NINE FIREFIGHTERS INJURED DURING RESIDENTIAL STRUCTURE FIRE – MCKINNEY, TEXAS – AUGUST 30, 2025 – NIOSH SERIOUS INJURY REPORT F2025-08

Nine Firefighters Injured During Residential Structure Fire – McKinney, Texas – August 30, 2025 – NIOSH Serious Injury Report F2025-08 

On August 30, 2025, two firefighters were seriously injured and seven sustained minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire in a large single family dwelling in McKinney, Texas. At 21:10 hours, the 911 dispatch center received a call from an occupant reporting a fire in the master bedroom of a residential home. At 21:11 hours, Tiller 11, Medics 3 and 11, Trucks 3 and 5, Engine 7, and Battalion 2 were dispatched for a residential structure fire. At 21:17 hours, Tiller 11 and Medic 11 arrived on scene. Tiller 11 gave a size-up of a two-story residence with heavy smoke coming from the front door on Side Alpha. Captain 11 reported he was unable to conduct a 360 size-up, there was a hydrant on Side Alpha, and his crew would conduct a fast attack with a pre-connected hoseline. Captain 11 assigned Medic 11 firefighters to conduct search operations as both crews entered the structure, proceeding to the second floor. Truck 3, Medic 3 arrived on scene along with Battalion 2 with his incident command technician. Battalion 2 assumed Command of the incident and had Truck 3 deploy a secondary hoseline and enter the structure. Between 21:20 and 21:33 hours, all interior crews worked on the second floor in zero visibility conditions but were unable to locate the fire. Exterior crews deployed hoselines on Side Delta after locating the fire on the first floor at the Side Charlie/Delta corner. At 21:34 hours, Tiller 11 and Medic 11 firefighters on the second floor became low on air and decided to exit. The captain of Truck 3 reported that his crew was still operating on the second floor but they were headed to Side Charlie sector as flames were visible.

A firefighter from Tiller 11 ran out of air, and the captain of Truck 3 called a Mayday. Captain 11 then also ran out of air. Medic 5 entered the structure as the rapid intervention team and located the Tiller 11 firefighter. They began to extricate him and, with the assistance of Truck 5, cleared the structure at 21:49 hours – followed by the remaining interior crews. The Tiller 11 firefighter and Captain 11 were transported to a local hospital for treatment of significant smoke inhalation. Seven additional firefighters were transported to the local hospital and evaluated for smoke inhalation, an overexertion injury, and extreme dehydration. Fire investigators determined the cause of the fire which did extensive damage to the residence started in the master bedroom on the first floor and was classified as accidental.

The structure involved in this incident was a Type V Lightweight Wood Frame construction open floor plan large area residential structure that was built in 2016. The residence was located in the Stone Hollow subdivision of similarly constructed large residences at 7409 Joshua Tree Lane just south of Gabe Nesbitt Park in the southwestern section of McKinney, Texas. The two-story structure contained 4,450 square feet of living space and included a surrounding security fence. The structure contained high ceilings and a winding staircase to the second floor. The structure layout included five bedrooms and a raked (sloped floor) media (theater) room. The building also featured a steeply pitched multi-gabled roof. The residence was not equipped with an automatic fire sprinkler system. A fire hydrant was located about 150 feet from the residence and additional hydrants were available in the subdivision.

McKinney is a city in and the county seat of Collin County, Texas. A suburb of the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex, McKinney is about 32 miles north of downtown Dallas.  The U.S. Census Bureau ranked McKinney as the nation’s fourth fastest-growing large city from 2010 to 2019 and determined the city’s estimated 2025 population was 236,001. The 67.7 square mile city is protected by the McKinney Fire Department operating from 11 fire stations with 270 personnel staffing 5 engines, 5 ladder trucks, 8 medic units, 1 EMS supervisor, 1 Rescue, 2 ARFF units, 2 brush units, and 2 battalion chiefs. It maintains three shifts: A, B, and C. Each shift is staffed with a minimum of 57 personnel on-duty per shift, across the 11 fire stations. Shifts operate 48 hours on with 96 hours off. The fire department’s leadership includes a fire chief, three assistant chiefs, battalion chiefs, and captains.

The city PSAP (Dispatch) answers 911 calls for EMS, fire, and law enforcement emergency and non-emergency requests for service. It includes a communications manager and telecommunicators which include shift supervisors. Fire departments are dispatched on one channel and operate on multiple fireground channels. Fire department stations are dispatched based on geographic location and type of emergency incident.

The McKinney Fire Department provides initial training for recruits and professional development for fire officers. Firefighters are sent to a local fire academy to train and test for national certification as NFPA 1010 Fire Fighter I and II as well as NFPA 1072 Hazardous Materials Responder at the awareness level. Firefighters are also trained to receive certification as State of Texas paramedics. The incident commander at this incident had 26 years of total fire service experience with the department. Tiller 11 Firefighter (seriously injured) had two months of fire service with the department and three years at a previous department. Captain 11 (seriously injured) had 21 years of fire service with the department. At the time of the incident, all firefighters were wearing full structural firefighting turnout gear and a NIOSH approved SCBA.

Weather conditions at 20:53 hours on August 30, 2025, included an outdoor temperature was 76 degrees F, the dewpoint was 71 degrees F, the wind was out of the east at 3 mph, there had been no precipitation in the last 24 hours, and conditions were cloudy (Weather Underground 2025). Note: The weather conditions did not appear to be a significant factor in fire development or the outcome of the incident. 

At approximately 21:10 hours on August 30, 2025, Dispatch received a 911 call from an occupant reporting a fire in the master bedroom of a residential home located at 7409 Joshua Tree Lane. The occupant stated that everyone was out and the home was

filling with smoke. At 21:11 hours, Dispatch transmitted an alarm assignment for a residential structure fire. Tiller 11, Medics 3 and 11, Trucks 3 and 5, Engine 7, and Battalion 2 (battalion chief and incident command technician) were dispatched and assigned fireground channel 1. While en-route, Captain 11 (acting officer of Tiller 11) accessed an electronic aerial map of the scene to get details on the location as well as the location of the nearest hydrant.

At 21:17 hours, local law enforcement arrived on scene reporting significant smoke and that everyone safely evacuated the structure. At the same time, Tiller 11 and Medic 11 arrived on scene, observing smoke on Sides Alpha, Charlie, and Delta. Tiller 11 parked in front of the structure and gave a size-up of a two-story residence with heavy smoke coming from the front door on Side Alpha, which was open. Upon exiting the apparatus, Captain 11 observed smoke coming from the eaves of Side Alpha. He found fences on both sides of the structure as well as a pad locked gate at the driveway and reported to Dispatch that he was unable to conduct a 360 size-up. He announced that they had a hydrant on Side Alpha and that his crew would conduct a fast attack with a pre-connected hoseline from Tiller 11. Tiller 11’s drivers began to establish a water supply, while the Tiller 11 Firefighter stretched a 200-foot 1.75-inch pre-connected hoseline in the front yard.

Captain 11 ordered Tiller 11 Firefighter to control the front door as they prepared to enter the structure. When Tiller 11 Firefighter turned on his cylinder, he heard a rush of air. Captain 11 noticed that Tiller 11 Firefighter’s quick connect was disengaged from the SCBA cylinder, which allowed air to flow directly out and not into the SCBA. Captain 11 helped resolve the SCBA issue.

At 21:18 hours, Truck 3, Medic 3, and Battalion 2 arrived on scene. At the same time, Captain 11 assigned the Medic 11 firefighters to conduct search operations as both crews entered the structure through the front door into the hallway. Tiller 11 Firefighter entered first, observing smoke that was not banked to the floor, with a heavy exhaust movement at the ceiling on the first floor. He proceeded down a hallway and encountered the winding staircase on the left-hand side. He proceeded up the staircase to the second floor. Seeing Tiller 11 Firefighter proceed to the second floor, the Medic 11 firefighters assisted him in taking the hoseline up the staircase, followed by Captain 11. Halfway up the staircase, both crews entered zero visibility conditions in thick black smoke.

At 21:19 hours, Battalion 2 assumed Command. He parked on the opposite side of the road from the fire building, but his view was obstructed by Tiller 11. He performed Command from the car along with his incident command technician for the incident. Captain 3 (Truck 3 officer) gave a size-up at 21:20 hours of heavy smoke showing on Sides Bravo, Charlie, and Delta as they arrived on scene. Command ordered Captain 3 to get a secondary hoseline in place, and Truck 3 firefighters began to establish a 200-foot 1.75-inch hoseline from another discharge on Tiller 11.

As a crew of four, Truck 3 entered the structure, following Tiller 11’s hoseline to the second floor. Truck 3 left one firefighter at the bottom of the staircase for hose management. As they reached the top of the staircase, Captain 3 began a left-hand search towards the Side Charlie/Delta corner while two Truck 3 firefighters remained to protect egress. Tiller 11, Medic 11, and Captain 3 began pulling ceiling as they believed the fire was in the attic. Tiller 11 Firefighter and Truck 3 began spraying water towards

the ceiling where the others were making holes. All firefighters on the second floor began bumping into each other in the zero visibility conditions. The firefighters noticed that the second floor was loud with no clear explanation and their SCBA voice amplifiers were not working. This required them to get closer to each other and yell for communication. All firefighters on the second floor attempted to use their personal thermal imaging cameras and continued to pull ceiling but could not locate the fire. All thermal imaging camera screens were either white or blue with no useful readings to display.

At 21:21 hours, Truck 5 arrived on scene and began to stage. Due to a car in the driveway in front of the padlocked gate, the Truck 5 crew used a saw to cut the security fence on Side Delta for access. They pulled a 1.75-inch hoseline down Side Delta for exterior suppression. The Truck 5 crew observed fire on Side Charlie and requested a secondary hoseline deployed down Side Delta. At 21:23 hours, Captain 11 reported that his crew was operating on the Side Charlie/Delta corner inside the structure. He did not report that they were operating on the second floor. With no fire found, he ordered Tiller 11 Firefighter to spray water to cool the space.

At 21:25 hours, Engine 7 arrived on scene and reported fire above a garage on Side Charlie/Delta corner. Upon arrival, they deployed a 2.5-inch hoseline down Side Delta to assist Truck 5 with exterior suppression. At 21:30 hours, Captain 3 reported heat and heavy smoke but no source of fire yet. He ordered the two hoselines on the second floor to stop flowing water until the fire was located. Command reported water on the fire, with Engine 7 hitting most of it on Side Delta. When departing the local hospital and hearing the structure fire call, Medic 5 staged at the intersection near the scene. They texted Command to inform him they were close in case he needed them to respond to the scene.

At 21:34 hours, Tiller 11 Firefighter was told by a Medic 11 firefighter that his EOSTI (end of service time indicator) was sounding and was running low on air. Captain 11 noticed Medic 11’s EOSTI sounding and radioed that Tiller 11 and Medic 11 were  coming out to recycle. Captain 11 told the Medic 11 firefighters to wait at the stairs while he located the Tiller 11 Firefighter. At 21:35 hours, Engine 7 reported two hoselines on the fire with conditions looking better and extension on the Side Charlie/Delta corner. Medic 3 responded that they were going to assist Engine 7 with the extension on Side Charlie. The Medic 11 firefighters followed the hoseline to the bottom of the staircase. Since they were running low on air, they exited the structure to change cylinders.

At 21:36 hours, Captain 3 reported that his crew was still operating on the second floor but moving to Side Charlie sector as flames were visible (area of the media room). As they moved towards this side of the structure, a Truck 3 firefighter bumped into Tiller 11 Firefighter, knocking him off the hoseline and onto the floor. Tiller 11 Firefighter became disoriented, ending up in the raked media room on the second floor. As Captain 11 attempted to stand him up, both fell to the floor in the media room. As Captain 11 attempted to stand, he felt heat and believed the floor was burnt out.

Captain 3 located Tiller 11 Firefighter, who was running out of air in the media room. With conditions worsening, Captain 3 ordered his crew to exit the structure. Tiller 11 Firefighter ran out of air. He unplugged his regulator from his facepiece, covered the connection point with his gloved hand, and laid on the floor. At 21:38 hours, Captain 3 called a Mayday stating a firefighter was out of air on the second floor. Command responded, requesting emergency tones and emergency traffic only. Captain 11 attempted to connect his buddy breather to Tiller 11 Firefighter’s SCBA. However, Captain 11 ran out of air. He immediately removed his regulator, but heat and smoke burned his throat. He loosened his facepiece enough to draw in air through his hood and plugged the regulator back in. As they waited for help, Captain 3 told the Tiller 11 Firefighter to stay on the floor. After hearing the Mayday, the Medic 11 firefighters went to the front door, where they began to shine lights and make noise with their tools to indicate the exit direction for the interior crews. EMS 1 (EMS supervisor) did not allow unassigned personnel to reenter.

At 21:41 hours, Medic 5 entered the scene and requested orders after hearing the Mayday. Command ordered them to take the RIT pack to the second floor and assist with the Mayday. Command requested a second alarm. At 21:43 hours, Truck 3 firefighters exited the building with their EOSTIs sounding. They informed Medic 5 of the last known location of Captain 3 and that the Mayday was on the second floor. Medic 5 reported entering the structure as RIT. Command responded, telling Medic 5 to turn left at the top of the stairs. As Medic 5 entered, they followed the hoselines to the second floor, where they located Captain 3 at 21:46 hours. Fire was visible at the ceiling of the media room as Captain 3 helped Medic 5 apply the regulator of the RIT pack to Tiller 11 Firefighter. Although still conscious, Tiller 11 Firefighter was unable to self-extricate, requiring Medic 5 to physically move him to the stairs. Captain 11 and Captain 3 followed shortly after.

Truck 5 reported that they were relocating to Side Alpha to assist with RIT. They entered the structure and reported that they were on the staircase. Medic 5 responded, requesting that Truck 5 assist with removing the Mayday firefighter. During extrication, Tiller 11 Firefighter became unconscious and more difficult to move. They reported that they were on the left side of the staircase on the second floor and had fire overhead. At 21:47 hours, Command ordered all units to withdraw from the structure. Medic 11 responded that they would be EMS and began doffing their equipment to prepare for medical treatment.

At 21:49 hours, Engine 7 reported that the Mayday firefighter and RIT were out of the building. Medic 11 firefighters assisted in removing Tiller 11 Firefighter from his SCBA and structural firefighting turnout gear. They put him onto the stretcher and began patient assessment. Captain 11 and Captain 3 exited the structure. At 21:53 hours, Command initiated a PAR and ordered a defensive strategy. He confirmed to Dispatch that the Mayday was cleared and all firefighters were accounted for at 21:55 hours. Minutes later, interior crews transported Tiller 11 Firefighter and Captain 11 to a local hospital for treatment of significant smoke inhalation.

The next day, the fire was under control with on scene units still working on hot spots. The last unit cleared the scene at 06:25 hours.

The fire department cause and origin investigation determined that the fire started in the master bedroom on the first floor and was classified as accidental.

The Tiller 11 Firefighter and Captain 11 sustained significant smoke inhalation injuries requiring them to be off duty for recovery. Seven additional firefighters were transported to the local hospital and evaluated for smoke inhalation, an overexertion injury, and extreme dehydration.

NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the serious injury of two firefighters:

• Scene size-up and risk assessment.
• Supervision of interior operations.
• Fire behavior, dynamics, and tactics.
• Air management and firefighter survival.
• Clear communication of assignments.
• Communication of critical information.
• Resources for responding to Mayday.
• Staged and available EMS.
• Psychological safety.

The NIOSH report made several recommendations:

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure the first arriving resource completes an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis before committing firefighters to interior operations.

Recommendation #2a: Fire departments should ensure ICs immediately establish divisions/groups with a supervisor to communicate conditions and provide accountability.

Recommendation #2b: Fire departments should ensure each apparatus has established riding assignments to designate a crew officer.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should train firefighters and fire officers to select interior fire attack strategies and tactics based on fire conditions present.

Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure firefighters and fire officers are properly trained in and use principles of air management and survival procedures for out-of-air emergencies.

Recommendation #5: Fire departments should train firefighters and fire officers to use Task-Location-Objective assignments for clear communication of expectations.

Recommendation #6: Fire departments should educate personnel on use of radio communication processes for sharing critical information, such as conditions and actions.

Recommendation #7a: Fire departments should ensure a rapid intervention team/crew is dedicated and in place during structural firefighting operations to immediately respond to a firefighter emergency.

Recommendation #7b: Fire departments should employ an on-deck crew in a forward staged position throughout the incident to be assigned to developing needs.

Recommendation #8: Fire departments should ensure EMS with transport capability is on scene at any fire or special operation location to provide emergency medical care and transport.

Recommendation #9: Fire departments should develop and implement a professional development program that promotes psychological safety, and effective safety communication during incidents as a key element for improving worker empowerment and decision making on the fireground.

After this incident, the McKinney Fire Department implemented changes to incident response and fireground operations. These changes were based on the department’s critique of the incident on August 30, 2025.

• Location of RIT Equipment on Apparatus – During the incident, there was confusion about the location of RIT equipment on Tiller 11. The fire department has since standardized the equipment layout for all apparatus to ensure consistency for firefighters locating tools and equipment for operations.
• CAD Data Recommendations – During the incident, the CAD data recommendations had a glitch causing it to assign Tiller 11 as two units, an engine and truck. As such, this reduced the dispatched assignment by one apparatus. The fire department has worked with Dispatch to correct this data issue.
• SCBA Maintenance per Manufacturers’ Instructions – During the incident, the Tiller 11 Firefighter’s SCBA quick connect disengaged from the cylinder while he was exiting the apparatus. The connection on the threading was not tightened to the manufacturers’ recommended torque. The fire department has ensured that all SCBAs have undergone inspection and maintenance to correct this issue per manufacturers’ instructions.

Commentary:

Fire operations in Type V Lightweight Wood Frame large area residences pose unique challenges to firefighters. Residential structures of up to 50,000 square feet can now be found in many communities. The open concept floor plans that are often present in this classification of dwelling allow for the rapid spread of smoke and fire within the structure. High vaulted ceilings, open two-story foyers, multiple interior staircases and balconies and large attics formed with gabled lightweight wood trusses allow for high volumes of heat and smoke to accumulate above the heads of unsuspecting firefighters. The rapid ignition of these overhead fire gases can trap firefighters and expose them to flashover and smoke explosion conditions. The often unconventional layout of the interiors of these large dwellings can easily disoriented firefighters within the structure far from the exit points. Firefighters should consider using tactics usually reserved for large area commercial occupancies such as the deployment of rope search lines and multiple thermal imaging cameras to maintain orientation during interior operations in these large area dwellings.

One example of the hazards of firefighting operations in large area residential dwellings can be found in a fire that occurred in a 10,000 square foot residence in Huntington, Maryland on March 19, 2011. A seemingly routine chimney fire extended into the massive attic space and flashed over seriously injuring 10 firefighters. Several of the firefighters were forced to bail out of windows and run through walls to escape the structure: https://www.firehouse.com/home/news/10463987/md-firefighters-bail-from-blaze-after-flashover

Another example includes a fatal fire that took the life of Prince William County Firefighter Kyle Wilson on April 16, 2007 when a wind-driven fire rapidly extended into the large area lightweight wood frame residence trapping Firefighter Wilson in a second-floor master bedroom: https://www.facebook.com/groups/192218352449074/permalink/1504640244540205/

Firefighters must recognize the potential for rapid fire spread in modern large area lightweight wood frame dwellings and adjust their firefighting strategies and tactics accordingly.

We have attached photos from the incident. The link to the NIOSH report is here: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/firefighters/programs/pdfs/f202508.pdf

We have also attached the link to an article published in FireRescue1 by group member Chief Gary Bowker on the firefighting challenges in large area residences: https://www.firerescue1.com/building-construction/articles/11-mcmansion-challenges-for-firefighters-BMdDvhefZ0V9MbmS/

Thanks to multiple media sources for additional information for this article.

Honor the service of the injured firefighters in this incident by studying the construction features of large area lightweight wood frame residences and by touring a lightweight wood frame dwelling under construction in your local response district with your crew members today.

Remember Fallen Brothers!

Get Out There And Know Your Local!!!