Thursday, January 3, 2008  On October 23, 2007, while training at the smoke house facility, a Deputy Chief detonated a smoke grenade (approved for use by the Fire Chief and another Deputy Chief). The smoke grenade turned out to be tear gas (CS M7A3). 19 firefighters were injured. 2 required hospitalization. The Board of fire Engineers admitted they didn't know what they were using and thought it was a smoke grenade, even thought the container was clearly marked "GRENADE, HAND, RIOT, CS, M7A3" in red with a red stripe. One Deputy Chief said all the canisters looked the same. Just like buying milk at the market. Just different colors. The board of engineers later responded that they didn't need to apologize to anyone because they didn't make any mistakes. LESSONS LEARNED: Always where your SCBA for any smoke house training, even if you are outside the building. Also, ask what is going to be used by training officers so you can get a look at it. Pressure your town to hire a fire chief and/or deputies that are trained in firefighting. Not just a town citizen that wants to be chief.  

Instructors: We can preach all we want-but if we don't set the example by actions-our words are nothing but BS. Firefighters burn to death annually at TRAINING BURNS. This can very easily be fixed....if we wanna. Full "modern-head to toe with no exposed skin" PPE-all the time... ...and a full and serious understanding that the goal is to not kill or seriously burn a participant...OR a Fire Instructor. Never been burned wearing your "old gear" ? You got lucky. Wanna play? Get a game. Wanna do this job for a long time? Get smart. These photos are from a live fire training burn in late 2007..... (This submission to FirefighterCloseCalls.com was in memory and honor of FDNY Captain John Drennan, R.I.P.)  

Monday, November 5, 2007  On a live fire training exercise, I was assisting a lead instructor in setting up a warehouse burn. Concrete building, piles of pallets, the usual drill...and of course all the pallets were outside. I used that as an excuse to leave off my SCBA while running burn material up and down stairs and into the warehouse area. The captain started burning the piles of pallets inside while I was chugging more to the burn rooms, so I got a good dose of smoke before the exercise even started. I donned my SCBA for the drill, but in the middle of the evolution, while leading young firefighters through a search drill, I almost became a live "hose dummy" and had to evac. LESSONS LEARNED: Controlled environment or not, a live burn means live smoke and heat. I should have been wearing my SCBA before the kindling got lit...I know better. The accumulation of smoke didn't strike me until several minutes later, and I nearly passed out, in the middle of a drill. What if I had been on a roof, or needed to assist one of my young firefighters with an emergency of their own? I got lucky.  

Thursday, August 16, 2007  My department is a combination volunteer/paid department. We were conducting live fire trainings at our training centers burn house. I had a volunteer assigned to me for an evolution, so my crew was myself, a career firefighter and this volunteer. Our task was to take a handline to the second floor of a residence to extinguish a bedroom fire. I had the volunteer feed hose from the first floor up the stairs to the second floor where we pulled it to the bedroom. We needed about 5 more feet of hose to reach the bedroom, so I went back to tell the firefighter at the bottom of the stairs to feed more hose. That firefighter was no where to be found. I asked the safety people if they knew where she went, and they said they thought she went outside. I radioed and yelled for her to no avail. I then radioed a MAYDAY and retrieved my other crewmember to start a search. Command never received the mayday, and as we were starting down the stairs, she reappeared and we then put the fire out. I immediately came outside to find out why the RIT standing by was not activated by command. They said they never received a mayday. I knew I heard it transmit over a radio. LESSONS LEARNED: What we found out was the firefighter went outside to stretch more hose without notifying anyone. When I transmitted the MAYDAY, I did not push the transmit button hard enough and the radio I thought I heard was my voice amp attached to my mask. I never confirmed with command that they heard the MAYDAY, and that was my fault.  

Saturday, July 28, 2007  During the course of the last two months our fire district has been training in an acquired structure that will be torn down in the near future to be replaced by an office building. The last training conducted in the structure consisted of stretching hand lines in through the outside basement entrance and advancing them into the 1st floor bedrooms to simulate a second floor fire in a two story home. This day we conducted 6 evolutions consisting of (3) three person companies with 2 instructors in the building. One instructor was assigned to the basement level with another on the 1st floor. After the completion of the last evolution the instructor in the basement called me down to show me something he had found. Over the last month or so metal scavengers have been ransacking the home tearing out anything metal that can be sold. What we found was the scavengers cut out the main support I beam in the basement leaving the floor joi sts that contained 3 nails each supporting the load where they overlapped. Luckily enough this was an older home built in the 60’s and nothing happened but the potential was there. Lessons Learned: Prior to any training session in an acquired structure, survey the structure to make sure nothing has been done that will alter the stability of the building. Secure the building to try and prevent this from happening. In our case the scavengers had permission from the builder to be there but no limits were set on what could be taken. If this situation happens to anyone else, establish ground rules on what can be taken and what has to stay.  

Sunday, July 1, 2007  While conducting NFPA 1410 drills, and unloading a portatank from the side of a tanker, one of the retaining straps came undone and the tank tipped, striking me in the head before my partner and I could get positive control of it. The tanker was parked at a bit of an angle, and my partner had not worked with this particular apparatus before. It was an extremely hot day, and very tempting to be down to just turnout pants and a t-shirt seeing as it was 'just training'. But we were in full PPE. LESSONS LEARNED: Everybody needs to do 'walkthroughs' before going on to time-trails; even on seemingly innocuous tasks. Without the PPE I would have suffered a bad gash at least, or possibly a more serious head or neck injury. No harm done because we followed the rules in spite of discomfort.  

Saturday, June 30, 2007  I have attached a video clip taken from a BFD security cam showing a hydrant gate that failed yesterday while we were doing pumper relay training. An intake on the truck had just been closed and the gate failed. Fortunately no one was in the path of the flying gate...or this would have been an injury report or possibly worse. Following the incident we found that the gate failed at the female coupling (cast broke). This gate was on a reserve engine, with the age of the gate unknown (probably more than 20 years old). The gate was made of pyrolite. It appeared that the threads were rounded allowing the gate to “vibrate” when under pressure. With a surge in pressure the gate mostly likely twisted a bit causing the cast to break. Immediately following this we inspected all our hydrant gates (both the threads and the valve assemblies) and removed 4 from service that have the same thread wear. It goes to show that when we inspect our equipment, that we really need to be detailed!  

Wednesday, May 23, 2007  We have placed firefighters in extremely dangerous situations and risking their lives for no apparent reason during a so called training evolution. On approximately May 14th, 2007 the **FD acquired a vacant singlewide mobile home to be used for a �firefighter down� training scenario. The structure was completely boarded up from the inside and sealed to obscure light from entering the building. Several employees of various fire departments were to attend the training on May 16th, 2007. The **FD was to take the lead and instruct �rookie� firefighters from other departments was well as their own on interior firefighter operations, including victim search and rescue. The instructor and safety officer had briefly described the scenario to the firefighters involved earlier that day. In his description they would place a live firefighter inside the mobile home, light it on fire, search for the victim and suppress the fire. A lay out of the building was never discussed; a walk through of the building was never performed before the live drill took place. When asked if firefighters could walk through the mobile home they were denied, with the reason being it had to be as realistic as possible. There was not a safety briefing prior to the event taking place, RIC teams were not assigned and only one Engine had attack lines pulled off for the training scenario. There was not a secondary water source established, the water provided to the primary engine was from a tender (a hydrant was not used). The utility company was not advised that there was a live fire drill about to take place and none of the full time **FD employees participating in the event were allowed to put in for overtime pay or other means of compensation. The facts and events leading up to and after the live fire drill have been documented by a Union member who was the �victim� or down firefighter inside the mobile home. He was instructed to don his protective gear and SCBA, enter the structure and light the fire. He was told that everyone was ready for the drill to begin. He asked for a hand held radio and was denied. He asked if he was to turn on his PASS alarm, he was instructed to light the fire and hide in the building, do not use your PASS alarm. He described to me the interior of the mobile home; all of the windows were boarded up FROM THE INSIDE, the bath tub (preformed fiberglass) was packed with wooden pallets, trash and other debris and set on fire with a mixture of diesel fuel and gasoline. As he lay down inside the building the conditions rapidly deteriorated. He yelled for assistance and requested for the designated interior crew to come in and put out the fire. There was confusion on the exterior as to who was assigned to suppress the fire. He stated �they acted as if they were not ready for the drill to being.� Several more vocal attempts were made by him for the crew to come in and put out the fire. Finally a crew made entry but due to their inexperience they could not advance the line properly and put out the fire. At this time the fire �rolled over� the interior crews and started catching other parts of the structure on fire behind them towards their only exit. The crews, including the victim, were barely able to escape without being injured. Once outside the lead instructor instructed the firefighters to �let it burn� and not suppress the fire. Adjacent to the burning mobile home there was another home approximately 10 feet away which started to catch fire. Other lines were pulled and an attempt was made to protect the exposure. The adjacent mobile home sustained damage to the windows which broke out, the window frames melted, and interior drapes and blinds melted. Along with this damage the electric service caught fire, burned the weather head and utility pole to the ground causing a power outage for at least one block. By now the structure was fully involved and other **FD engines were arriving to suppress the fire. The mobile home burned to the ground and the victim was left with unanswered questions. It is my understanding the several OSHA violations were committed and several NFPA 1403 violations occurred. Again, to recap: the victim was sent in without a radio (by himself); a RIC team was not used; a safety briefing was not performed; a walk through for other firefighters was not completed; a secondary water source was not established; accelerants were used to start the fire; materials other than class �A� combustibles were used to fuel the fire; damage was incurred to other structures by the training fire and full time firefighters were not paid. It is also my understanding that the EPA was not advised. I feel this action allowed by the Chief and Captain risked firefighters� lives unnecessarily. OSHA as well as the EPA should be involved at the highest priority. I need assistance immediately on how to proceed and contact information for the above agencies.  

Monday, April 9, 2007  Recently a local fire department was given the oppertunity to practice truck operations at the local high school. The school was at the end of the multi-million dollar renovation in which a three story new building was built and the existing back wings built in the 50's were to be torn down. They were given the chance to train on venting procedures on the roof. As they were pacticing with the k-12 on the roof creating a hole the captian accidently cut too much out of the roof. This caused the roof to collapse into the space between the ceiling tiles and the roof. The only reason why it did not go all the way thru was because of the webbing holding the roof up. Then as they were practicing forcible entry in the building they did not use any kind of breathing apparatus to protect themselves from the visible asbestos and concrete dust in the air. Over the next few days, members were complaining of a strange sensation in their throat. LESSONS LEARNED: #1: Be careful when you are venting #2: Be careful when training #3: Be careful and know what you are doing on the roof #4: IF YOU KNOW IT IS DANGEROUS FOR YOU...THEN FREAKING PROTECT YOURSELF FROM IT THERE ARE TOO MANY FIREFIGHTERS DYING FROM PROTECTIBLE THINGS  

Sunday, April 1, 2007  Our department was involved in live fire training in an acquired structure, the building had been prepped strictly following NFPA 1403. The structure is a warehouse covering an entire city block and was mostly non-combustible construction with an attached cinder block and concrete office. Due to the size of the building (aprox. 150,000 sq. ft.) and the construction (the area for live burns was the separate office occupancy attached to the warehouse area) electric utilities were left on in the warehouse but isolated from the office. On this day we had completed 3 training evolutions, each involving 4 companies. The training staff set 5 pallets and � a bale of straw in the office in a room that had not had a fire in it on any previous day. The straw was ignited and the evolution was begun, the initial engine company made entry and knocked down the fire approximately 5 minutes after initial ignition. As the training officer I was observing from the stairway directly above the entry point and watched 2 firefighters on the nozzle on their knees extinguishing the remainder of the fire when a sudden bright flash occurred at the ceiling above their heads and sparks flew throughout the room for approximately 5 seconds. Emergency traffic was called and the evolution was immediately stopped by the training officer. The building was evacuated and no one was injured. Investigation afterward revealed the electric panel in this part of the building with all of the breakers turned off was a subpanel and the 440 volt line feeding it from another panel in another part of the warehouse ran through the ceiling of the fire room. The metal conduit had melted leading to a short. LESSONS LEARNED: 1. For training in acquired structures assure all utilities are disconnected. This will require extra diligence in commercial structures due to redundant power sorces and feeds thast do not come from the pole to the panel as we are used to in single family residences. 2. We completed over 100 live fire evolutions in this building with one close call due to diligence of following NFPA 1403. One close call was too many. 3. Always assume and work as if electric is present in a strucure. We had been assured by qualified utilities personnel that the building had been isolated. After this incident I have heard 5 other "stories" from our members of electrical close calls during incidents.  

Tuesday, January 30, 2007  January 28, 2006. NCDOT had donated two single family dwellings to our department to use for live fire training. Everything went well during the day. All the NFPA 1403, local and state requirements had been fulfilled. We had a great water supply, 1 instructor for every 3 firefighting students, good accountability, good safety briefings, a safety officer, etc. What could go wrong? We had a 2 1/2" line wyed off with one 1 3/4" attack line attached. While the primary attack crew was advancing on their set fire, the 2 1/2" rolled over and closed the valve. As soon as their line went limb, the instructor maydayed and the crew retreated and evacuated. The back team was ordered in and the RIT team advanced and staged at the door. Alert firefighters went straight to the valve and opened same and the initial attack crew reverted to a back up posture. No injuries resulted. LESSONS LEARNED: This situation happened in training, however it could have just as easily happened during the real deal. 1) Always have somebody stay with the valve to monitor same. 2) if that is not possible, tie down the line or lock OPEN the valve in some form or fashion. 3) Remember that this can also happen using a break apart nozzle as a shut off valve when extending lines. 4) Back-up and RIT teams MUST always stay alert, Stay geared up and at the ready and NEVER be complacent. 5) Most of all, stay CALM and never PANIC!  

Thursday, December 21, 2006  I am an Asst.Chief/training co-ordinator for our small rural department. We were recently training at our live burn training center (4-20 ft steel shipping containers first floor with 1-40 ft container second floor w/interior steel staircase) with a larger metro FD. We were simulating fire attack on a basement fire by stageing crews at the top of the stairway then having them advance the attack line down the stairway to the appropriate burn room. My position was as interior safety officer and I staged myself at the top of the stairs in full PPE. After several repetitions condtions became extremely dangerous heavy smoke/zero visibility & high heat. I decided to vent the upper floor by opening the window on that level. After opening the window I started towards the exterior exit. I failed to keep my hand on the wall and became disoriented. The next thing I knew I fell down 2 steps of the stairway before catching myself. My helmet became dislodged and almost pulled my SCBA mask off. I managed to remove myself from the room to the outside area. LESSONS LEARNED: It has become apparent that we neglected to design a way to prevent any one from inadvertantly entering the stairway when visibility becomes zero. I also learned that it is necessary to more closely monitor the conditions in our burn containers (do we get more real training if the temps are higher?) The last and most important lesson for me was to insure my PPE is properly donned and everything in place. Thanks for providing me with this opportunity to share this lesson.  

Monday, November 20, 2006  My own close call involved draining large diameter, 6 inch, hose after testing. WE had laid out more than the recommended length of hose to get the testing over quicker and the roadway sloped away from the engine slightly downhill. The end of the 6 inch hose was capped with a 6 inch cover with a small pet cock valve that only allowed a small stream ow water to be released. This was not the best setup considering the hundreds of gallosn of water being held back by the cover. I tried checking the residual pressure on the cover by seeing if the cover would move easily using a hose tool. After waiting awhile, I became impatient and began untwisting the cover while there was still some pressure from the water on the cover. Remember, the other end of the long hose had been disconnected from the engine and was just laying in the street. I was very surprised when I released the cover with the hose tool and the cap immediately shot off with a loud bang and sailed 30 to 40 feet down the road. Fortunately, there was no one in the way and no injury occured. I was also fortunate that the cap shot in a straight line and did not pivot up toward my head which could have occured if the fitting hung up and didn't allow the cover to come off all at once. Since that incident, we use a cover with 2 1/2 inch threading built in so that a nozzle can be attached and the pressure can be safely released in a reasonable time. Lessons Learned: I thought that under the lessons learned category it would have been good to point out that any hose under 300 psi pressure for testing should not be walked checking for leaks. Leaks should be checked for before the actual test pressure is applied when there is relatively low engine idle pressure or low testing equipment pressure. Once the test pressure is applied, especially after 3 minutes duration, there should be no one near the hose. Once pressure is applied our main concern should be to keep everyone out of harms way. I don't know if the department making the report would want to add that type of comment or whoever adds the lessons learned section. It might prevent a future injury. When testing large diameter hose stick with the recommended length because excessive hose layouts greatly increase residual pressure especially when the hose is on a downward incline. Always use a cover on the end of large diameter with a nozzle attached or other fitting that allows for releaving pressure on the large volume of water in the hose. Also, disconnect the hose at each fitting before attempting to release the cover fitting to limit the amount of water in the hose.  

Friday, November 17, 2006  On Sunday November 12, 2007 Lake Carmel Fire Dept. was holding a car fire drill. I was one of two safety officers. We were about 45 minutes in the drill and had done approx. 7 evolutions where we would approach car sweep under and then attack fire but not put it out. I was walking in front of vehicle doing the safety thing when i heard a loud bang and then felt something hit my leg. I really didn't flinch or make a move for that matter so nobody relized I was hit. The stinging was incredible and I just stood there. I am apart of the secret list and i frequent your website so at this point all those close calls are running through my head.One member walked over and asked if i was ok and i looked at him and said it hit me. He walked me away and we removed my gear to find NO BLOOD but a welt straight accross the back of my left knee. The hood strut shot and hit the back of my leg where is standing about 25' away. I was in full PPE including my scott pack but my mask was not on because i was not in the "hot zone". I now have a bruise the size of a softball but all is well. LESSONS LEARNED 1. Remove struts and any other gas charged cylinder. 2. Make sure you have ALL YOU PPE on. I did but can not say it enough. 3. MAKE SURE YOU VEHICLE FIRES YOU DO NOT FIGHT IT FROM THE FRONT OR REAR.  

Wednesday, November 15, 2006  Crews were setting up to do a final complete burn down of an old house. Rooms were stoked with hay, old pallets, old wooden fence. Training officer okayed use of 2 gallons of gas on the first floor since there would be no crews entering for the burn. Gas was put down in living room, crews diligently put on all their turnout gear(all of it)and SCBA. About five to ten minutes had elapsed from the pour to igniting a trailer with a road flare from the front porch. I had turned to walk off the porch when the house lit up. It was like being tackled from behind and being thrown off the porch about twenty feet. The crew in the basement lighting a pile of pallets by back stairs barely made it out since vapors ignited and burned towards the basement where it had settled. The ignition broke windows and cracked some on houses in the neighborhood. How stupid were we? All Hazardous Materials Technicians on the crew, all know the chemical properties of gasoline! This was a momentary lapse in judgment that could have been disastrous. LESSONS LEARNED: As far as a major lesson learned was a VERY healthy respect for gasoline. Also, using ordinary combustibles only for live fire evolution cannot be emphasized enough. My crew knew that we could have ended up on a "what not to do report" they still talk about it. As a Chief Officer I make sure to relate this story at any live training at my current department when talk goes to using accelerants.