FIREFIGHTER DIES AFTER BEING OVERCOME BY HEAVY SMOKE ON SECOND FLOOR DURING RESIDENTIAL STRUCTURE FIRE – HOUSTON, TEXAS – JULY 9, 2014

Firefighter Dies After Being Overcome by Heavy Smoke on Second Floor During Residential Structure Fire – Houston, Texas – July 9, 2014 – NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Report F2014-15 & Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office Firefighter Fatality Investigation Report FY 14-04

On July 9, 2014, Houston Texas Firefighter Daniel Groover of Engine 104 died after becoming disoriented while conducting interior operations during a two-story residential structure fire. Engine 104 with a crew of four, including Firefighter Groover, was dispatched to a report of a shed fire. On arrival, the engine captain observed fire and black smoke coming from Sides Charlie and Delta of a private dwelling and called for additional units to respond. The crew reported hearing ammunition going off while Firefighter Groover and another firefighter stretched a hoseline to the structure. The captain and Firefighter Groover forced entry at the front door while the other firefighter attempted to knock down fire on the Alpha/Delta corner of the structure. The captain then ordered the engine crew to take the hoseline through the front door. After seeing only minimal smoke and no visible fire or civilians on the first floor, the captain and the two firefighters proceeded to a narrow stairway to the second floor to conduct a search. Encountering high heat, the firefighters backed down the stairs. The captain then realized Firefighter Groover was missing. The captain radioed Firefighter Groover several times with no response, then he informed Command of the missing firefighter. The captain returned to the second floor and could hear a PASS alarm in the room on his left and notified Command. His low-air alarm was going off, so he had to back out. Another engine crew made entry through an entrance off a balcony on Side Charlie at the second floor and located Firefighter Groover unresponsive just inside the balcony door. The injured firefighter was removed from the balcony via ladder. After receiving basic life support, he was transported to the hospital where Firefighter Daniel Groover died from his injuries. The cause of the fire which started in an adjacent shed and spread to the attic of the residence was undetermined.

The residential structure involved in the incident was a two-story single family dwelling of Type V Wood Frame construction built in 1963 on a slab foundation. The structure had been remodeled in 2012 and consisted of 4,608 square feet of living space. The first floor consisted of a large living area, large kitchen, full bathroom, master bedroom with full bath, attached two-car garage, and an attached storage shed, which contained ammunition reloading equipment, ammunition components, and ammunition. The second floor had two bedrooms, a full bath, and a sewing room with French doors that led out onto a balcony. The first-floor exterior was covered with brick, and the second floor was oriented strand board covered with vinyl siding. In the rear of the structure, the first floor had a covered patio, and the second floor had a large balcony. The attic space above the master bedroom was open to the garage attic space. The garage attic space connected to an 11-foot x 15-foot unfinished void space of the second floor. The unfinished void space shared a wall with a second-floor bedroom and was open to the attic space above the second floor living area. There were no significant exposures on the exterior of the dwelling.

The City of Houston is the most populous city in Texas, and the fourth-most populous city in the United States with a population of 2,304,580 residents in 2020. Located in the southeast portion of the state near Galveston Bay and the Gulf of Mexico, it is the seat and largest city of Harris County and the principal city of the Greater Houston metropolitan area. At the time of the incident the city had a total area of 656.3 square miles and was protected by the Houston Fire Department which was the fourth largest fire department in the United States and served a population of 2,239,000 residents. The fire department was rated by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) as a Class 1 fire department and was an Internationally Accredited department through the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI).

At the time of the incident, the fire department employed 3,907 personnel, of which 3,789 were uniformed members. The daily minimum staffing for the Emergency Response Division was 832 personnel. The Emergency Response Division was divided into two divisions – north and south – with a deputy chief staffing each division on each shift. The South Division had 13 districts and the North Division had 11 districts. The Emergency Response Division directed all fire suppression, special operations and emergency medical services from 92 fire stations with 87 engine companies, 37 ladder or truck companies (including 5 tower ladders), 56 basic life support (BLS) ambulances which were staffed with 1 EMT/B firefighter and 1 EMT/B engineer operator per unit, 34 medic units (advanced life support) (ALS) with 1 firefighter paramedic and 1 engineer operator paramedic; and 11 squads (non-transport ALS units) staffed with 1 firefighter paramedic and 1 engineer operator paramedic. Additional units on duty included 3 rescue companies including 1 heavy rescue and 3 safety officers.

The fire department provided aircraft rescue firefighting (ARFF) for two large commercial airports from four airport fire stations. The fire department provided automatic aid with one career fire department and one volunteer fire department which were located in entities within the municipality. The fire department was part of a regional mutual aid pact which covered transportation emergencies in the greater metropolitan area. In calendar year 2014, the fire department responded to 318,630 incidents (276,880 EMS and 41,750 Fire). The average response time for a fire incident was 5.8 minutes.

The fire department required potential candidates for employment as a firefighter to have a high school diploma or GED and 60 hours of college credit, or two years of military service with an honorable discharge. Once selected as a candidate, the firefighter trainee began a 15-month probation period and was first required to attend a 9-month Recruit Training Program at the department’s fire academy. The training consisted of state approved curriculum that included 468 hours of training that covered NFPA qualifications for Fire Fighter I & II, Hazardous Materials-Awareness, and Hazardous Materials-Operations, NIMS 100 & 200, 700 & 800. In addition to the firefighter training, the firefighter trainees received Emergency Medical Technician Basic (EMT/B) certification. Upon completion of recruit school, the firefighter trainee was assigned to a probationary period serving two-month periods each with an engine company, a ladder company, and with an EMS unit. Upon completion of probation, the probationary firefighter was promoted to the rank of firefighter.

The department required that all Emergency Response Division firefighters receive two hours of continuing education unit training, one hour of risk management training, and 24 hours of in-service training per month. The department also conducted live fire training for all members twice a year at the department’s fire academy.

Firefighter Daniel Groover had 21 years of firefighting experience. He was certified as Fire Fighter I & II, Live Burn Fire Fighting, Driver Operator/Pumper, and had attended various firefighting courses related to aircraft, and various other administrative and technical courses.

Weather conditions at the time of the incident included a temperature of 92 degrees F and the relative humidity was 54%. Wind speed was 11.5 mph and wind direction was from the south under overcast skies (Weather Underground). Note: Research by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has shown wind speeds on the order of 10 to 20 mph are sufficient to create wind-driven fire conditions in a structure with an uncontrolled flow path [Madrzykowski and Kerber, 2009]. The wind conditions at the time of the fire likely had a significant impact on fire development and the outcome of the incident. Since the wind speed was greater than 10 mph, it may have contributed to the fire getting into the void spaces toward the main living area of the residence.

On Wednesday, July 9, 2014, at 15:55 hours, the county dispatch center transmitted a still alarm for a shed fire at a private dwelling at 1510 Mistletoe Lane in the Kingwood section of northeast Houston. The initial unit dispatched was Engine 104. Arriving on scene, the Engine 104 Captain observed fire and black smoke coming from Side Delta and Side Charlie of the structure and called for additional resources. This upgraded the alarm to a box alarm that dispatched Engines 102, 103, & 63, Ladders 102 & 101, Squad 64, Ambulance 56, and District Chiefs 102 & 64. Note: Engine 104’s station was less than a mile from the structure fire. The Engine 104 Captain corrected the address for the dispatch center and advised them that ammunition was going off. District Chief 102 was in route and heard the captain’s transmission and requested a confirmation of a working fire. The captain replied affirmative.

The Engine 104 Captain attempted to do a 360-degree size-up, but, due to a fence and ammunition going off, he was unable to complete it on Side Delta. Firefighter Daniel Groover and a second firefighter from Engine 104 had pulled a 1 ¾-inch hoseline off the engine. The captain met up with Firefighter Groover and attempted to force entry into the garage exterior man door on Side Alpha. Firefighter Groover was using a sledgehammer but was only able to open the door a foot while the second firefighter tried knocking down the fire with the hoseline on Side Delta of the structure. When Firefighter Groover was swinging the sledgehammer, his mask-mounted regulator was swinging freely and hitting the SCBA donning switch. The captain informed Groover that he was losing air. This occurred several times. It is believed that Firefighter Groover may have turned off his cylinder valve at that time. The Engine 104 driver engaged the pump then took 100 feet of 4-inch supply hose toward the hydrant on the Alpha/Bravo corner of the street.

At 1607 hours, District Chief 102 and his incident command technician (ICT) arrived on scene. District Chief 102 gave a report to dispatch that heavy smoke was coming from a two-story residence, assumed Command, and sent his ICT to assist the Engine 104 pump operator with the supply hose connection to the hydrant. Command was approached by a civilian, who stated he had the owner of the dwelling on the phone and that no one was home but their three dogs. When Ladder 101 arrived, Command directed them to ventilate the roof. After helping establish a water supply, the ICT began to set up the accountability system. The Engine 104 Captain and Firefighter Groover forced entry at the Side Alpha front door. At 1609 hours, Ladder 102 arrived on scene and was ordered to ventilate the roof since they were the first arriving truck company. The Engine 104 Captain then went to Side Delta to have the second firefighter from Engine 104 bring the hoseline to the Side Alpha front door. The Captain noticed that some of the fire was knocked down but now fire was in the attic and smoke was coming out of the eaves and ridge vent on Side Delta. The Engine 104 Captain and second firefighter made entry at the front door and began to search the first floor.

At 1610 hours, Engine 102 arrived on scene and was ordered to pull a second hoseline to back up Engine 104. Engine 103 arrived and was assigned as the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT). The Engine 104 Captain and Firefighter Groover had opened the interior man door to the garage and opened both garage doors and saw no smoke in the garage. After seeing only minimal smoke, no visible fire or civilians on the first floor, the Engine 104 Captain and Firefighter Groover proceeded up a narrow stairway to the second floor where they met up with the second Engine 104 firefighter, who had tried to pull more hoseline to reach the top of the stairs. The Engine 104 Captain requested a pike pole, so the second firefighter went to the apparatus to retrieve it.

At 1612 hours, Ladder 101, Ambulance 56, and Squad 64 arrived on scene. The Engine 104 Captain, Firefighter Groover, and the second firefighter went up the stairs and encountered a louvered door at the top of stairs. The Captain opened it and saw a scuttle hole to the attic. The Captain opened the attic access panel but could only see dark, brown smoke and used a thermal imager but did not see any fire.

At 1613 hours, Command ordered the Ladder 102 driver to cut the utilities, and a minute later Engine 63 arrived on scene. Command radioed the Engine 104 Captain for a status report but did not get a reply. District Chief 64 and his ICT arrived on scene and was assigned to Side Alpha and District Chief 64’s ICT assisted with accountability.

The Engine 104 Captain observed three other louvered doors in the hallway. He started on his left and opened each door, using the thermal imager to scan the room. He never saw any fire or civilians, but he did notice that doors closed on their own after he moved back into the hallway. At 1616 hours, Ladder 101 was ordered to take a 1 ¾-inch hoseline supplied by Engine 104 to Side Delta. A minute later, the Ladder 102 driver reported to Command that fire had broken through the roof on Side Bravo. Command asked for a report from Engine 104. A minute later, the Engine 104 Captain radioed Command, but the message was inaudible.

After the Captain completed the bedroom search, he used a pike pole, opened holes in the ceiling, and heard a firefighter say it’s getting hot, he was low on air, and “Let’s go get flashlights.” The Engine 104 Captain pulled the ceiling as he worked toward the stairs and saw the second firefighter go down the stairs. As the Captain and second firefighter descended the stairs, the second firefighter asked where Firefighter Groover was. The Captain had assumed Groover had already gone down the stairs because he never saw Groover go past him when he was on the second floor.

At 1621 hours, the Captain radioed Firefighter Groover several times with no response. Note: The captain had mistakenly called the second firefighter’s radio instead of Firefighter Groover’s. Ladder 102 notified Command that the roof was vented on Side Charlie. The Engine 104 Captain notified Command they were coming out to change SCBA cylinders. The Captain saw District Chief 64 at the front door and informed him that Firefighter Groover was missing. The Engine 104 Captain radioed Command to see if Firefighter Groover was in alarm on the electronic accountability system. Ladder 101 notified Command that they had a firefighter they were sending out with a burn injury. Command notified Squad 64 to check on the burned firefighter.

The accountability officer noticed that Firefighter Groover was in alarm and tried to radio Groover for a verbal response but, no response came. At 1624 hours, District Chief 64 tried to radio Firefighter Groover with no response. Again, the accountability officer radioed Groover. The Engine 104 Captain was low on air but went back up the stairs to search while the second firefighter went to change his air cylinder. At 1625 hours, District Chief 64 notified Command that he was activating the RIT. A minute later, the Engine 104 Captain heard a faint PASS device in the room to the left through a closed louvered door. The Captain opened the door and could still hear the PASS alarm but had to back out because his air was getting very low. He radioed Command about hearing the PASS and having to back out.

At 1628 hours, District Chief 64 notified the RIT that Firefighter Groover would be in the second-floor bedroom to the left. Minutes later, the crew from Engine 63 made entry through the exterior Side Charlie double doors on the balcony to the room on the second floor and found Firefighter Groover just inside the doors. The Engine 63 driver notified Command they had removed the missing firefighter to the balcony. Engine 63 and the RIT took the unresponsive firefighter down a ladder off the balcony to the rear yard. At 1635 hours, Command called for defensive operations while personnel accountability reports (PAR) were in progress. At 1642 hours, PARs were completed as Ambulance 56 transported Firefighter Daniel Groover to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.

According to the county coroner’s report, the cause of death for Firefighter Groover was smoke inhalation. The firefighter had a carboxyhemoglobin of 22 percent.

Investigators theorized several possible casualty scenarios. Firefighter Groover was found unconscious and unresponsive on the second floor with his facepiece partially dislodged and helmet off. It is not known why his helmet was off and his facepiece dislodged but one possibility is that the firefighter attempted to remove his facepiece (shedding the helmet) and was exposed to products of combustion due to an SCBA or out-of-air emergency. The air cylinder was later discovered to have approximately 500 psi of air remaining. He may have become unconscious and collapsed on the floor. In a second possible scenario, investigators noted that the top half of the louvered closet door was broken out. It is possible that Firefighter Groover thought this was the door on the left being the way out and tried to break through it, causing him to become trapped. (The entry door to the room was the same louvered style.) And in a third possibility, investigators noted that the right panel door had a nonoperating handle on it, but it was bent downward, possibly by Firefighter Groover trying to open the door just prior to him becoming unconscious.

According to the state fire marshal, the fire started in the storage shed that contained ammunition reloading equipment, ammunition components, and ammunition. The fire developed in the shed, causing the heating of an unknown item, likely a propane bottle, resulting in an explosion. The explosion damaged the west wall of the shed, providing additional ventilation. The fire then developed, further igniting available combustible materials, and spread through the eaves of the residence into the attic. The fire then spread through the attic in a north and east direction. The cause of the fire was undetermined.

Indicators of significant fire behavior included:

• Ammunition going off.
• Smoke and fire on Side Delta upon arrival.
• Heat and heavy black smoke in attic and void spaces.
• Second-floor hallway attic access opened, and ceiling pulled, causing heat and smoke to push down.
• Heavy fire on Side Charlie, both first floor and attic.
• Fire under control approximately 31 minutes after arrival.

NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that led to the fatalities:

• Crew integrity.
• Air management.
• Mayday procedures.
• Firefighting experience.
• Operational characteristics of the SCBA and other life safety devices.
• Fireground communications.
• Ventilation timing.
• Hoseline deployment.
• Construction features of the residence.
• Munition Hazards.

Firefighter Daniel David Groover, age 47, was a 21-year member of the Houston Fire Department and was assigned to Engine 104. He joined the department after serving five years as a medic in the U.S. Army. Danny had also previously served as a paramedic. He was a second-generation firefighter; his father, Captain Gary S. Groover (retired), was a Houston firefighter for over 30 years. He is survived by his loving wife of 13 years, Ellie Groover; his adult sons, Marcus Rodriquez, Thomas Vela and Cory Groover; his parents, Gary and Joyce Groover; his three grandchildren and numerous other relatives and a host of loving friends.

On July 12 hundreds of Houston area firefighters and emergency responders gathered with the family and friends of Firefighter Daniel Groover for a memorial service honoring the fallen firefighter. A procession was held from College Park High School to the Woodlands Church where the service was held. Interment services were on July 14 at the Houston National Cemetery.

The name of Firefighter Daniel Groover has been inscribed on the 2014 plaque displayed at the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial on the campus of the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

Commentary:

Maintaining orientation under high heat and low visibility conditions is a basic firefighter survival skill. While we will never know why and how this firefighter got separated from his crew and then became disoriented in the structure, we can learn from this incident. We also do not know why his SCBA facepiece became dislodged causing him to be exposed to the toxic environment. Firefighters need to be trained in basic air management and SCBA emergency techniques and must also be trained to declare a Mayday when encountering disorientation and SCBA emergencies while in IDLH atmospheres.

We have attached photos and floor plan diagrams from the incident. The link to the NIOSH report is here: https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/163405

We have also attached the link to the Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office investigation report: https://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/fire/documents/fmfffgroover.pdf

We have also attached the link to an article on firefighter disorientation by group member William Mora published in Firehouse magazine:

https://www.firehouse.com/safety-health/article/10495887/the-firefighter-disorientation-challenge

Thanks to multiple media sources for additional information for this article.

Honor the service of Firefighter Daniel Groover by reviewing your department’s procedures for dealing with SCBA emergencies and by reviewing your department’s Mayday procedures.

Remember Fallen Brothers.

Get Out There And Know Your Local!!!