Hey…
While not directly related to injuries from firefighting, a Fort Wayne (IN) Firefighter is on medical leave after he became involved in a "push & shove" with another firefighter at the scene of a working fire. FW Chief Pete Kelly told the media that the firefighter’s actions can be linked to stress. The Firefighter does not face any disciplinary action…here is the video:
WORKING FIRE RESPONSE REPORT-Staffing, Command & Control:
Poor response? Poor staffing? Who is responding? No command or control? No accountability? Poor radio communications? The following info about a fire in North Stanford (CT) is hardly the only place this could happen. The good news is that no Firefighters lost their lives-and there are plenty of "lessons learned" for any FD.
EVERY fire department, career, call or volunteer, past history shows what all of our responses and service levels will generally be or not be, who will probably turn out and what response times will be…and we need to plan for that. If we don’t know who is turning out-we need to figure it out (see next paragraph) …but odds are, past responses will provide reliable and predictable data into future responses. After all, if your FD has low staffing and no plans for command and control today, odd’s are it will also be a problem tomorrow. And in so many un-staffed FD’s, once the tones go off, it may be a "crap shoot" to see who turns out and when they might show up.
A common issue for un-staffed call and volunteer FD’s (as well as career FD’s with re-call) is that many have no idea who is responding until they turnout. We shared this link with you a while back and we think this is one of the BEST solutions, designed by firefighters: www.iamresponding.com … this product provides a dirt cheap solution for un-staffed FD’s. As you know, we are self funded and accept no funding from anyone-so this isn’t an advertisement…we just feel that once in a while, a product (or whatever) can make a major difference in FF safety…since adequate staffing can directly lead to a safer fireground…and we pass it on.
In the case of this fire, the FD in CT would have known "immediately" who is turning out-as just one solution to the various issues. One way or the other, every FD has a responsibility to know "what will respond, the quality of the response and how quickly they’ll arrive" when the 9-1-1 caller is reporting a bad day. We are very thankful no FF’s were seriously hurt or killed in this fire…and hope we all can learn from this "close calls" example.
The consultant hired to evaluate this early October house fire in North Stamford (CT), was blunt last week in blaming the FD for their lack of response, command, control and overall leadership that led to the house burning down. The majority of things that went wrong, went wrong within the first 20 to 25 minutes…response was a big problem in this fire as it began with only 3 Firefighters responding to the first alarm: 2 on Long Ridge engines and a 3rd FF who responded POV. A request for mutual aid from other FD’s didn’t come until 6 minutes into the fire..and this delayed the arrival of additional companies 21 more minutes into the fire.
AUTOMATIC AID CANCELLED – THEN RE-ESTABLISHED:
This was the first significant fire in Long Ridge where they went without the automatic aid response of the nearby Turn of River FD. Shortly before this fire, the Turn of River Fire Chief asked that the automatic mutual response agreement with Long Ridge be limited to a "request only" agreement, so his FD could save money. Long Ridge has since signed a similar agreement with Stamford Fire & Rescue that will re-establish an auto-aid plan, but there was no automatic mutual aid agreements with any FD at the time of the October fire. What would have been best for those who dial 9-1-1? We sometimes forget about them….but they are really the only reason we exist.
The report folks found several instances where FF’s failed to use proper and accepted practices adding to the potential of danger to the FF’s. The report criticized the first arriving units for failing to establish command, which caused confusion on the fireground when add’l companies arrived …not knowing who was in-charge. A reliable water supply also was not established until 21 minutes into the fire. And while hydrants in that area are rare, there was one 900 feet down the road. Instead of using this hydrant, the 2 1st due engines attacked the fire on the first and second floors using tank water. When both drivers went into the burning home by themselves to fight the fire without backup units, they violated "two in two out rule" for interior structure fires…at minimum. Lots for all of us to learn. Here is more:
From all of us to all of you-the BEST for a Wonderful Thanksgiving.
Nothing to be thankful for? Look again.
Take Care-BE CAREFUL.
BillyG
The Secret List 11-26-08 / 2150 hours
