Thursday, October 26, 2006  Incident Description: At approximately 1815, myself and the academy members, my two assistant instructors and our engineer for Engine 7 arrived at the training site and began preparing the drill. My assistants stocked all four vehicles with Class A materials while the academy class began laying out the hose lines for the drill. The 2 ½ inch line was charged, but the wye was left closed and 1 ¾ inch lines were both left dry. Firefighter XXX, acting upon my direction, broke the driver side window of the vehicle to provide adequate oxygen to the fire. I gathered the academy class and reviewed the expectations for this drill, and reviewed safety procedures. They were divided into two two-person teams and one three person teams. Each team was assigned a safety officer/instructor. The plan was to have two teams fight a different car fire simultaneously, with the third manning a safety/back-up line. We had a brief discussion on hose streams, and instructor signals. Due to the fact that we had only 6 SCBA with us, and 7 students, I made the decision to handle the ignition duties sans SCBA. I was wearing my full firefighting PPE ensemble, including bunker pants, coat (collar up and secured loosely), gloves, Nomex hood and helmet. I cannot recall if my hood was actually over my head or around my neck, but judging from the burns I received, I believe it was around my neck. My helmet is not equipped with a face shield or Bourkes (due to prior damage) and the chin strap was not under my chin but behind my head. At approximately 1835, I filled a cup with about 24 ounces of gasoline (instead of diesel, due to previous issues with ignition failure during cold weather and repeated extinguishment) and splashed it into the passenger compartment. At this time, the students were instructed to don their gear and prepare to begin. There were some delays, and the students were just about ready at approximately 1845, although the lines off of the gated wye were not yet charged. I stuck a flare and approached the vehicle, hoping to get it lit and let it get a good start before the students made their attack. My initial attempt at ignition failed, as I was unable to get the driver seat headrest to ignite. Suspecting that the fumes from the gasoline might be a potential flash hazard, I knelt by the driver door and reached my arm up and over the sill of the window, turning my head and sticking the flare down towards the floor of the car. It was at this time that there was a loud “whump” and a significant concussion. The impact of the explosion was powerful enough to knock my helmet from my head and throw it approximately fifteen feet and push me back. I was not knocked unconscious, nor was I knocked from my feet. I could feel right away that my eyebrows had been singed, and my face was very warm. I did not, at this point, think that I was injured beyond that. As my assistant instructors approached me, they asked if I was OK, and I replied that I thought so. They, along with firefighter XXX, took me to Engine 7 and examined my face. It was then that they discovered many small lacerations, probably a result of the remaining windows in the car breaking in the explosion. It also became apparent that I had received burns to my entire face, my ears and left side neck, and that I was bleeding from my nose as well. An ambulance was called and while we waited, I did my best to clean my face with saline and 4x4 gauze pads. Engine 2 arrived shortly thereafter (perhaps at 1855?) and firefighter XXX assumed my medical care. When the ambulance arrived about 5 minute later, XXX walked me to the ambulance and assisted with my care enroute to the hospital. I cannot accurately provide much more information for the next several hours due to the various pain medications I was administered, but upon my discharge from the hospital later in the evening, I was informed that I had sustained first degree burns to my face, neck and ears. There is some moderate blistering, and significant pain. There was no evident damage to my respiratory system and my eyes appear to have been unscathed. LESSONS LEARNED This incident, and my injuries, were completely avoidable. This was no accident, but an incident caused by a failure on my part to appropriately address my own safety on the drill ground. Below you will find a list of omissions and failures on my part that led to my injuries. Fuel Choice: My FD uses diesel fuel as an accelerant when doing live fire training such as this due to it’s significantly higher flash point . I chose to use gasoline due to the ease of lighting and re-lighting during repeated extinguishment while training. This was a poor choice on my part, and a contributing factor. To my knowledge, the NFPA recommends against the use of ANY accelerants during live fire training. The relatively small amount of gasoline I used proved to be more than enough to create a DANGEROUS fume build-up which, when ignited, created an explosion. Ignition Method:As long as I have been teaching similar classes for vehicle fires with my FD, the method of ignition was to attach a highway flare to a broom stick with duct tape and ignite from a distance. I personally have used this method DOZENS of times safely. During this incident, I failed to bring a broom stick and decided to initiate ignition with the flare in my hand. I honestly did not even remember the stick trick, and never considered the danger of this ignition method. This omission on my part placed me at arms length from what was essentially a low-yield bomb. Protective Gear: Due to the shortage of SCBA on the drill ground, and the fact that I wanted to get this class completed by 2200hrs, I made a hurried decision that the students would all wear SCBA to facilitate rapid rotation of the teams through the various fire scenarios. I was therefore not wearing an SCBA during ignition! Had I been wearing an SCBA, this report would not be necessary. Also, I was not using a faceshield or ANY other eye protection. The only reason my eyes were not severely injured was because I had them closed at the time of the explosion. My eyelashes and eyebrows were completely burned off, and the deepest burns are around my eyes. This is probably the most terrifying issue surrounding the whole incident for me. I did receive moderate burns and cuts to my ears and neck as well. As I stated in the initial pages of this report, I cannot remember if my Nomex hood was up or down, and am not positive that I had it on. Due to the injuries I received, I must assume that it was down or I wasn’t wearing it. Once again, a simple, unconscious omission on my part results in preventable injuries. Additional Factor: This Fire Department currently has little or no written standards regarding safety in our SOGs, rules and regs, or by-laws. Many of our training procedures are based simply on what we saw the guys who trained us do. This is a huge deficiency, and easily remedied by adopting NFPA 1403 as our guideline, which we have not done, but I have recommended after this incident.  

Thursday, September 28, 2006  It was a normal training night. Our newly appointed training coordinator had planned a "fire fighter challenge" type of drill. This is always a fun drill to see how fit you are compared to your fellow firefighters. Everything was going as planned. We were toting around pales of foam, carrying a ppv fan and of course the ladder climb with a tool. Several of our members had already proceeded through this course with no incidents until our overzealous Training Coordinator decided it was his turn. He is the type of person that always has to be right and must be the center of attention. He was doing well but not as well as some of the other guys had done. He climbed the ladder and decided to a ladder slide. This consists of placing the ff's hands and feet outside of the rungs of the ladder and sliding down the outside rails. He was dropping fast (dressed in full ppe and pack, no mask). As he reached the 3rd from the bottom rung something went wrong and his knee made contact with the rung. This shattered his knee cap and propelled him backwards onto the concrete apron. Our worst fear was that he had suffered some sort of back injury. He was extremely lucky to only having a knee injury. This did require surgery and extensive rehab. Being a Vol. FD we do have workers comp, but they only pay medical and $18 a week for work pay. This guy is no longer a Training Coordinator, but is still wearing a red helmet. He did return to full duty after several weeks. LESSONS LEARNED 1. Everyone must perform all activities in a safe manner at all times. NO EXCEPTIONS! 2. Even if you have insurance or workers comp you might be surprised to find out how little coverage that you have. 3. Don't place a person in a position that they are not qualified to perform. 4. Set the example by being safe. There is no room for show boating in the fire service (Paid or Volunteer.)  

While we were out training on a new Yamaha Rhino (similar unit pictured below) one firefighter was injured. The two were training on the Rhino and were horse playing around. They were doing donuts in the loose dirt and gravel back by the L.P. props. They stopped and changed drivers and the new driver attempted a curve too fast. He turned the unit over on its' side. The passenger stuck his leg out and the unit rolled onto his leg. He received 5 stitches and a bruised ankle. He was placed on Injured On Duty (IOD) and the driver was taken for testing ....and then taken home. NO HORSEPLAY on the Training Grounds. You train like you operate.  

Thursday, May 11, 2006    "...one hour into the training, the scenario turned into a rescue..."
 
Swift Water Rescue Tech I class, (DRI curriculum). After a full day of classroom instruction, day 2 was on the White River, just south of Indianapolis, with the water at about normal level. 20 students and three very qualified instructors. The first scenario was to row across the river to a specified point. As two teams had failed, myself and another individual made a third attempt. We were very close, yet fighting the strong current as we were on the outside bend. The current swept us into overhanging tree branches. I grabbed a branch to hold our position and the inflatable was instantly swept from under me. Having full swift water protection on and a personal comfort in the water, for a second I wasn't worried until the next second I was immediately forced into a strainer, which is the rest of the tree in the water. I estimate the water velocity moving at about 5-6 knots. I was instantly pinned with the water at my shoulders, facing downstream. I honestly thought it was my time, knowing this is how victims and rescuers die. One hour into the training, the scenario turned into a rescue. Having twice seen the survival video, that included navigating these obstacles, and all the composure that was left, I was able to lift myself over the strainer and was washed out it. Unfortunately it wasn't over. A throw bag had reached close enough for me to grab but was hung up in the tree so I couldn't be swept to the shore. The rope was also at my waist and was down stream from me which meant the current was forcing me into it. I remained upright with the PFD but I was flexed at the hips due to the current. Only one of the two instructors who came for me actually made it, and was able to locate and cut the rope, and tow me to shore.
LESSONS:

1)Recognize the environment you're in. If any aspect is unfamiliar, slow down and realize that ignorance or misguided self-confidence may get you killed.

2)Make sure ALL protective gear is worn properly and you are familiar with it.

3)ALWAYS understand that EVERY training can turn into an emergency,especially the more the conditions are similar to the real thing. You must be prepared to respond.

4)Trust your instructors and know the material. Focusing on what you've been taught will help you to avoid panic.

5)NEVER leave the boat unless it is a planned part of the evolution, or you are fully qualified to handle every aspect of the water.

The lessons above summarize several spur-of-the-moment mistakes I made. Hindsight is 20/20 but in the moment, you have very little focus on the big picture.

There are many more lessons, and a few other parts of this story that complicated matters.

Stay safe and make sure your family knows you love them.
 

Monday, May 8, 2006  On April 21st, I was teaching a firefighter how to operate the pump on our 2005 pumper.  We were supplying the engine with a 2 1/2" supply line from a hydrant that flows at approximately 100psi, while flowing 160 GPM from a smoothbore nozzle on a 200 foot 1 3/4" handline.  We had been switching from tank water to hydrant and back for about an hour.  As the tank neared the empty mark, we went to fill the tank, which is where it all went south on us.

As the firefighter cracked the Tank Fill valve, I cracked the 2 1/2" inlet valve.  At about the time both valves were fully opened, there was a loud bang from inside the pump enclosure and water began spraying from every crack, seam and opening on the panel.  Both of us jumped away from the panel for a second, not sure what was going on.  We then both moved to shut the pump down, with the firefighter attempting to close the Tank Fill valve while I tried to shut down the 2 1/2" inlet and take the rig out of pump mode.  As we reached for our respective valves, the top half of the pump panel broke loose, barely missing out heads as it slammed open with enough force to break th panel and dent the light enclosure on the panel.  It just barely caught the back brim of my helmet as it went over, and it still had enough energy behind it to spin me around!

At this point, we were able to shut the rig down.  Upon inspection of the pump, it was noted that the RUBBER hose from the Tank Fill valve to the tank had blown loose, allowing over 100 psi of water out of the 2 1/2" piping to spray directly at the pump panel.  At this time, we do not know if the hose clamp failed or the hose failed.

Lesson Learned:

Proper PPE should ALWAYS be considered for whatever fireground operation a firefighter is doing.  Pumping a fire engine is often considered a mundane task and many firemen choose not to don the their bunker gear, helmet and eye protection.  This is a potentially fatal error.  A second sooner or later, a couple inches higher or lower, and either one of us could have been injured, maimed or killed in this incident.  We are issued PPE for a reason, guys!  Let's make sure and use it.

 

Sunday, May 7, 2006  The importance of safety was brought home to a couple of our guys today.  While walking the hose lines checking for leaks on NEW 5in DJ hose section, that was only about 30 ft away, let go from the coupling.  The hose was being tested at 300 psi per NFPA and had been under pressure for about 3 minutes.  The noise from the hose burst could be heard at the pump panel over the engine and the pump tester which were both running.  The two firefighters who were standing about 30 ft away saw the hose let go described it as being over six feet in the air.  As I am sure you can understand it startled them to say the least.  

All agreed that if they had not stopped to look at a coupling just before the happening they would have been right beside the break when it happened.  This would have seriously hurt two of our own if not possibly killing them.

 

SOME FACTS

Saturday, April 22, 2006   Our department was recently approached by a property owner in our district, requesting our assistance burning down a mobile home on their vacation property.  The trailer was an old one, infested with termites, and the owners, as well as their neighbors, would prefer to see it burned rather than torn down and allow the termites to migrate to neighboring structures.  We jumped at the chance, as we seldom have a structure offered to us in this manner. 

Since the owners wanted the trailer burned soon, so they could begin construction on their new camp, we accepted that we would not be able to use the structure for numerous training sessions...it would be a simple burn-to-the-ground exercise.  However, we did spend considerable time planning how to do it safely.  Our main problem was that of exposures....the owner's boat shed approximately 30 feet behind the trailer, a neighbor's camp approximately 30 feet from the B-side, and another neighbor's house 80 feet away on the D-side. 

On the day of the burn, we spent a great deal of time securing a water supply, carefully placing handlines to protect the exposures, and conducting a detailed safety briefing so that all members knew their roles and responsibilities before the burn began. 

We ignited the structure, using only hay as a fuel (no class B accelerant's whatsoever).  The burn proceeded as planned and the fire progressed more or less as we predicted.  Handlines were flowing to protect the exposures on the B and C sides, due to their proximity to the burn structure.

As the fire reached its peak, the radiant heat was intense.  However, the previously placed handlines did their job, protecting the nearby structures.  However, the structure on the D-side, 80 feet away, and the one we were least concerned with during our planning, proved to be the vulnerable point.  The building, 2 stories high with vinyl siding, absorbed more heat than we anticipated.  The vinyl siding warped from the heat, almost instantaneously....by the time we recognized it was happening, the damage had been done.  We turned a handline to cool the wall, but it was too late to prevent the damage.

In the end, the entire side of the house will have to be re-sided, with the fire department's insurance paying the bill.  An expensive lesson learned:  Despite our extensive planning, handlines in place, and other precautions, we underestimated the effect of radiant heat on a structure 80 feet away, as well as the fragility of vinyl siding when exposed to relatively moderate heat. 

Although no firefighters were in danger from this exercise, the cost in property damage, and to a greater extent, public perception, was detrimental to us.  Although the homeowner was very gracious about the whole incident and took it rather well, we all felt pretty bad about it.  I hope that by reading this, some other department out there will learn from our mistake, and learn to consider ALL possible scenarios when planning live burns.   

Monday, April 10, 2006  Our Fire Company was approached by an estate and contractor to burn down a house.  Our (former) fire chief looked over the structure and found it ok to light off.  The house had been lived in by an elderly man who collected everything and anything!  House was 2 1/2 story, wood framed, filled with junk.  Across from this house are three other dwellings and there is a hydrant about 300' from the B/C corner.  The morning of the burn was a cool, dry, clear, November day.  We gathered at the firehouse. got our radio designations and operations channel.  County dispatch was advised that there will be a "training" burn going on in the area.  Equipment that will be on scene will be two engines (1000 gals each), mutual-aid tanker (3000 gals), Rescue-Squad, and our brush unit (250 gals).  Chief said there would be no need for any other lines since this will controlled.  We were not going to do any suppression practices with this house, just "ease-it" into the foundation.  Crews did a walk through which allowed for some frustration venting on windows and walls.  After that was complete, the chief directed myself and another FF to put old gasoline and diesel fuel in the basement. (all windows and doors were out of the house).  A FF threw a flare at the basement door, but missed.  I took the flare to the B/C corner and did a toss and run.  As I quickly walked away from the house I turned to see if I made it when......BOOM!  The loudest explosion I ever heard as the B/C corner of the house from Sub-level to Floor 2 just disappeared!  I was hit with not only debris, but also the gasoline we dump in.  Following the earth shattering ka boom, the house all at once burst into flames.  As I staggered back to the staging area, crews were rushing to get lines pulled for exposures.  As I sat in the tailboard scared and crying, I awaited for EMS to arrive. (there was no EMS on the scene)  I was transported to local ER and treated for minor chemical burns from the gasoline. 
Upon my return to the fire scene I walked up to the chief who sat with his head down and nearly in tears.  He was very upset by his actions and offered many apologizes.  As a firefighter, I am ashamed by my lack of common sense.  I was also upset not only with the chiefs, but the SAFETY OFFICER., and everyone else who could have said, "Maybe this isn't a good way to do this!" 
Just a few months ago I learned that the chief never filled out the correct paperwork with environmental protection.  After a "brief" investigation into the incident, it was discovered that the natural gas meter may have still been the house.  The contractor said he just shut the line off at the street and cut the line to the rest of the house.  Was this the cause?  Had the chief done the paperwork, he would have seen that ALL utilities MUST BE checked!  To this day I have not filled a complaint with E.P. or anyone else.  I never thought about this incident to your site until I read the latest training mishaps. 
 
www.FireFighterCloseCalls.com
SURVIVAL REMINDER:
 
NFPA 1403


"LIVE FIRE TRAINING EVOLUTIONS IN STRUCTURES"




=Training center burn buildings that are properly and legally procured and prepped�.including a FULL inspection of WHAT is inside & what will burn.

 




=Adequate water supply and space for all equipment, personnel and apparatus.

 




=A pre-burn briefing session.

 




=Use of fuels that have known, controllable burning characteristics.

 




=Presence of a seasoned, trained and qualified safety officer.

 




=Use of a fireground communications system, a realistic and usable accountability system, a building evacuation plan, backup safety and replacement personnel, EMS (on scene) and a pre-burn search.

 




=Use of full PPE

 




=What is the comparison between your DAILY FD OPERATIONS and YOUR TRAINING EVOLUTIONS?

 




=Consider the DIFFERENCES between your TRAINING and your FIRE SCENE OPERATIONS!

 

Saturday, March 4, 2006    Who is qualified? Who is trained? WHO is in charge?
The STANDARDS are out there-we just have to WANT to respect them.
 
My partner and I were placed in charge of lighting the fire in a practice burn.  It was a one story older home, approximately, 3000sq. feet.  We were lighting a fire in the master bedroom which was attached to the living room by a 25' hallway.  The bedroom itself was 15' by 25'.  We were to light the fire and then exit the building to allow the attack team to enter.  I was concerned about this since the interior instructor was certified, but had very little hands on experience.  Our IC was the same way, very competent on paper but almost no hands on experience and he refused to listen to anyone who was not an officer.  We lit the fire, and it built up so fast, that we were having fire beat us out of the bedroom door 25' from the ignition area.  We ran to the hallway where we had placed a charged 1 3/4" line for our protection.  By the time we got there, we had black smoke to the floor.  We pushed into the room approximately 2 feet and started to knock the fire down.  I heard it and felt it darken down significantly.  I radioed the IC and advised him of the situation and the need to ventilate the fire room since it was not a safe training environment.  He advised to keep the evolution going and for my partner and I to exit the structure.  When we crawled out of the hallway into the living room, I saw the smoke was still black and pushing out of the hallway into the living room from ceiling to floor and I was concerned the fire had built back up and was getting ready to flashover.  The attack team was made up of 3 brand new firefighters and the instructor.    Without knowing who was starting down the hallway, I grabbed one of them going in and said, "the room is probably 20 seconds from flashover, you need to start cooling the overhead."  Then exited as per ordered.  As my partner and I exited, we saw turbulent, pressurized black smoke pouring from the two windows, sliding glass door (which had been removed prior to operations but was boarded up with plywood) and the attic gable.  Against orders, we ran back into the house to put the fire out.  There was no radio communication with the attack crew because the instructor had forgotten one and the new firefighters had never been trained to bring one.  Upon re-entering the living room, the smoke that had been pushing into it was now turbulent with fire rolling out the top of the hallway.  The instructor was still in the living room and had sent two of the new firefighters who had never been in a fire before down the hallway alone.  My partner and I got our line we had used earlier and that was still in the living room and entered the hallway with the nozzle open.  We pushed all the way down the 25' hall with the nozzle on and without receiving very much water back down on us.  (Prior to operations I had set the pump on the engine so that we were receiving 150gpm.) We made it into the bedroom and started knocking the fire down.  I ventilated the windows, door and knocked the attic fire down before the interior instructor came into the room.  The two new firefighters who were in the room both suffered burns to their ears, necks and shoulders.  They both required new sets of PPE for theirs was ruined. 

Later during the investigation it was determined that they had been given zero instruction on what to do, how to do it, or how to recognize dangerous smoke and fire conditions.  They both thought that I was joking when I told them the room was close to flashover, because they didn't think they would be placed in that situation.  Prior to the fire, I had voiced my concerns to the IC about the instructor and had also voiced my concerns to my Lt. (who was outside safety) about the IC because he would not listen to us and would not allow us to stay inside and instruct the fire attacks.  We came within seconds of killing two of our personnel (one of whom quit over it and the other is now a career member with us) due to lack of training, inexperienced instructors, and an IC who refused to listen.

It is imperative that fire departments shed the "Good old boy" system, and stop placing poorly trained and inexperienced people in positions of authority, just because they have taken a few classes and a certification test.  A piece of paper does not substitute for an experienced, trained, firefighter.  Start training for the low frequency, high risk incidents.  Train every day like your life depends on it because it does depend on it, and learn something new everyday.  Understand and be great at the basics before everything else, or you may not survive long enough to get to the everything else.  Realize, train for, and equip your personnel for the fact that every time we are engaged in firefighting, someone may get hurt.  Pay attention, BE PROACTIVE with training and firefighter safety.  Treat every incident as the one that might kill you.   Train hard, be safe, God bless you all.

 

Tuesday, February 21, 2006  By Willoughby Mariano and Susan Jacobson Sentinel Staff Writer

(FireFighterCloseCalls.com NOTES: This article has been re-posted due to requests 2/06)

November 24, 2002

KISSIMMEE -- For the first 10 minutes, the training exercise seemed so ordinary.

Osceola and Orlando firefighters lighted a fire in the closet of an abandoned house. It burned. Flames shot through a window. Firefighters sprayed water and the flames died down.

Then Orlando fire engineer Tim Wright poked a metal pole through the broken pane of a plate-glass bedroom window and pulled out a white fire helmet, still aflame.

Something was wrong. But firefighters had yet to discover that Osceola Lt. John Mickel and rookie Dallas Begg had died in a superheated burst of flame and smoke, merely feet from others who survived, according to transcripts of interviews with firefighters on the scene July 30.

Through hundreds of pages of transcripts and reports released last week, firefighters tell investigators about the tumultuous minutes during what seemed like a typical live-burn exercise -- and how they stumbled through a narrow passageway against the blistering heat, steam and dense smoke, unaware that the training exercise already had turned deadly.

This fire was supposed to be the first in a series that training day, and Lt. John Simpson, the scene commander, planned few surprises for the patch of overgrown grass and abandoned buildings at the former Florida Bible College, according to the transcript of his Aug. 12 interview.

The "victim" was a life-size mannequin dressed in a fire helmet and jacket, and firefighters knew the layout of the house.

Simpson gave them a tour, pointed out the closet where the fire would burn and set the ground rules: Ten short blasts of a horn meant firefighters must evacuate immediately.

Osceola firefighter Steve Carroll set fire to straw and wood pallets with a flare. Two Orlando firefighters shoved a mattress across the bedroom floor to Osceola firefighter Bryan Harris, who said he tossed it on the flames.

Then they walked out of the room.

"I heard a distinctive sound," Harris said. "It went something like 'whoosh,' and I had made the comment, 'there went the mattress.' "

That mattress may have helped cause a flashover, superheated flame that ignites everything nearby, even the air, according to the investigator's report.

At 10:10 a.m., Carroll radioed to Simpson: "Interior's ready; go ahead and send them in," Harris recalled.

Roof flames cause concern

Outside, in the tall grass, an Osceola fire observer focused her video camera on firefighters as they pulled on air packs, masks and other gear. Carey Graham, an Osceola fire inspector, sat out front on a lawn chair and signaled Mickel with a "thumbs up."

Mickel returned it and disappeared with Begg into the burning house. It was Begg's eighth day on the job and Mickel's 10th year. Together they formed the exercise's search-and-rescue team. Their mission: to sweep the home's interior and rescue the victim.

Other teams followed as Graham watched the thick, black smoke rise in the front bedroom behind a pane of glass.

The fire seemed small. There were barely any flames, he told investigators.

Around 10:13 a.m., on orders from Simpson, Wright walked to the bedroom window and used a firefighter's pole to break it.

The move was supposed to help firefighters inside by clearing smoke and heat away. Instead, the fresh air fueled the deadly flashover, according to reports.

Smoke and flames jumped through the hole and licked the roof, Graham said, then subsided as quickly as they started. Something seemed wrong.

"I remember looking around at everybody thinking that wasn't right, and didn't seem right. But nobody else seemed to be concerned," Graham said.

Graham also noticed a silhouette, the form of a firefighter inside the burning bedroom. At the time, he thought it was a member of an attack team squirting water with a hose. But when night fell hours later and the accident was over, he realized he was wrong.

"When I had later learned that Dallas Begg was pulled from that area, I figured that's what I saw," Graham said.

No response starts panic

Inside, firefighters could not see the fire they fought. They could not even see each other. The smoke was too thick. They identified each other through touch and through the sounds of their voices. To avoid the heat, they kept low to the ground.

The sequence of events is unclear from the transcripts, but Harris thinks Begg bumped into him as he rushed into the building, nearly knocking him over. Carroll said he heard Mickel talking to Begg, teaching the younger man how to conduct a search.

"I remember hearing Mickel say, 'Did you search the room completely?' and Begg saying, 'Yes.' " Carroll said. "That's the only thing I really heard clearly. They were talking like a rescue crew . . . "

That was the last anyone heard from the men.

Towing a fire hose, engineer Dennis Whittemore and two other firefighters of attack team one ran in behind Mickel and Begg, squeezing through one tiny room, then a narrow passageway 2 feet wide, then another cramped room.

The fire was hot and needed water, so Orlando engineer Randy Dickson asked if everybody was out of the burning bedroom.

"They're out," someone responded.

"And I said, 'They're out of this area, out of the fire room? And he said, 'Yes,' " Dickson said.

They were wrong.

Whittemore pulsed water into the darkness, shooting searing steam onto Harris' back. The steam may have pushed Mickel and Begg back into the blazing bedroom, an investigator's report says.

"I started to just feel steam on my shoulders, my hands, my neck," Harris said. "I got as low as I could. At one point I was even on my stomach; I just couldn't shake it."

Harris ran outside with Carroll, stumbling over Orlando Lt. Michael Pelletier and firefighter Thad Heath of attack team two as they pushed forward and opened their nozzle.

By the time Carroll exited, Simpson already was worried.

He had watched Wright pull out the shell of the helmet from the bedroom window, and he realized there could be a problem.

"It kind of threw me for a loop because it was white, and I was trying to figure who would have a white helmet on in the building?" Simpson said. "And things were starting to, to, click in my head."

He hadn't heard from the search-and-rescue team. Maybe no one had.

At 10:17, Simpson called out over the radio for Mickel and Begg. No response.

At 10:18, Simpson called out again, and a minute later he asked if anyone was missing a helmet.

At 10:23, Simpson gave the order to evacuate and sent Dickson into the smoky darkness with a flashlight. He needed to account for his men.

Sirens blast as men work

Ten horn blasts sounded, the signal to leave.

Pelletier of attack team two turned to tell Heath to evacuate, but then he caught a glimpse of what he thought was a mannequin. He reached to pull it from the fire.

"I remember the air pack coming apart; the gear was actually starting to come apart as we were trying to drag, still at this point not realizing," Pelletier said.

"What I was still thinking [was] it was the rescue mannequin, until we rolled him over and the air mask actually came off his face and we realized that it was a firefighter," Pelletier said.

They radioed for help. Others scrambled to pull Mickel's body out through the window.

One was Orlando engineer Walt Lewis, who threw off his air mask, helmet and air pack and went to work on Mickel, trying to revive him on the ground. Time seemed to shift, he said. His vision felt altered.

"I guess the best way to describe it is in some war movies that kind of show where the one person is focused on something and everything else behind, around, is a blur," Lewis said. "That's the way it seemed."

Then a helmet flew out of that blur, a sign that a firefighter was signaling for help. Dickson had found Begg propped up by the window. Another firefighter down.

Simpson called for helicopters and ambulances. Paramedics worked. Sirens wailed. The ambulances arrived and took Begg and Mickel away.

Dazed, the men pulled off their gear and walked out onto the weedy grass and dead leaves. They knelt and said nothing.


 

Friday, September 23, 2005  As a new FF recruit (about 8 mos) we read the site religiously in order to get whatever tips I can, since we have small department with not much fire volume. The below close calls were all part of a �live smoke� training in an abandoned house we did last week. While they weren't things that caused a lot of pause after the training sessions, it reminds me that the basics are ever important. Close Call #1 � My partner and I are on the first evolution and we are training on primary searches. We make our way through the entire home, and are nearly completed with the search when I come upon what I expect is one of the �surprises� they claim to have for us. With the near zero visibility, my sweeping hand comes upon a small object � and in the faint glow of light, it looks like a stuffed animal. As I chuckle to myself, I go to pick it up, and am impressed that our department could afford such a realistic prop cat. My hands wrap around its torso (I think, again, how impressive the doll is with its mass and slight squishiness) when its tail starts to wrap around my arm. At this point, I am sure that our department can�t afford any robotic cat prop, and that this must be the real deal. I call over one of the instructors, who confirms my suspicions, and we immediately take the cat to fresh cool air, and administer oxygen therapy. Thankfully, although the cat was showing signs of oxygen deficiency and was very sedated, after a few minutes of oxygen, it became more alert, hopped up and ran home. This could have been bad for the cat, and bad for the VFD in terms of PR, since this was clearly someone�s pet. The close call was from: 1) not adequately securing the training structure when note in use (there were some small holes animals can get in through); and 2) not adequately searching the home prior to starting the smoking process to verify it was clear of people AND animals. Someone asked the question � what if it had been a possum or a raccoon� I smiled and raised my axe� Close Call #2 � My partner and I am are on RIT, when a MAYDAY call comes through (it is made clear that this is a �training� MAYDAY and not the real deal). We rapidly find the firefighters (one of whom is a rookie like me) in a back bedroom, who are disoriented and cannot find their way out of the bedroom (door shut behind them). It turns out that the other rookie really was a little disoriented and panicky, and as I was in the process of leading them to the door, he began to sweep with his axe, as if to resume the search of the house � but unfortunately was swinging with the handle (rather than head of the axe) and rather than at floor level, was right at my head�s level. Sure enough, his axe hits my head, and luckily my helmet was in between the two, or my wife would make me quit the department for sure! The close call was from: 1) Not emphasizing the �obvious� enough to recruits � relax, don�t swing your axe at head level, remember to hold the axe by the head, etc. 2) Not recognizing that the recruit was in a panicky state, so that we could reassure him everything was OK.  

Friday, August 5, 2005  ...the senior officer in charge said the room we were in was just a few seconds away from flashover... Last Fall my department had a training burn at a house that was slated for demolition. This was the first night of the burn and my company was first up to burn. We lit the fire in a back bedroom and fueled the fire with only a little bit of hay and one pallet. There was on burn about 10 minutes before it was my crews turn. The heat and gasses still remained in the house due to no ventilation. So we light the fire in the bedroom and wait about 20 seconds to let the fire build up. My team makes entry and the fire had grew so rapidly that it met us at the front door upon entry. We made our way down the narrow hallway with a 1 3/4 inch hand line and when we got about half way down the hallway we realized we were in trouble. The room we were in was about to flash over. The visibility was at zero and I couldn't even see the reflectors on the persons in front of me air pack--even with my flash light shined on it. The smoke was banked down to about an inch off the floor and the flames were rolling over on the ceiling. The senior officer in charge said the room was just a few seconds away from flashover. 3 people got burned one with 3rd degree burns on his ears and one other firefighters bunker gear was toasted including the thermal layer and moisture barrier. Many things were wrong with this burn first off there was no ventilation horizontal or vertical, there was only one hose line in place, also we did not ventilate between fires so the heated gasses and smoke remained in the house further making the fire grow rapidly. Many changes were made the next night during the burn which included a safety line coming through the back door into the house and also ventilation was performed to ensure the fire did not get out of hand again. This was only a training exercise and there is no reason that any training fire should ever get that hot and out of control to where firefighters get burned or almost killed and our department will forever change its training methods based upon this close call.  

Monday, April 25, 2005  My Ladder company arrived to a 2 story residential fire with heavy charged smoke coming from the second floor. As the D/O (Driver/Operator) on our Ladder company it was my duty to establish a secondary means of egress for interior companies that were gaining entry. Per our department procedure, this is one of the responsibilities of the Ladder co. D/O anytime that their is 2 or more stories, in addition to starting some simple horizontal ventilation once hoselines are in place. I grabbed a hook, ladder anchor, and a 24' ladder from the truck and made my way to the "C" side of the house and completed a one person raise on a smooth concrete slab. The window was already open with light smoke showing from it. At this time I radioed my inside team (Lt. and firefighter) and the Incident Commander of the secondary egress location. At this time I did not feel comfortable leaving the ladder there (with the relaxed angle) unsecured on the smooth slab if a brother was in need of using it in a hurry to escape. So, without anyone footing the ladder I proceeded up to anchor the top rungs into the window sill. I was in full PPE, and SCBA without my mask on my face. When I reached the sill, I secured myself to the ladder with a proper "leg lock" in the rungs and hooked the anchor to the sill and looked down to secure the rope to the rungs. As I completed my hitch, the Engine company opened up their line as they advanced up the interior stair well. Without adequate ventilation yet, there was only one way for the fire to be forced out. I looked up just as the hot smoke and gases hit me in the face. Before I could do anything, I felt an incredibly hot sensation in my chest and felt myself begin to lose consciousness. I don't know how long I was out for, but it could not have been more than a few seconds. I was hanging to my right side by my right leg on the ladder rung. I struggled to upright myself on the ladder with all my effort. It was very difficult to unlock my leg from the rungs, since as I had to rise up to withdraw my leg, it put my head back up into the now venting window. I freed up my leg and quickly descended the ladder. It took me a moment to collect myself as I realized how luck I just was. I could have easily been burned both on my face as well as inhalation burns to my airway and lungs. Furthermore, I could have easily fell to the ground approximately fifteen feet to the concrete slab below. After gathering myself and completing my tasks, I met back up with my Lieutenant and made him aware of what had happened. We assured that I was O.K. and the Incident Commander was also made aware of the "Close Call". Lessons learned: When climbing a ground ladder ensure that someone is footing it. When entering a potentially I.D.L.H. atmosphere, wear your mask! When working from a ground ladder if at all possible, lock in with your truck belt or a leg lock. It saved me from all of the other mistakes that I made leading up to that point. Also, this incident occurred on a "controlled" practice burn. Does that make it worse? It really didn't make a difference  

Monday, April 11, 2005  It was during a training of structure fire and I was inside the middle of doing the training when my partner passed out in the middle of searching part of our training.
He was claustrophobic and forgot to tell me about it. So we"re in the middle of doing a search of a two story house when he passed out on the top floor and we where in full gear. So I finally start to feel dead weight on my turn out pants.
I keep pulling him until I found the victim and I looked back on him to find him not responding to me--yelling at him through my scba mask I dropped the victim and found out that all the training i've had on first aid was going to pay off.
I started to remove his gear when I smelled smoke. They where lighting the house up with us inside!!!
I pulled him slowly to a blacked out area when I saw the rest of the department telling me to go down stairs and start my hose training. So I yelled down to them that my partner is passed out. By the time we got back inside it was really hard to see because we had black smoke in front of us!! I finally heard my alarm go off and I just stood up and picked my partner up in my arms and started my way down stairs to the front door. I guess that the hose team saw my flashlight because they came and got my partner. After this all happened I learned to never ever do a second story search w/o command knowing and to communicate better with your partner. I also learned to carry a radio at all times while on call.
 

Courtesy of The Commercial Appeal October 22, 2004 Some Memphis firefighter recruits say the "Hell Night" exercise they endured -- and that landed trainee James A. Coleman in a coma -- was a far cry from the one Fire Department officials described. Director Richard Arwood said recruits had regular 15- to 20-minute breaks during the eight-hour session Oct. 12 and that instructors monitored recruits' pulse and breathing. But several recruits told The Commercial Appeal the only people having their vital signs checked were the seven loaded onto ambulances. Some said there was a bell they had to ring if they couldn't handle Hell Night's rigors. Nobody wanted to ring it, they said, but a few did. Department brass said the training wasn't meant to humiliate recruits so they wouldn't have required recruits to ring a bell if they were unable to go on. After hearing details about Hell Night, Larry Anderson, of the Fire Department Safety Officers Association in Massachusetts, said it sounded a lot like hazing. He said that type of training, made to break recruits, is uncalled for. Memphis Mayor Willie Herenton, citing potential lawsuits, won't comment. Fire officials now say they are doing a thorough investigation of what happened on Hell Night. Coleman has been unconscious since. Six recruits suffering dehydration were treated at area hospitals. Doctors said Coleman didn't have a heart attack or stroke and seemed in good physical condition, his family said. They don't know what happened but fear he may have gone too long without oxygen. Arwood, the fire director, said details he gave out last week about Hell Night were based on standard training procedures. Now, he said, department officials are questioning many of those involved, from recruits to instructors. The emotions from having a recruit collapse into a coma made it difficult to get a firm grasp of what happened, he said. "We're now seeing that the full investigation is what's going to really get the facts for us." Nine recent academy graduates and fire recruits, including some who called The Commercial Appeal to talk about the incident, shared their Hell Night experiences. They asked that their names not be published for fear of losing their jobs. Some said the training was intended to break them, while others called it necessary preparation for fighting real-world fires. A firefighter from Class 84, which graduated in February after having its own Hell Night, said his training was tough, but not over the top. And he said there were adequate breaks. Others -- including some from Coleman's class -- described recruits vomiting in their masks, gasping and wheezing for air and being pushed to the point that they nearly threw up liquids while drinking. On Oct. 12-13, the current recruit Class 85, whose members started in July and are about halfway through, was split into two groups. About 45 went through training the first night. From there, the group was broken into smaller teams of four to six recruits, who went through exercises, called "evolutions," through the afternoon and night. They jogged the "Memphis Mile" between the Frayser fire and police training centers, carrying a 40-pound hose pack and wearing full firefighter gear, including jacket, pants, boots and gloves -- and weighing about 35 pounds. An air mask, tank and back plate added another 35 pounds. If someone dropped a pack, which happened Oct. 12, the whole group ran the Memphis Mile again, recruits said. They used the short breaks to guzzle water and Gatorade. In another evolution, they chopped wood for three minutes, while wearing full gear. They also carried a nearly 200-pound dummy about 100 feet. During all this, recruits said, instructors harassed them and told them to ring the bell if they couldn't take any more. Ringing the bell would be admitting failure -- and nobody wanted to do it, they said. An evolution called "Shake and Bake" put recruits in a dark tower where they take off their gear, get it reassembled and back on in a minute. Some groups that didn't make the time cut had to run the tower's stairs. Others said punishment for mistakes was doing pushups or running a mile. They rappelled off a six-story tower and ran about 40 yards carrying a pressurized hose, which takes tremendous work to control. They were blindfolded in a dark, smoke-filled building, crawling on hands and knees to reach a water nozzle, then had to follow the hose line to find their way out. The first set of evolutions lasted about four hours, then they broke for a 30-minute lunch, and started again, putting out propane, car and building fires and rescuing someone trapped in a car. The training was cut short by Coleman's collapse, recruits said. Thursday, the 41-year-old was strapped to a bed in Methodist North Hospital's intensive care unit. He's breathing on his own, family said, and his eyes flutter and limbs move, but he hasn't regained consciousness. It's a waiting game, his brother Gregory Coleman, 38, said. The family's priority is his brother's health, but they also want fire officials to say what happened, he said. "The secrecy of it all has bothered me."