound section of Newark have been dedicated to the memory of the fallen firefighters. Bronze plaques have been affixed to the front of the quarters of Engine 16 & Ladder 8 on Ferry Street in honor of Firefighter Augusto Acabou and the front of the quarters of Engine 27 & Ladder 4 on Elm Road in honor of Firefighter Wayne M. Brooks Jr.

The names of Newark Firefighters Augusto “Augie” Acabou and Wayne M. Brooks Jr. have been inscribed on the 2024 (2023) plaque displayed at the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial on the campus of the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

Commentary:

Fighting shipboard fires are low-frequency, high-risk operations for most fire departments. Agencies that have port facilities within their local response districts should provide training and specialized procedures and equipment to their members should they be expected to respond to these types of incidents. Shipboard firefighting poses unique and significant challenges for firefighters. Tactics that are often applied during structural firefighting can be used in many cases in shipboard firefighting, however there are specific tactics for ship fires that must be learned. Ventilation of below deck areas can be difficult and sometimes may not be possible. Fires in cargo holds may generate tremendous heat and dense smoke that cannot be released by traditional horizontal and vertical ventilation techniques. Battling an advanced fire in a compartment in a steel hulled vessel has been likened to entering into an oven. Vessel stability also needs to be addressed as water runoff from fire streams may cause the ship list before it sinks or rolls over suddenly. In most cases the fire will have to be attacked from a defensive position, often from several vantage points. Land-based firefighters rarely have the previous experience and expertise to handle a fire deep below deck on a ship and must rely on crew members and any shipboard fire extinguishment systems to aid in the firefight. The materials that are burning must be quickly determined and the best course of action may be to seal the burning compartment in hopes that starving the fire of oxygen may cause the blaze to diminish or be extinguished. Local firefighters should seek the assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard, the local port authority or a professional marine firefighting/salvage company before overcommitting fire personnel on a burning ship.

We have attached photos and diagrams from the incident. We have also attached the link to the NIOSH report: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/firefighters/programs/pdfs/face202310.pdf

We have also attached an article published in Fire Engineering magazine by Wayne Gatchell reviewing the basics of shipboard firefighting: https://www.fireengineering.com/firefighting/shipboard-firefightingthe-basics/

We have also attached an article published in Fire Engineering magazine by Corey Wilson on response tactics for ship fires: https://www.fireengineering.com/firefighting/is-your-fire-department-prepared-for-shipboard-firefighting/

Thanks to multiple media sources for additional content of this article.

Honor the service of Newark Firefighters Augusto Acabou and Wayne Brooks Jr. by studying the basics of shipboard firefighting and by touring a commercial vessel in your local response district with your crew members today.

Remember Fallen Brothers.

Get Out There And Know Your Local!!!