TWELVE FDNY FIREFIGHTERS PERISH IN FLOOR COLLAPSE DURING DRUG STORE FIRE – THE 23RD STREET FIRE – MANHATTAN, NEW YORK – OCTOBER 17, 1966

Twelve FDNY Firefighters Perish in Floor Collapse During Drug Store Fire – The 23rd Street Fire – Manhattan, New York – October 17, 1966

Submitted by Rick DeGroot

On October 17, 1966, a fire in the basement of a commercial occupancy in the Flatiron District of Manhattan, New York claimed the lives of a dozen firefighters of the New York City Fire Department (FDNY). It was a most tragic and mournful day that touched the heart and soul of every member of the department. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, the incident was the greatest loss of firefighter’s lives at a single incident in the history of the FDNY. Every rank except for the rank of captain was touched by this tragedy: one deputy chief, one battalion chief, two lieutenants, and eight firefighters were killed, one of which was a probationary firefighter. The scourge of “renovated buildings” played a major role in this cataclysmic event. The cause of the fire which started in the basement of an adjacent building remains unknown. The incident would come to be known as the 23rd Street Fire.

The structure involved in the incident was a four-story Type III Ordinary Construction brownstone-type mixed occupancy building with an art dealer studio occupying the basement, first, and second floors. The third floor was occupied by a lamp company and the fourth floor was the residence of the Brown family. Note: a brownstone is a term used in North America to refer to a townhouse clad in brown sandstone that was historically a popular building material. The structures are usually from 3 to 6 stories in height and may have commercial spaces on the lower floors. A typical architectural detail of brownstones in and around New York City is the stoop, a steep staircase rising from the street to the entrance on what amounts to almost the second-floor level. This design was seen as hygienic at the time many were built because the streets were so foul with animal waste.

Manhattan is geographically the smallest and most densely populated of the five boroughs that make up the City of New York. The borough of 22.83 square miles of land area had a population of 1,694,251 according to the 2020 U.S. Census. Manhattan has been described as the cultural, financial, media, and entertainment capital of the world. The borough consists mostly of Manhattan Island, bounded by the Hudson, East, and Harlem Rivers. The Flatiron District is a neighborhood in Manhattan named after the Flatiron Building, a unique wedge-shaped building at the junction of 23rd Street, Broadway and Fifth Avenue. Generally, the Flatiron District is bounded by 14th Street, Union Square and Greenwich Village to the south; the Avenue of the Americas and Chelsea to the west; 23rd Street and Madison Square to the north; and Park Avenue South and Gramercy Park to the east. At the time of the incident the area was occupied by many commercial shops and stores along with high-rise office and residential buildings. Many of the side streets are lined with mixed-use brownstones with residential apartments over ground floor commercial occupancies.

Today the Borough of Manhattan is protected by the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) which consists of 17,321 career firefighters, EMS personnel and support staff that serve a population of about 8 million residents in the city of approximately 321 square miles. The department staffs 254 fire stations within 14 divisions in 53 battalions operating 197 engine companies, 143 ladder companies, 8 squad companies, 5 rescue companies, 450 ambulances, 1 HazMat company, 1 USAR company, 10 wildland units and 3 fireboats. The FDNY is the largest municipal fire department in the United States, and the second largest in the world after the Tokyo Fire Department. Call volume in fiscal year 2023 was more than 1.8 million calls for service including 23,901 structural fires, 12,594 non-structural fires, 233,320 non-fire emergencies, and 1.6 million emergency medical calls including 605,140 life-threatening medical emergencies.

The Flatiron District of Manhattan is protected by fire units from the First and Third Divisions:

• Engine 14 – 14 East 18th Street – 0.4 miles from the fire building.
• Engine 3, Ladder 12, Battalion 7 – 150 West 19th Street – 0.7 miles from the fire building.
• Engine 1, Ladder 24 – 142-46 West 31st Street – 0.7 miles from the fire building.
• Engine 16, Ladder 7 – 234 East 29th Street – 0.7 miles from the fire building.
• Ladder 3, Battalion 6 – 108 East 13th Street – 1 mile from the fire building.
• Squad 18 – 132 West 10th Street – 1 mile from the fire building.

Area weather conditions on the evening of the fire included an air temperature of 52 degrees F and a relative humidity of 61% with a brisk west wind at 14 mph under mostly cloudy skies (Weather Underground). Note: Research by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has shown wind speeds on the order of 10 to 20 mph are sufficient to create wind-driven fire conditions in a structure with an uncontrolled flow path (Madrzykowski and Kerber 2009). It is unknown if the windy weather conditions on the evening of the fire was a factor in fire development and the outcome of the incident.

Herb Brown, his wife Marion, and their four children lived in an apartment on the top floor of a four-story brownstone at 7 East 22nd Street in Manhattan. The first and second floors of the building housed Brown’s art gallery and frame shop, and the third floor was occupied by a lamp store. At approximately 9:30 p.m. on Monday, October 17, 1966, Marion smelled smoke and asked her husband to investigate. But for the fact that this family was home, and the wife alerted her husband of the smell of smoke, this fire may have gone undetected for quite some time. The husband did not detect smoke in their apartment and proceeded down to the third floor. Not sensing smoke, he exited onto the roof of a rear extension built onto the original brownstone. Here he noticed smoke issuing from a skylight on the roof of this extension. He returned to alert his wife to call the fire department emergency number and prepare the children with clothing to evacuate the building. The call was received by the Manhattan Fire Communications Office at 9:36 p.m. reporting a smoke condition in the building.

At this hour, the routine in most firehouses of the FDNY would have the members straightening up the kitchen after having finished the evening meal. That would be if their alarm calls for fires or emergencies were low. The members would then gather around discussing the topics of the day being current events or the experiences of recent fires or other notable calls from the public for assistance. As the evening would unfold 12 firefighters, husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons will have made the supreme sacrifice. Leaving behind 12 widows and 32 children with the memory of their fathers having sacrificed their lives for the citizens of New York City.

At 21:36 hours, Engines 14, 3 and 16, and Ladders 3 and 12, Battalion 6 and the Division 3 Deputy Chief were dispatched for a call for fire at 7 East 22nd Street. The smoke that Herb observed from the skylight had originated in the building’s cellar, which housed drums of lacquer and other supplies for art and framing.

Members of the first-arriving engine company, Engine 14, encountered extreme heat and thick smoke while advancing a 2.5-inch hoseline to the rear of the basement of the art dealer. They were unable to make much progress, and because of the untenable conditions, the company was ordered to retreat to the sidewalk and operate their 2.5-inch hoseline into the cellar from there. While Engine 14 was advancing to the cellar, the next-arriving engine company, Engine 3, stretched to the second floor and conducted a search.

An aerial ladder was raised to the roof where members could accomplish vertical ventilation. The members dispatched to the roof assignment are expected to conduct a visual survey of whatever exposures are presented and to give a report. The fact that a rear extension two stories tall was constructed on the rear of this brownstone is a significant detail to share with the Incident Commander and all units operating. This detail of information should be considered a ‘Red Flag’ that everyone needs to consider in their ‘size up,’ enhancement of situational awareness and evaluation of fire dynamics and spread.

As fire operations progressed in 7 East 22nd Street, the Deputy Chief was advised that a fire alarm monitoring company, the Holmes Protective Company, had received an alert at 21:46 hours for Wonder Drugs and Cosmetics at 6 East 23rd Street, a five-story building of ordinary construction located immediately behind the initial location. Additional commercial occupants of that building included a candy shop. The Deputy assigned the Chief of the 7th Battalion and members of Ladder 3 to the drug store to investigate the alarm and attempt to gain access to the rear of the 22nd Street building. Upon arriving and entering the first floor a light smoke condition was present. This information would represent another ‘Red Flag’ of critical information.

Encountering no progress in the building on 22nd Street with the possibility of fire extension into a building on 23rd Street, a second alarm was struck that had Engines 1, 5, 18 and 33 respond. Engine 5, with a hoseline and accompanied by the members of Ladder 3, proceeded to the basement on 23rd Street to navigate their way to a rear cinder block wall. They experienced an odor that smelled like gas but found no fire.

As with many older cities in America’s Northeast, buildings in New York City routinely extend to the property lines and share walls, known as party walls, and other features with adjacent structures. Such was the case for 7 East 22nd St. and 6 East 23rd St. Though the firefighters on scene were unaware, the cellars had been reconfigured. In 1961, a load-bearing party wall that formed the border between the two buildings had been removed, and a block partition was constructed 35 feet into the rear of the 23rd Street portion of the cellar. This space was used by the frame shop to store drums of lacquers and other refinishing chemicals as well as other supplies and finished products. Because of the shared cellar, the building department considered these buildings to be one and the same, but the removal of the cellar wall was not approved by the department.

A Deputy Chief from Division 1 assumed Command on 23rd Street. Engine 18 was instructed to stretch a hoseline into the first floor Wonder Drug store accompanied by members of Ladder 7. The drug store had the only access to the cellar from the 23rd Street side, and access from the 22nd Street side could only be made through the brownstone. They stretched this line to the rear 100 feet into the store because smoke was issuing from the floor molding atop what was a 5-inch layer of Terrazzo flooring supported by ordinary lumber floor joists. This type of flooring is a mixture of crushed marble, quartz, granite, and glass chips poured with a cementitious binder. This floor did not offer any indication of heat from the fire raging and degrading the wooden floor joists below.

As fire operations were progressing, it was not known just how long the fire had been burning in the basement of the art dealer. The seat of the fire was in fact below the rear of the Wonder Drug store with numerous members present on the first floor and basement areas. Those attack teams trying to advance onto the main body of fire from the 22nd Street vantage point were not making progress to knock down a fire fueled with the heavy fuel base of wood used for framing, volatile paints, thinners, lacquers, and mineral spirits. The heat release rate and temperatures were extreme as were the smoke conditions.

Those units entering the address at 6 East 23rd Street should have noted the floor of the Wonder Drug store to be poured in place terrazzo flooring. This fact would also raise another ‘Red Flag’ of pertinent information that creates a dangerous circumstance and question of structural stability in fire situations. This information should be communicated to the Incident Commander and all units operating in the building. This tragic event would reveal to the fire service that such a floor does not present evidence of heat from active fire below and depending upon a lack of compromise and openings, the migration of smoke would also be hindered. This floor was installed over layers of wood planking supported by timber joists, with cement, tiles, and an additional layer of terrazzo above that. This would have added tremendous weight per square foot that would have exacerbated the time to failure as the timber joists were being degraded by heavy fire.

The members of Ladder 3 and Engine 5 did not realize that stored stock and limited width aisles obscured the fact that the basement space they were searching did not extend the full length of the building. Had these members been able to determine that fact it would have been another ‘Red Flag’ of critical information to share with the Incident Commander and units operating in the building.

The members of Engine 18 and Ladder 7 did not realize that they were operating above a fire that was raging below since before the arrival of the initial units at 21:36 hours. At approximately 22:39 hours, one hour and three minutes after the initial alarm, the floor of the drug store suddenly collapsed causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two additional firefighters – Rudolph Kaminsky and William McCarron – who had attempted to warn the others of the changing conditions suffered fatal burns during a flashover at the rear of the store. The supporting timber floor joists measured 3 inches by 14 inches and were spaced 16 inches on center. Timber beams of this mass would withstand the direct exposure of fire for some time.

Fireman Nicholas Cicero was standing at the top of the stairs and felt a large volume of air rush into the cellar, as if the fire was taking a breath. He alerted the firefighters in the cellar that something was wrong. They retreated up the stairs as the collapse occurred and engulfed the cellar. Some members suffered burns as they climbed through the flames and intense heat. Lieutenant Royal Fox of Ladder 3 stayed back to ensure that the last firefighter made it to safety. The situational awareness of Fireman Cicero and the selfless actions of Lieutenant Fox saved the lives of their fellow firefighters.

Just after the floor collapse and withdrawal of what members were still alive and able to escape the flames, other members made valiant attempts to re-enter the occupancy with hoselines. They would be thwarted by the volume of fire and heat venting from the entrance of the store. A member of the Fire Patrol, Edward Popisil, had seen where the companies were operating prior to the collapse and drew a sketch of their location in the store, making it possible for rescue crews to locate the trapped members quickly. Sadly, however, their efforts would end with 32 children without fathers and 12 wives as widows.

Engine 18 lost all but two of its members that night. The chauffeur was operating in the street and Firefighter John Donovan was returning from a detail when the collapse occurred. Donovan was nearly killed when he slipped into the cellar during rescue efforts but was saved by members of Ladder 24. Ladder 7 lost four men, and both Deputy Chief Thomas Reilly from the Third Division and Battalion Chief Walter Higgins from Battalion 7 were killed.

Companies worked tirelessly through the night and into the morning to gain access to the cellar and dig out their brothers from the rubble. Thousands of firefighters, many off-duty would gather to assist in the search of rubble and burnt debris to remove their heroes with dignity. The five-alarm fire continued to burn and would eventually involve three buildings.

Chief of Department John O’Hagan had been out of town and arrived on scene in the morning as the firefighters’ bodies were being reverently carried from the building. While addressing the firefighters on scene, he said, “This is the saddest day in the 100-year history of the fire department. They never had a chance. I know that we all died a little in there.”

Unauthorized and unreported building modifications contributed greatly to this fire and collapse. Occupants of the 22nd Street building had taken over a portion of the cellar of the 23rd Street building to enlarge their work and storage space. In doing so, a load-bearing wall was removed and a non-load bearing partition was added 35 feet from it. Not only did this compromise the structural integrity of the building but also the smoke and fire protection originally afforded by the wall.

Firefighters were not initially aware that the 23rd Street cellar was only 65 feet deep. When crews from Engine 5 and Ladder 3 entered the cellar and began looking for the seat of the fire, they were unaware that they only had access to a portion of the cellar. Without measuring or pacing out the distance, there was no way to tell that the wall they had found was merely a partition, and that the seat of the fire was behind it. This would have been a daunting task in the smoke.

If the building is our enemy, as the late Frank Brannigan once said, then time is its secret weapon. The collapse occurred just over an hour after the initial alarm. We need to consider every minute of elapsed time as a minute closer to collapse. It can be easy to lose track of time at a fire scene, so many departments today use time stamps to help crews maintain situational awareness.

The cause of the fire which started in the basement of the adjacent building at 6 East 22nd Street remains unknown.

Today, Madison Green stands on the former site of the 23rd Street Fire.

Members of the FDNY killed in the line of duty at the 23rd Street Fire on October 17, 1966:

• Deputy Chief Thomas A. Reilly, Division 3, age 53, was survived by his wife, Marie; and his six children, Rosemary, Virginia, Joseph, Dolores, Thomas and Veronica. He was a US Navy veteran of the Second World War and was buried a Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Fireman William Francis McCarron, Division 3, Aide to Chief Reilly, age 44, was a Marine Corps veteran of the Second World War. He was survived by his wife, Winifred and three children. He was buried at Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Battalion Chief Walter John Higgins, Battalion 7, age 46, was an 11-year member of the FDNY and was a US Navy veteran of the Second World War. He was survived by his wife, Virginia, and three children and was buried at Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Lieutenant Joseph Priore, Engine 18, age 42, was survived by his wife; his 2- and 3- year-old daughters; and his six-month-old daughter, Christine. He was buried at Mount Olivet Cemetery in Maspeth, Queens, New York.
• Fireman Bernard Adolph Tepper, Engine 18, age 41, was a Army Air Force veteran of the Second World War and was survived by his wife, Dorothy, He was buried at Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Fireman James V. Galanaugh, age 27, Engine 18, was a US Navy veteran. He was survived by his wife, Virginia and his 11-month-old son, James Vincent. He was buried at Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York. His wife’s father, Fireman Vincent John Laurence, an 18-year veteran of the FDNY, died while fighting a fire in a tenement in Brooklyn in 1955.
• Fireman Joseph Kelly, Engine 18, age 35, was six-year member of the FDNY and was survived by his wife and one child. He was a veteran of the US Army and was buried at Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Probationary Fireman Daniel L. Rey, Engine 18, age 26, was survived by his wife, Virginia; his stepchildren, Jeannie, age 10, Ricky, age 8 and Glen, age 5; his mother, Josephine Rey; his father, Alfred, who was a retired member of the FDNY, and his brother, Thomas, who was a member of Engine 291 in Ridgewood, Queens. He was a US Army veteran of the Vietnam War and was buried at Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Lieutenant John James “Black Jack” Finley. Ladder 7, age 54, was survived by his wife, Ethel. He was buried at Saint Charles Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Fireman Carl Lee, Ladder 7, age 29, was a six-year member of the FDNY and was a veteran of the US Army. He was survived by his wife and two children and was buried at Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Fireman John G. Berry, Ladder 7, age 31, was survived by his wife. He was buried at Long Island National Cemetery in East Farmingdale, Nassau County, New York.
• Fireman Rudolph F. Kaminsky, Ladder 7, age 32, was survived by his wife, Jeanette, and his daughters, Rosemarie, age 13, and Glorianne, age 11. His body was cremated and the ashes were given to the family.

On October 21 an estimated 20,000 firefighters from around the globe attended a combined funeral held at St. Patrick’s Cathedral in Midtown Manhattan honoring ten of the men who had perished in the floor collapse at the 23rd Street Fire. Fireman William McCarron’s funeral was held at St. Boniface Church in Elmont, Long Island, New York.  Deputy Chief Thomas Reilly’s funeral was held at St. Brigid’s Church in Westbury, Long Island, New York.

A memorial sculpture crafted from iron, steel, and timber fire debris by an FDNY firefighter to honor the fallen firefighters is located in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in Morningside Heights in Manhattan at West 110th Street.

The New York City Fire Academy sits on Randall’s Island, between Manhattan and Queens. When it was constructed, all streets on the academy grounds were named for the firefighters lost in this fire.

Much of the site of the fatal fire is today occupied by a high-rise multi-use building and some of it is green space. The casual observer would have no idea of the tragedy that occurred on that site except for the presence of a plaque on the wall to honoring the men who gave their lives that night. On the 50th anniversary of the tragic fire, a plaque honoring the 12 firefighters who died in the fire was mounted on the outside wall of a high-rise building that now occupies the site across 23rd Street from Madison Square Park.

The names of the twelve fallen members have been honored at the New York Firemen’s Memorial on Riverside Drive at 100th Street in Manhattan, New York. The memorial honors the members of the NYFD and the FDNY who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the line of duty. Built in 1913 on a hillside facing the Hudson River, the memorial comprises a grand staircase, a balustraded plaza, a fountain basin, and the central monument. Made of Knoxville marble, the monument is a sarcophagus-like structure with a massive bronze bas-relief of horses drawing an engine to a fire. To the south and north are allegorical sculpture groups representing “Duty” and “Sacrifice.” The members of the FDNY hold an annual remembrance ceremony each Fall at the Memorial to honor their fallen members.

The names of the twelve fallen members have been inscribed at the New York State Fallen Firefighters Memorial on the grounds of the New York State Capitol in Albany. The memorial honors the men and women of the fire service who have perished in the line of duty in the Empire State. The memorial is located between the Justice Building and The Egg in a park-like area bordered by Norway maple trees. Dedicated in 1998, it consists of a ten-foot-high bronze statue of two firefighters rescuing an injured comrade backed by a granite wall fifty-four feet long and fifteen feet high inscribed with the names of New York state firefighters who gave their lives to save others. The memorial is placed on a plaza of charcoal and red brick pavers forming a Maltese Cross. As of October 2025, there are 2,818 names on the wall. The earliest name on the wall is from the year 1811.

Commentary by Jerry Tracy, Deputy Chief retired, FDNY:

If you read the reports and the published document from the Board of Inquiry, one can deduce that there were many warning signs or ‘Red Flags’ that may not have averted this event but are a lesson that details of vital information observed on the fire ground are worthy of sharing with incident commanders and all members operating. This will only enhance the ‘Situational Awareness’ for everyone, aiding decision making and altering actions and tactics when appropriate to do so.

Experience is a cruel teacher. It gives the test before presenting the lesson! – expressed by an anonymous source. “One learns more from experience than from books.” This proverb has been traced back to “The Schoolmaster” by Roger Ascham and comes from the Latin phrase “experiential docent” meaning experience teaches. Walter Scott (1854-1900) disagrees with this proverb, saying that “experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes.”

Commentary:

Terrazzo is a composite material, poured in place or precast, which is used for floor and wall treatments. It consists of chips of marble, quartz, granite, glass, or other suitable material, poured with a cementitious binder (for chemical binding), polymeric (for physical binding), or a combination of both. Metal strips often divide sections, or changes in color or material in a pattern. Additional chips may be sprinkled atop the mix before it sets. After it has cured, it is ground and polished smooth or otherwise finished to produce a uniformly textured surface. Very popular for floors in commercial applications due to their high durability, they were installed in many legacy Type III Ordinary Construction commercial and mercantile buildings. They have also seen a bit of a comeback recently in new commercial and residential applications.

Terrazzo shares certain qualities with standard concrete, namely strength, durability and insulation. Finished terrazzo, including its substrate, can weigh over 20 pounds per square foot. This is several times heavier than other commercial-grade flooring options and is a dead load that needs to be supported properly. The floor of Wonder Drugs was documented as having been 5 inches thick and supported by 3 x 14-inch joists and wooden planks. Rough calculations indicate that the floor could have weighed over 55 pounds per square foot. Even with its substantial subfloor structure, this building was not designed to carry this amount of weight.

The building was not showing traditional signs of an impending collapse. Because of the characteristics of the poured aggregate floor, there was no sponginess, no soft spots and no bowing. While the floor of Wonder Drugs was supported by 3 x 14-inch timbers, terrazzo is an efficient insulator and the floor acted as a heat sink, disguising the danger that lay below. It was also effective at blocking the communication of smoke from the cellar to the first floor.

Even with today’s thermal imaging technology, firefighters need to be aware of the insulating factor of terrazzo and other poured aggregate materials. The difference in heat signature may not be as drastic as one would expect with thinner or lighter-weight flooring materials.

All of these factors led to an unexpected and catastrophic collapse. Upon examination, many of the floor joists were found to be burned completely through, with nothing supporting the heavy and brittle terrazzo, and there was no way for the firefighters to know that the structural integrity of those beams had burned through. The terrazzo maintained its integrity as the support system it rested on burned away, but when the remainder of the framing could no longer support the weight of the floor, it gave way in large chunks. Nothing was splintered; nothing was bent or twisted. There was nothing to grab on to. The floor opened like a trap door, dropping these men into the heart of the inferno that they had been assigned to extinguish.

In 1972, Emanuel Fried wrote about the importance of the 20-minute rule, his message being that uncontrolled fire burning for more than 20 minutes and involving more than one floor is likely to result in collapse and the loss of firefighters. While there has been discussion on whether 20 minutes is still an appropriate amount of time with today’s furnishings and lightweight construction methods, the message still holds true. Monitor the time and if progress is not being made, pull everyone out, regroup and move to a different tactic.

Evacuating firefighters from a building should not be viewed as a surrender. In some cases, crews can be redeployed to an offensive posture with a different approach. In others, a transitional attack can be used, and when progress is being made, companies can re-enter the structure to complete the work. If this is the case, however, a careful assessment of the structure must be conducted to ensure that collapse is not imminent.

Terrazzo flooring tends to mask an advanced fire on the floor below, such as in a basement, and has a history of sudden failure as the supporting wood floor joists are consumed by the fire. Besides the 23rd Street Fire, there are several notable fire service events where the sudden collapse of a terrazzo floor caused the death of multiple firefighters:

In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on May 16, 1976, four firefighters were killed when the terrazzo floor of a restaurant failed and tossed the firefighters into a burning basement at Barston’s Overbrook Deli & Restaurant: https://www.facebook.com/groups/192218352449074/permalink/1532675251736704/

In Brackenridge, Pennsylvania on December 20, 1991, four firefighters were killed in a terrazzo tile floor collapse during a fire in a furniture refinishing business: https://www.facebook.com/groups/192218352449074/permalink/1406259207711643/

We have attached photos and diagrams of the 23rd Street incident. The link to a documentary video presented by retired FDNY Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn who is a survivor of the incident can be accessed here: https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?q=FDNY+Deputy+Chief+Vincent+Dunn+23rd+street+video&cvid=eb03f4e359674edb92edf398817e421e&gs_lcrp=EgRlZGdlKgYIABBFGDkyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQ6wcYQNIBCDg0ODhqMGo0qAIIsAIB&adppc=EDGEESS&PC=EDBBAN&ru=%2fsearch%3fq%3dFDNY%2bDeputy%2bChief%2bVincent%2bDunn%2b23rd%2bstreet%2bvideo%26cvid%3deb03f4e359674edb92edf398817e421e%26gs_lcrp%3dEgRlZGdlKgYIABBFGDkyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQ6wcYQNIBCDg0ODhqMGo0qAIIsAIB%26FORM%3dANAB01%26adppc%3dEDGEESS%26PC%3dEDBBAN&mmscn=vwrc&mid=784CC6A3ECDB3E814D1F784CC6A3ECDB3E814D1F&FORM=WRVORC&ntb=1&msockid=7bfec4acc8e611f18cb539969c2615d4

We have also attached the link to a Fire Engineering podcast hosted by Chief Joe Pronesti with Chief Jerry Tracy discussing the 23rd Street fire: https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?q=Fire+Engineering+podcast+hosted+by+Chief+Joe+Pronesti+with+Chief+Jerry+Tracy+discussing+the+23rd+Street+fire&mid=82DF0213A964381FA7B182DF0213A964381FA7B1&FORM=VIRE

We have also attached the link to an excellent article by retired FDNY Deputy Chief Jay Jonas that contains additional details on the incident that can be accessed here:

https://dam.clarionengage.com/content/dam/fe/downloads/FFN-FRM-Downloads-Editorial/23rd%20St%20NYC%20Fire%2010-1966.pdf

Thanks to FDNY Chiefs Jerry Tracy and Jay Jonas, and Battalion Chief Greg Rodgers along with several fire service references for the content of this article.

Honor the service of these 12 valiant firefighters by reviewing the challenges of renovations in commercial buildings and the dangers of terrazzo floors and by surveying your local response district for buildings that are equipped with terrazzo flooring with your crew members today.

Remember Fallen Brothers.

Get Out There And Know Your Local!!!