NINE FIREFIGHTERS DIE IN RAPID FIRE PROGRESSION DURING FURNITURE SHOWROOM FIRE – CHARLESTON, SC – 2007

Nine Firefighters Die in Rapid Fire Progression at Commercial Furniture Showroom – Charleston, South Carolina – June 18, 2007 – The Sofa Super Store Fire – NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Report F2007-18

On June 18, 2007, nine Charleston, South Carolina firefighters died when they became disoriented and ran out of air in rapidly deteriorating fire conditions inside a burning commercial furniture showroom and warehouse facility. The first arriving engine company found a growing fire at the enclosed loading dock connecting the showroom to the warehouse. The Assistant Chief entered the main showroom entrance at the front of the structure but did not find any signs of fire or smoke in the main showroom. He observed fire inside the structure when a door connecting the rear of the right showroom addition to the loading dock was opened. Within minutes, the fire quickly spread into and above the main showroom, the right showroom addition, and the warehouse. The burning furniture generated a huge amount of toxic and highly flammable gases along with soot and products of incomplete combustion that added to the fuel load.

The fire overwhelmed the interior attack crews, and the firefighters became disoriented when thick black smoke filled the showroom from ceiling to floor. The interior firefighters realized they were in trouble and began to radio for assistance as the heat intensified. One firefighter activated the emergency button on his radio. The front showroom windows were knocked out and additional firefighters, including a crew from a mutual-aid department, were sent inside to search for the missing firefighters. Soon after, the flammable mixture of combustion by-products ignited, and fire raced through the main showroom. Interior firefighters were caught in the rapid fire progression and nine Charleston firefighters died. At least nine other firefighters, including two mutual-aid firefighters, barely escaped serious injury. The fire was believed to have started in some discarded furniture in the loading dock area, and though the source of ignition remains undetermined, a carelessly discarded cigarette was suspected to have been the cause of the fire.

The structure involved in the incident was a one-story Type II Non-combustible construction commercial furniture showroom and warehouse facility totaling over 51,500 square feet that incorporated mixed-construction methods. The structure was non-sprinklered. The facility had been renovated and expanded a number of times over the past 15 years. The original structure was constructed in the 1960’s as a 17,500 square foot grocery store with concrete block walls and lightweight metal bar joists supporting the roof to create an open floor plan. After being converted to a furniture retail store, the original structure was expanded by adding a 6,970 square foot addition on Side Delta in 1994 and a 7,020 square foot addition to Side Bravo in 1995. Both additions were attached to the original exterior walls and consisted of steel beams supporting the walls and roof.

To provide access between the original structure and the two additions, the exterior walls on Sides Bravo and Delta of the original structure were each penetrated in three locations to form six 8-foot x 8-foot openings that were equipped with metal roll-up fire doors. These fire doors were equipped with fusible links designed to automatically close the doors in the event of a fire. In 1996, a 15,600 square foot warehouse was added to the rear of the main showroom. The main showroom and the warehouse were connected by an enclosed wood-framed loading dock of approximately 2,250 square feet. Double metal doors connected the rear of the right-side addition to the loading dock area. These metal doors swung outward opening on to the loading dock. Additional access to the loading dock area was available from the rear of the original structure.

At the time of the incident, the showroom included painted sheet-metal siding on the Sides Bravo and Delta exterior walls with a combination of sheet metal and concrete block on Side Charlie and a front masonry and block facade on Side Alpha. The roof over the main showroom (original structure) was constructed of sheet-metal roof decking covered by foam insulation and a weather membrane. Both right and left showroom additions included roofs constructed of sheet metal roof decking over fiberglass insulation. The fire caused extensive damage to the roof structure, making an analysis of the roof construction difficult.

The warehouse was a free-standing, clear-span structure with sheet-metal walls and roof. Both structures contained concrete floors. The main showroom measured nine feet from the floor to a suspended drop ceiling and approximately 14 feet to the roof, creating almost five feet of void space above the suspended ceiling. The warehouse measured 29 feet from the floor to the roof. The warehouse contained rows of metal storage shelving that contained a variety of furniture items including couches, chairs, mattresses, etc. The roofs over the main showroom, the showroom additions on both Sides Bravo and Delta of the structure, and the warehouse contained limited penetrations (ventilation ductwork, utilities, etc.). Thus, there were limited openings for smoke and hot gases to escape naturally in the event of a fire.

According to city building officials, the property was annexed into the city in 1990. The original structure and the three additions were considered as four separate structures for code enforcement purposes. Separate permits were issued for the construction of the left and right side additions and the warehouse. City building officials indicated to NIOSH investigators that after the fire, the furniture store property was determined to be “non-code compliant” (not in compliance with applicable codes). Work had been performed on the loading dock area and the maintenance shop without permits between 1996 and 2005. Other code violations included the accumulation of trash outside the loading dock, large quantities of flammable liquids, solvents, and thinners in the loading dock area, and storage of furniture and flammable materials in non-permitted areas.

At the time of the incident, city ordinances required commercial structures over 15,000 square feet to be equipped with a sprinkler system. The original structure was grandfathered (exempt from this requirement) while the left and right additions (at Sides Bravo and Delta) did not meet the threshold requirement. Thus, since the store was considered as 4 separate structures, the facility had been exempted from sprinkler system requirements.

The structure had been inspected by the fire department on a number of occasions. In 1987, fire inspection duties were transferred from the fire department to the city with the last documented fire code inspection by the city in 1998. The fire department continued to perform periodic pre-plan inspections. A building pre-plan form obtained from the fire department dated April 26, 2006, noted that store contents were “household furniture and office equipment” and that the rear warehouse contained racks approximately 30 feet high.  The pre-plan form did not mention the large volume of furniture and flammable materials (fuel load) contained in the structure. It was reported to NIOSH investigators by firefighters during interviews that trash from the furniture business, including packing materials, cardboard, broken furniture and other flammable materials, were routinely stored against the building near the loading dock on Side Delta of the structure.

Charleston is the largest city in South Carolina, the county seat of Charleston County, and the principal city in the Charleston–North Charleston metropolitan area. The city lies just south of the geographical midpoint of South Carolina’s coastline on Charleston Harbor, an inlet of the Atlantic Ocean formed by the confluence of the Ashley, Cooper, and Wando rivers. Charleston had a population of 150,277 residents as of the 2020 U.S. census. At the time of the incident the city was protected by the Charleston Fire Department, an ISO Class 1 rated department consisting of approximately 240 career firefighters and fire officers operating 16 engine companies and 3 ladder truck companies from 14 stations. The fire department served a population of approximately 106,000 residents in a geographic area of about 91 square miles.

At the time of the incident the Charleston Fire Department required firefighters to receive basic training to at least Fire Fighter I certification from the South Carolina Fire Academy or some other source. While the South Carolina Fire Academy was accredited by the International Fire Service Accreditation Congress (IFSAC) to provide a number of NFPA level courses, at the time of the incident, the fire department recognized training from sources other than the South Carolina Fire Academy as meeting their basic certification requirements. Note: Basic firefighter certification required by the fire department at the time of the incident did not meet NFPA 1001, Standard for Firefighter Professional Qualifications. Once hired, the recruits were assigned to the department’s training center for ten days of hands-on training after which the new firefighters were assigned to companies throughout the city. Individual companies normally trained from 0930 to 1130 hours each day with each company’s captain responsible for the training. The nine city firefighters lost in the incident had experience levels ranging from 19 months to 32 years.

On the evening of the incident, the temperature was approximately 86 degrees F with a dew point of 72 degrees F and a relative humidity of 63 percent. The sky was partly cloudy with light winds blowing from the south up to 11 miles per hour. Note: Research by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has shown wind speeds on the order of 10 to 20 mph are sufficient to create wind-driven fire conditions in a structure with an uncontrolled flow path (Madrzykowski and Kerber 2009). The wind condition likely had an impact on fire development and the outcome of the incident. 

On Monday, June 18, 2007, at approximately 1907 hours, Charleston fire units were dispatched to a possible fire behind the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture store at 1807 Savannah Highway in the West Ashley area of the city. Engine 11, Engine 10, Ladder 5, and Battalion 4 were dispatched per department procedures. The on-duty Assistant Chief also responded. While enroute, Battalion 4 observed heavy dark smoke rising into the air and radioed Dispatch that smoke was coming from the direction of the store. Per department procedures, this initiated the response of third-due Engine 16 to the scene.

Battalion 4 arrived on scene driving east to west, pulled past the store and drove down the alley to the loading dock located on Side Delta of the structure. He observed fire burning from ground level to over the roofline outside of the covered loading dock. Note: The covered loading dock connected the front showroom area to the rear 15,600-square foot warehouse facility. Battalion 4 radioed Dispatch that the fire was a “bunch of trash free burning against the side of the structure.” The dispatcher asked the responding units if they heard Battalion 4’s report on the fire conditions. Engine 10, Ladder 5, and Engine 16 acknowledged.

When the Assistant Chief arrived on-scene, he parked in the parking lot in front of the main showroom right addition. The Assistant Chief and Battalion 4 briefly discussed their observations and directed Engine 10 to back down the alley to the loading dock area. The Assistant Chief entered the store through the main entrance located in the center of Side Alpha of the structure and walked down the center of the showroom to the rear (in the original structure) then went back outside. He did not observe any smoke or fire in the main showroom. Battalion 4 drove his car to the front of the showroom and observed the Assistant Chief coming out of the showroom’s main entrance. The Assistant Chief remained at the front of the store while Battalion 4 returned to Side Delta. Note: Departmental policy was that the highest ranking officer on-scene was the Incident Commander. Command was never formally announced at this incident.

While the Engine 11 crew looked for a hydrant to establish water supply, the Assistant Chief and the Engine 11 acting captain re-entered the main showroom. The Assistant Chief radioed Engine 16 to come inside the front door when they arrived on scene. Engine 16 acknowledged. Ladder 5 arrived on-scene at 1912 hours and pulled into the parking lot in front of the furniture store, facing east. Battalion 4 radioed the Assistant Chief and informed him that the fire was now inside the structure. The Assistant Chief radioed Dispatch and requested that Engine 12 be sent to the scene. The Fire Chief advised the dispatcher to relocate Engine 15 to Station 11. Battalion 4 radioed Engine 12 and instructed them to lay a supply hoseline to Engine 10. Engine 12 acknowledged.

The Assistant Chief detected fire when he opened a door connecting the rear of the right showroom addition to the loading dock area. The Engine 11 acting captain radioed that he needed a 1½-inch hoseline inside the building. When Engine 15 radioed that they had relocated to Station 11, the Assistant Chief instructed Engine 15 to come to the scene. The Assistant Chief also instructed Engine 15 to bring a 1½-inch hoseline inside to the rear right-side (Charlie/Delta corner) of the structure. The Assistant Chief radioed that the fire was inside the rear of the structure and was moving towards the showroom.

The Engine 11 acting captain went outside and met the Ladder 5 crew pulling a 1½-inch hoseline off Engine 11. The Assistant Chief radioed Dispatch and requested that Engine 6 be sent to the scene. Engine 6 was dispatched at 1914 hours. The Fire Chief (enroute to the scene) radioed Dispatch to change the assignment to have Engine 19 dispatched to the scene and have Engine 6 relocate to Station 11. Engine 16 radioed the Assistant Chief to ask if they were to go to the rear of the building. The Assistant Chief instructed Engine 16 to come to the front door and bring a 2½-inch hoseline inside. The Fire Chief arrived on-scene at 1916 hours. Note: Beginning at approximately 1916 hours, the Ladder 5 engineer is heard over the radio asking for the 1½-inch hoseline from Engine 11 to be charged.

A mutual aid department noticed heavy black smoke in the area and self-dispatched to the scene. The fire had already spread to the warehouse when the mutual aid department arrived on-scene. After some discussion with the Fire Chief, the mutual aid department was assigned to Side Charlie of the warehouse to begin fire suppression.

The burning furniture quickly generated large volumes of smoke, toxic gases and soot that added to the fuel load. At approximately 1926 hours, a store employee called the city’s 911 Dispatch center and reported that he was trapped inside the back of the building. Note: The employee was actually working near the front of the warehouse opposite the covered loading dock. The employee stated he was banging on the exterior wall with a hammer. The dispatcher told the employee to continue banging on the wall and to stay calm and stay as low to the floor as he could. The dispatcher radioed the Fire Chief and informed him of the situation. This information was also relayed to the city police dispatcher and a police officer on-scene verbally informed some firefighters of the situation. The Assistant Chief and Battalion 5 (who had arrived on-scene) quickly instructed a crew of four firefighters from the mutual aid department to initiate the rescue attempt on Side Bravo of the warehouse. This crew quickly located the point where the trapped civilian was banging on the exterior wall. They were able to cut through the metal siding of the exterior wall using a Halligan bar and axe. The firefighters were able to safely extricate the civilian at approximately 1933 hours. The civilian employee rescue was announced over the radio. The mutual aid firefighters assisted the employee to the front parking lot where he was checked by EMTs.

As the civilian was being rescued, the fire was extending into the main showroom. The fire quickly outgrew the available suppression water supply. The interior fire attack crews could not contain the spread of the fire. Note: At this point, three hoselines were inside the main showroom – the initial 1½-inch hoseline, a 2½-inch hoseline and a 1-inch booster line. All three hoselines were pulled off Engine 11 which was being supplied by Engine 16 through a single 2½-inch supply line approximately 1,850 feet long. Water supply from Engine 16 to Engine 11 was established at approximately 1926 hours. The interior crews from Engine 11, Ladder 5, Engine 16, Engine 15, Engine 19, and Engine 6 became disoriented as the heat rapidly intensified and visibility dropped to zero as the thick black smoke filled the showroom from ceiling to floor. The interior firefighters realized they were in trouble and began to radio for assistance. At least one Mayday was called. Another firefighter radioed that he had lost contact with the hoseline and needed help. One firefighter activated the emergency button on his radio.

Note: During this incident firefighters experienced intermittent radio communication problems and interruptions. Audio transcripts of the fireground channel recorded multiple instances where firefighters inside the structure (including some of the firefighters who did not survive the incident) transmitted over the radio but the transmissions were not heard or not understood. The first recorded transmission of a firefighter requesting assistance occurred at approximately 1927 hours and transmissions requesting “we need help,” “lost connection with the hose,” and “Mayday” continued until at least 1934 hours. The first “Mayday” was recorded at approximately 1932 hours. The first recorded transmissions indicating chief officers were aware of the firefighters calling for assistance was at approximately 1933 hours.

The Engine 6 crew and three firefighters from Engine 15 were able to find the front door and exit the showroom. The front showroom windows were knocked out to improve visibility. Firefighters, including two firefighters from the mutual aid crew who extricated the trapped civilian, were sent inside to search for the missing firefighters at approximately 1936 hours. The two mutual aid firefighters made brief contact with two disoriented firefighters just as the flammable mixture of gases and combustion by-products in the showroom ignited, filling the showroom with flames. The two mutual aid firefighters lost contact with the two disoriented firefighters and were driven outside by the intense heat and flames. One of the rescuers received second degree burns on his face, neck, hands, and arms. An off-duty Battalion Chief and the Engine 6 engineer also entered the structure for a rescue attempt. They were also driven out by the rapid fire spread.

While firefighters were known to be trapped inside, the number and their identities were not known. Interior firefighters were caught in the rapid fire progression and nine firefighters from Charleston were killed.

According to the county coroner’s report, the cause of death for all nine firefighters was carbon monoxide toxicity, smoke inhalation and thermal injury due to fire.

The fire was believed to have started in some discarded furniture in the loading dock area, and though the source of ignition remains undetermined, there is reason to believe it may have been a discarded cigarette. The area adjacent to the ramp was used by store employees as a smoking area.

NIOSH investigators made a total of 43 recommendations in their report including:

• Improving and enforcing standard operating procedures.
• Incident Management System established at all emergency incident operations.
• Initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene be performed before beginning interior firefighting operations.
• Communications procedures and equipment improvements.
• Risk versus gain determination.
• Personnel accountability system implemented at all working incidents.
• Incident Safety Officer established at all working fire incidents.
• Rapid Intervention Team established at all working incidents.
• Adequate staffing to meet the demands of the incident.
• Ventilation operations coordinated with interior fire suppression operations.
• Pre-incident planning inspection program improvements.
• Adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present.
• Mayday procedure improvements.
• Use of thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during operations.
• Truss hazard recognition training for all personnel.
• Promote the installation of fire sprinkler systems in commercial occupancies.

Members of the Charleston Fire Department lost in the line of duty at the Sofa Super Store Fire on June 18, 2007:

• Engine 15 Captain Louis Mark Mulkey, age 34, was a 11½-year department member. He was a graduate of Summerville High School and attended Newberry College and USC. Louis was a Sertoma football and basketball coach with Summerville High School. He was survived by his wife, Lauren; his parents, Ovie and Elizabeth Ann Mulkey; one brother, Wayne Mulkey; and two nieces, numerous cousins and family members. He was buried at Summerville Cemetery & Mausoleum in Summerville, South Carolina.
• Engine 16 Captain Theodore Michael “Mike” Mike Benke, age 49, was a 30-year department veteran. He was survived by his wife, Kim; one son, Hunter; and two daughters, Taylor and Holly Benke Gildea; two grandchildren, Kayla Cofield and C.J. Chris Cofield, Jr.; his father and mother-in-law, Raymond and JoAnn Cofield, Jr.; Rusty, Chris and Charlene Cofield, and nephews Andy Benke and Raymond Cofield, IV. He was buried at Live Oak Memorial Gardens in Charleston.
• Engine 16 Firefighter Melvin Champaign, age 46, was a 2-year department member. He was survived by his three children, Evieon Champaign, Isaiah Champaign and Ruben Charity; his mother, Stella Champaign Ragin; two sisters, Gardenia Moore and Gwendolyn Wiggins; three brothers, Steven Champaign, Julius Cromwell and Carl Champaign, Sr.; his uncles, Rev. Hercules Champaign, Buster Champaign and Michael Fludd; his aunts, Mary Fludd, Lillian Pope, Evelyn Seabrook, Ruth Ragin and Mable Champaign, his niece, Ms. Trina Boyd, and other nieces, nephews, and cousins. He was buried at Stem Point Memorial Cemetery in James Island, South Carolina.
• Engine 19 Captain William Holmes “Billy” Hutchinson III, age 48, was a 30-year department veteran. Billy was member of the Pinecrest Baptist Church, a 1977 graduate of Middleton High School, an avid golfer, and a mason with Hammerton Lodge 332 A.F.M. He was survived by his wife, Phyllis; his three daughters, Christina H. Hughes of Goose Creek, Aubree Leigh Hutchinson and Haley Austin Hutchinson; his mother, Dorothy Hutchison; his brother, Randall and wife Betsy; his grandson, Chase K. Hughes; and his niece and nephew, Bright N. Hutchinson and William “Nick” N. Hutchinson. He was buried at Live Oak Memorial Gardens in Charleston.
• Engine 19 Engineer Bradford “Brad” Baity, age 37, was a 9-year department member. He was a member of Charleston Baptist Church and was a U.S. Marine Corp Veteran. Brad was also a member of the International Association of Fire Fighters and International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees. He was survived by his wife, Heather; and two children; his parents, James Baity and Dorothy; his brother, James Harvey Baity, Jr.; his sister, Sharon Ann Robertson; and his maternal grandmother, Alberta Alice Rogers. He was buried at Live Oak Memorial Gardens in Charleston.
• Engine 19 Firefighter James “Earl” Drayton, age 56, was a 32-year department veteran. He was survived by his wife, Kimberly; his five children, Shawntell Drayton, Jacqueline Drayton Davis, Jeanette Drayton, Evelyn Grant-Mack and Arthur Grant; his stepchildren, Daressa Saulters, Ashley Saulters and Brandon Simmons; his brothers and sisters, Ernest Drayton, Herbert Drayton, Vernon Drayton, Sandra Perry, Thelma Mitchell and Inell Frazier; his brothers-in-law, James Saulters, Kevin Saulters and Gary Saulters; his sisters-in-law, Sabrina S. Alston, Carla Saulters, Cherrilyn Saulters and Sheila Saulters and cousins, nieces, nephews, aunts, uncles and other relatives and friends. He was buried at Payne RMUE Church Memorial Garden in James Island, South Carolina.
• Tower 5 Engineer Mark Kelsey, age 40, was a 12-year department member. A former Washington, Indiana resident, Mark was a 1985 graduate of Washington High School and had a wrestling state championship in 1984. During his school years he, along with his two brothers, raced go-karts and motorcycles competitively for 11 years. He placed second in the American Motorcycle Association 100 class for the Indiana state championship. The three also competed in the national championship at Niles, MI, in 1982 and in Ohio in 1983. He belonged to the Wolfpack Motorcycle Club in Charleston and enjoyed any spare time on his custom bike. He was a member of the Naval ROTC during his junior and senior high school years. After graduation he enlisted in the Navy in August of 1985 and served his country for 12 years. He began basic training in Orlando, Florida, and was then transferred to the Great Lakes Naval Station in Illinois. He served in Bahrain during the Persian Gulf War. He was an engineer at Station 10 and acting captain. He also had been certified as a state fire investigator specializing in arson investigations. Mark also served as a captain with the Ashley River Fire Department. He was survived by his mother, Paula Kelsey; his son, Paul Kelsey; two brothers and sisters-in-law, Lee and Patty Kelsey and Tom and Missy Kelsey; his grandmother, Ruby Chestnut; nieces and nephews, Krista, Kasey, Abby and Sammy Kelsey; and his companion for the last four years, Christina Prevatte. He was buried at Sugarland Memory Gardens, Washington, Indiana.
• Tower 5 Assistant Engineer Michael Jonathon Alan “Frenchie” French, age 27, was a 1 ½-year department member. He also served as a volunteer firefighter with several fire departments prior to joining the Charleston Fire Department. He was currently serving as the captain of the Pine Ridge Fire Department. He was survived by his wife, Donna; his daughter, Kyla; his son, Aidan; His mother, Diane French; two sisters, Brandi D. Clark and Jean M. Dangerfield; his brother, Michael L. Campbell; his grandfathers, Luther William Tarrance, Sr. and Noah French; and a special uncle, Marvin L. Campbell. He was buried at Berkeley Memorial Gardens in Moncks Corner, South Carolina.
• Tower 5 Firefighter Brandon Kenyon Thompson, age 27, was a 4-year department member. Brandon graduated from Stratford High School and was formerly a firefighter for the Summerville Fire Department for five years, a firefighter for the City of Charleston Fire Department at Station 10 for the past four years. He was also a captain with the Pine Ridge Fire Department, which he served for the past eleven years. He was a member of the Firefighter’s Association. Brandon was to be married in four months. He was survived by his parents, Frank Norman Thompson, III and Diane White; two brothers, Frank N. Thompson, IV and wife Brandy and Jeffery A. Thompson and his wife Brandy; his fiancée, Rachel M. Sheridan; two nephews, Kaleb Thompson and Conner Thompson; and his maternal grand-parents, Harry and Lavonia White. He was buried Plantation Memorial Gardens in Moncks Corner, South Carolina.

A public memorial service for the fallen firefighters took place on Friday, June 22 at the North Charleston Coliseum in North Charleston. A procession of more than 300 fire engines, ladder trucks, ambulances, and command vehicles which stretched approximately 7.5 miles long moved single file along a route which passed each of the three fire stations from which firefighters were lost as well as past the site of the fatal fire, while bystanders, police officers, and ATF agents paid their respects by saluting or holding their hands over their hearts. The procession then moved along Interstate 526 to the North Charleston Coliseum. An estimated 30,000 people, including as many as 8,000 firefighters representing over 700 emergency services agencies from around the country attended the gathering.

Charleston Mayor Joe Riley announced on June 27 that the City of Charleston had reached a tentative agreement with Sofa Super Store owner Herb Goldstein to turn the site of the tragedy into a park with a memorial for the nine fallen firefighters. The Charleston Nine Memorial Park now occupies the site. A pathway leads from the parking area to a flagpole and plaque located in the center of the park. The nine markers in the park represent the location where each of the fallen firefighters were found. The new Charleston Fire Station 11 has been built adjacent to the site. Memorials are held annually in Charleston on the anniversary of the fire.

On March 25, 2008, it was announced that South Carolina state lawmakers had approved a bill to name a 3.6 mile stretch of U.S. Route 17 in honor of the fallen Charleston firefighters. The designated section, named the “Charleston Nine Memorial Highway”, runs from the intersection with S.C. Highway 171 to Sam Rittenberg Boulevard and includes the site of the fire.

The names of the nine fallen Charleston firefighters have been inscribed on the 2007 plaque displayed at the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial on the campus of the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

Commentary:

The Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire was a watershed moment for the North American Fire Service. The tragedy showed the importance of recognizing the potential of fire involvement upon arrival at a fire in a commercial occupancy. What started as a simple rubbish fire on a loading dock quickly extended into the store where the fire fed on the volume of flammable synthetic materials provided by the upholstered furnishings on display. An inadequate water supply coupled with inadequate fire streams to match the volume of fire met inside the showroom proved deadly for these firefighters. The lack of fire sprinklers in the occupancy filled with flammable upholstered furniture and bedding and the presence of unprotected steel construction added to the tragedy. Command and control issues also played a major role in the catastrophe.

Members of the Charleston Fire Department learned many hard lessons that day and they should be commended for heeding those messages. They were willing to share their story with the world and have made many organizational and operational changes since the event. New leadership and a change in the culture of the organization have yielded benefits for the firefighters and the community that they serve. We can all learn from their example.

We have attached photos of the incident. Also, several links to more information on the fire:

NIOSH Report: https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/163618

City of Charleston Report (The Routley Report) https://media.cdn.lexipol.com/pdfs/5-15-08_CharlestonReport.pdf

Investigation video from NIST & IAFF: https://youtu.be/lLsZylEzk5I

Video from the incident: https://youtu.be/hr3GLELnqkk

Audio from the first hour of the incident: https://youtu.be/begOYKprFeU

Video documentary on the incident: https://youtu.be/ID-u83pzwUU

Where the CFD is today:

https://www.postandcourier.com/opinion/editorials/firefighters-sacrifice-built-a-safer-charleston/article_c10776a0-70b1-11e8-a4f1-bb039b4f39a2.html

Thanks to multiple media sources for additional information for this article.

Honor the service of the nine Charleston firefighters lost in this tragic incident by conducting pre-incident planning activities at a commercial occupancy in your local fire response district with your crew members today.

Remember Fallen Brothers.

Get Out There And Know Your Local!!!

Time is approximately 1938 hours. Photo taken less than a minute after rescue crews were forced out of the showroom by the interior conditions. Note fire rolling out the showroom windows.