2 Kitchen Fires - Similar Close Calls with Cyanide

Tuesday, August 31, 2010  CLOSE CALL 1

Do not be fooled by complacency or bad habits. No matter how much smoke there is it is dangerous. The photo's attached were taken at small kitchen fire that was actually extinguished before the arrival of the first due units. An elderly occupant that was unable to escape the structure was trapped on the second division in a bedroom. The ladder company quickly threw a ladder to the second division and brought the occupant down the ladder. The moderate smoke condition was ventilated and readings were taken using the HCN meter. At the time metering began the first division had a fair amount of natural ventilation that had occurred, so readings did not exceed 7ppm which is just about the department's action level of 5ppm. The second division saw higher numbers that were as high as 22ppm. These readings were taken once the fans were started and after natural ventilation had a chance to remove some of the smoke. Imagine what the levels were while the elderly occupant was waiting to be rescued. By looking at the photos it is hard to imagine numbers this high. This is only stresses the importance of utilizing SCBA and monitoring before removing it. Do not commit into the dangerous smoke filled environment because it doesn't look that bad, because looks are deceiving.

CLOSE CALL 2

At a recent incident 2 City firefighters were taken to the Hospital with the possibility of Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN) exposure. A policy was in place to avoid this issue which was not followed. One of the reasons I’m sure was the size of the fire. We were on the smallest kitchen fire you could ever have. Very little smoke and the fire only left the stove and exposed the cabinet directly above. I don’t even think the ceiling was sooted up. It was one of those fires that we would have had cleaned up and been back at the station in a few minutes in days past.

With that established we have been running a HCN detector with the Township for close to a year. We typically run the unit though with a CO monitor after knockdown to make sure air quality is good enough to remove our masks. In this case we found High levels of CO over 100 ppm and HCN near 50 ppm in the building. With the IDLH of HCN being around 4 and the fire being out for 10-15 minutes already you can see where we were confused. We already had a Gas Powered Honda PPV fan in the front door ventilating so we gave it more time and sent a few guys in packs to the second floor to begin to strategically open windows. The two guys who had been on initial attack and following had removed their masks were seeing all this from outside and reported feeling a little nauseous. They were checked out by medics and as a precaution transported to the hospital to be checked out. Again there was absolutely no visible smoke in the structure at the time they removed their masks. They were later released with no ill effects.

We learned while still on the scene that when the fan was started in this case the choke was left partially on. You couldn’t tell as the fan was not sputtering and appeared to be running normally. With the readings not really coming down with close to 30 minutes of continuous ventilation already under our belt, we decided to put one of our electrical fans in the doorway in a PPV configuration to see if we could get the property ventilated. The levels slowly began to go down on the first and second floor but we were still finding pockets of higher readings. I opened up a small bathroom that had been closed from the start and got a quick reading of over 20 ppm. This home approximately of 2500 square feet had a basement with a secondary stair with Bilco doors. This door had been opened early on yet the door to the basement had been closed. As everyone who has vented a house knows this didn’t let air from either operation push into the basement. We were still getting readings of HCN near 40 ppm down there. Once we made sure that we had the door open and an exhaust from the basement it took around 10 minutes to get the area totally cleared out allowing us to clear the scene. This would have been one of those events that we would have cleared in 20 minutes and gave back to the family to occupy prior to using our HCN Detector.

As you can expect we had a lot of questions resulting from this call. To try to get a better idea of what had happened we took our fan down to our training building to run a few tests. First, we took readings of both CO and HCN and got 0’s. We then ran the fan in a PPV configuration into the space at full throttle for 15 minutes and took readings. We got really no readings on HCN and 17 ppm on the CO meter. We then ran the same fan at about half choke at full throttle for 15 minutes. Following this time we took a second set of readings. The HCN was up to 21, which is 5 times the IDLH number and the CO was at 96 which is also above what is acceptable for any length of time. Our monitors were located approximately 15 feet inside the multi room structure, one room past the room the fans were directly charging. We had one window open at the back side of the space with good air flow from the vent.

In closing I have been doing this job for over 25 years. I have choked on my fair share of smoke over that time. I was even taught to breath off the nozzle in my early years. Since we began using this detector it has really opened my eyes to the prevalence and pervasiveness of this gas. It doesn’t seem to be very predictable to date. All I can tell you is that we have been breathing it more than we thought over the years.
 

Close Call 1	Close Call 1

Three Close Calls - Three Structure Fires - No One is Learning!

Thursday, July 29, 2010  I have 3 close calls to inform you about. They all took place in the same department only a short time apart. The first was a single family dwelling( modular Type) with heavy smoke from a distance. First unit to arrive report heavy fire (fully involved) requested a tanker strike team of 4 Large tankers. As crews arrived they made entry on the dwelling (all occupants are out). They also placed 4 FF and 1 Probie on the roof which was already vented. Two or three turn out coats were burned and I believe two SCBAs. Another senior person and I stood in total awe. We have no say. Also they all stood around when they thought the fire was out and claimed what a great job they did. I then informed command the fire was still in the roof area. Second fire, same companies was a two story farm house (balloon construction) with heavy fire on the first floor with all occupants out. Entry made with one FF has his foot go through the floor. At this time fire was now on second floor and the steps were somewhat burned out. A FF on the second floor had to bail out the window due to a flash over. The walls were covered with wood coverings. The Third fire same companies was a two story farm house with heavy black smoke from some distance and was well involved upon arrival and the homeowner out of state. One crew starts a side A attack. A second crew tries to attack from side C. I asked them to stop. Multiple crews then tried to make entry through side A. I ask them to wait and was overruled.  Ladders were then thrown to second floor and vented second floor porch roof reached and vent entry search tried. I asked command to evac the building 4 times as the attic was now well involved. Crews stayed on Div 1. A ladder pipe was used to knock the heavy fire out. When the ladder crew asked to continue command stated, we will get it from inside. Crews were now on DIV 2 with a burnt out attic (slate roof) mopping up.  Also during this fire it was around 102 with heat index around 109. Three FFs were overcome with heat, 1 was the safety officer and the 2nd required large amounts of O2 and one required IV fluid and his heart monitored and he went back to fight the fire. LESSONS LEARNED: I do not believe these crews learned anything. Three close calls in a short period of time. We make the same mistakes we made 30 years ago when I was on the department.

Hoseline Breaks Away from Coupling at Structure Fire

Sunday, July 18, 2010  On July 15, 2010 at 03:00 hours the Shamokin Liberty Engine 21 was pumping a HUMAT valve that was supplying Kulpmont Engine 211. A section of 5” LDH came out a coupling that was hooked up to Engine 21. The hose flew through the air and almost hit a TV camera man who was walking by with his camera. The engines were operating at 940 Chestnut Street (Pappy Baluta and Sons Plumbing Store) in Kulpmont, Pennsylvania at a three alarm apartment building fire.
The incident was an example that complete PPE must be worn while operating on the fire ground. Non-fire personnel should be always restricted from areas where fire units and hoses are in operations.
 

Remember to ALWAYS Sound the Floor - Firefighter Falls Through Floor

Saturday, July 17, 2010  We were called to a house fire with smoke showing on a M/A assignment. The first set of crews entered the house finding fire shooting at them extiguished and advanced to bacement to clear the rest of the fire. A Second crew entered into the house and were sent upstairs to vent the celing and overhaul while Third team entered to take care of main floor. Well this is where it happened, a crew of 3 on hose line enters the center of the main floor room and a District Chief on nozzle and falls into hole in center of floor. The Mayday was called and Chief pulled out of floor and he and his crew backed out of house. LESSONS LEARNED:Futher review showed the first 2 crews had meet the floor and went around the hole sounding the floor the whole time. The Third crew followed hose line, and in followed it to the center of room but were not sounding floor for they figured since the first 2 crews made it in and no advised given a hole in floor that they were good to go. LESSON LEARNED NO MATTER WHO WHAT WHEN WHERE HOW AND WHY ALWAYS SOUND THE FLOOR LIKE SOUNDING

CLOSE CALL/MAYDAY IN FDNY FIRE

Video/Audio of the MayDay Wednesday, July 14, 2010  ...

Firefighter Injured During Structure Fire Rescue

Tuesday, July 13, 2010  On 2/20/10 at 0400 hours I reponded on a two man engine out of district to a neighboring volunteer fire district for a structure fire. While enroute dispatch reported a person trapped per the Police on scene. At this point my partner and I discussed our priority was to rescue the victim upon arriving on scene. Our engine arrived 30 seconds behind the volunteer company. They began deploying handlines to a basement fire. Fire was visible in the rear basement of a one story residential. My partner and I met with police to gather information on the victims location. We entered the side door on the first floor and proceded through a kitchen and down a narrow hallway. My partner took the first room on the right (Bathroom) I proceded to the end of the hall which was the bedroom. I discovered the victim laying next to the bed on the floor unconscious. I called for my partner and radiod out to IC that we had the victim and were exiting the building with the victim. We handed the victim off at the side door and reentered the building to continue our search. At this point what we did't know was the engine company attacking the fire was having water problems and there was no ventilation taking place. We continued our search for a few minutes with deteriorating conditions. Zero visibilty with intense heat. We tried to radio a few times asking the status of the fire and requesting information on any additional victims with no response. At this point it just didn't feel right. My partner and I decided to leave the building and regroup. We started to exit down the hallway and into the kitchen. When we got into the kitchen we would follow the counter and end up in the living room. The door we entered was in the kitchen and we couldn't find it. We made three attempts, additionally we called out to command and operations with no response. At that point we knew we were disoriented and we needed help to get out. My partner and I got together in the kitchen and called a mayday. I gave our location in the building as well as the first floor location. Almost immediately we heard the RIT coming up the porch stairs. They entered the building under extreme heat and zero visibility. We could here them coming and yelled back and forth until we could see there hand lights. They escorted us out of the building. Once removed from the building I discovered 2nd degree burns on both my knees. I went to the local clinic and was out of work for 2 weeks. LESSONS LEARNED: One of the biggest lessons learned is know your surroundings. Now that I think about it I never heard or felt any water attacking the fire below us. Additionally I didn't hear any windows breaking for ventilation. Fire scene communications are always a problem in these situations. If we had an understanding of how advanced the fire was we wouldn't of put ourselves at rick to search for additional victims.

Close Call with Electrical Wires in MD House Fire

Friday, July 9, 2010  The other night at a "routine" house fire that could have been much worse. Units were dispatched to the intersection of Poplar Ave and Woodside Ave Tuesday night for a reported dwelling fire, first arriving Engine 5 (BCoFD career) reported a house fully involved and requested the WFD. Due to E-341  responding understaffed, E-371  was added to the call. Upon arrival, the crew from E-371 was directed to pull a 1 3/4 inch line from E-5 and proceed to the C/D corner of the involved dwelling to provide exposure protection. While stretching the line, the crew was directed to make entry into the involved dwelling by an officer from st. 34, and proceeded to make entry into a kitchen door on the C side of the dwelling. Immediately inside the door, the crew became entangled in an energized 220-volt electrical line dangling just inside the door. Both the nozzleman and the back-up man were instantly incapacitated by the electrical shock. The captain from E-371 immediately recognized the situation, and proceeded to swat the line away from the crew, then single-handedly dragged both members from the dwelling. They were immediately attended to by EMS on scene and were transported to St. Agnes hospital. The nozzleman was treated and released approximately 3 hours later, the back-up man was observed overnight and released the next morning. Both have returned to service as of this time.

Fall in Mechanics Pit at Garage Fire

Saturday, June 26, 2010  I Responded with my volunteer fire department to a reported smoke report. Enroute we were upgraded to a structure fire in a garage. We are a volunteer department so a second department was dispatched as well. On arrival we found a well involved block structure with a wood framed garage addition on the front with heavy fire showing. Several FF's obtained SCBA while others pulled attack lines for a exterior attack and to cool a mobile home that was the primary exposure located near the structure. This was already showing radiant heat damage. Several FF's donned SCBA and obtained attack lines and began to advance the nozzles into the front bay area of the structure. On examination and prior to entering the crew had discussed that the roof did not look safe over the front bay area and had burned through. We used a straight stream to knock the tin and remaining roof trusses off the uprights from the exterior down onto the ground and on examination had a totally clear overhead to proceed through. After discussion it was decided to proceed forward. The floor was noted on entry to be concrete and entry was started again to work our way back the brick section to attack the fire still visible there. After taking a few steps over the roof debris now littering the floor the nozzleman disappeared from view. The nozzle man (myself) had been attempting to proceed carefully across the debris and was attempting to sound the debris when the tin roofing now laying across the floor folded and caused the firefighter to fall into a service pit located in the floor of the structure. After the initial fall I checked my air mask and made sure that it had not been dislodged and began to work myself up to an upright position. I still had possession of the hoseline and nozzle and began to place water on the fire in the rear of the structure. At this time I began to feel the heat of the debris so I directed the stream into the pit around me to cool the material around me. While I tried to free myself from the service pit the crew that was still exterior began to work their way to me and reached down to pull me out of the pit. I advised them I was at this time OK and to get me a folding attic ladder to provide me an way out. The pit was 6-8 feet deep with a difference in depth at each end. The IC had been advised of the fall and that a potential bad situation was developing and had requested EMS and a second alert for manpower and medical care. After a ladder was obtained and placed I self extricated from the pit and exited to access my gear. I did not luckily suffer any burns as I did have full PPE in place including a hood. After exiting I found that my only pain was a sore hand so EMS was canceled. I reported to the Chief who was briefed. After this I re assumed my position on a hoseline to assist in the final extinguishment. LESSONS LEARNED: Wow, I learned a lot form this. We are not guaranteed another day in this job so it is up to us to make our task and jobs as safe as possible. our department now does more of a size up of the structure and announce possible hazards to responding units. Personally I have learned to do a better evaluation of the building and use a risk vs benefit attitude before I enter. We do have a rural department with limited manpower so we are looking at alerting a third department on each confirmed working fire for a dedicated RIT team. Remember a Chief or the IC needs to do the walk around but you must continually re access the structure. Even though the overhead was clear the debris that was once above now hid the danger that was below our feet. Remember that 6 side review. I did have a radio with me but did not call a Mayday or activate my PASS. After a recent review and articles I have read we are looking at a RIT class and the proper way to call a Mayday.

Ceiling Collapse at Structure Fire in WI

Saturday, June 19, 2010  On May 29, 2010 @ 1716 hrs De Pere, WI Fire Rescue was dispatched to a report of a structure fire at 361 Southern Star Ln. Southern Star is on the far southwest side of the city, three miles from Station #2. A structure fire response of Engines 111 and 121, and Ladder 111 staffed by seven on duty firefighters was dispatched along with the departments Paid-on-Call firefighters. Enroute E121 Officer, based on numerous reports of fire, requested the incident be upgraded to a “Working Still”.   The “Working Still” added off duty De Pere firefighters staffing Engine 122, Ambulance 111, and Utility 111 along with Lawrence Engine 621, Ashwaubenon Ladder 311, Allouez Engine 1611 (RIT), Chiefs 102, 390, and 690. With a change of quarters by Bellevue Engine 521 and Green Bay Ambulance 421. 
 
Prior to the fire departments arrival the occupants had moved their vehicles out of the garage and thrown the main breaker on the electrical panel. The garage overhead doors were left open. Police on scene reported all occupants were out of the house and safe. 
 
On arrival of E121 at 1724 hrs the Officer reported a single story, wood frame, single family home with heavy smoke on side C of the garage. Walk around revealed fire on exterior wall of garage at the C/D corner, near the underground electrical service meter, with fire extending up to the roof and soffit. No smoke or fire was noted in the garage or house. Garage walls and ceiling were paneled with sheetrock.
 
E121 crew pulled a 1 ¾” preconnect and advanced it on the visible fire. E111 and L111 arrived. Officer of E111 was briefed, established and assumed Command, and assigned accountability. E111 crew established a hydrant water supply to E121.   L111 began preparation to raise the aerial. IRIT was established with L111 and E111 crews.
 
E121 crew extinguished exterior fire and advanced through the garage service door on side C to check for and to extinguish fire in the attic of the garage. No smoke or flame was visible in the garage area and E121 crew was clearly visible to Command and L111 crew through the open overhead doors on side A. E121 crew was able to access the garage attic through a ceiling scuttle. Once this scuttle was pulled a large volume of fire was seen in the garage attic. E121 crew began extinguishment while calling for a crew to pull ceilings. Command and L111 acknowledged the request.
 
Due to the remoteness of this subdivision only A111 and E621, of the “Working Still” assignment, had arrived on scene. A111 was assisting L111 and E621 had not yet been assigned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E121 crew noted the ceiling of the garage starting to sag and immediately evacuated the area. Two members exited through the side C service door and one through the side A overhead door. The garage ceiling and the roof above catastrophically failed. Crew reported that from the time they noted the ceiling sag to collapse was approximately 3-5 seconds. This collapse occurred 6-7 minutes after the arrival of E121.
 
A ‘Mayday” was called and a building evacuation was immediately implemented. Operations Command requested a Personnel Accountability Report and all members reported in. A defensive operation was started with multiple hose lines and master streams placed in service. The fire was brought under control at 1759 hrs with the last unit leaving at 2014 hrs.
 
This subdivision has been developed over the last seven years and is still under development. This house is of lightweight wood frame and truss construction and is approximately five years old. It has a poured concrete basement, vinyl siding over OSB sheeting, and asphalt shingles over OSB sheeting on a pitched roof. The collapse involved the garage and kitchen areas along with a portion of the great room that is adjacent to the kitchen. Metal plate connected “W” trusses were used in the garage and kitchen areas while metal plate connected scissor truss construction (cathedral ceiling) was used over the great room.
 
The fire is still under investigation but is believed to be a result of an electrical short. The fire extended up the outside walls of the building and entered the attic area through soffits, fly rafters, and the gable ends.
 
Photos taken by De Pere Fire Prevention Bureau unless otherwise noted.

Side D shortly after E121 arrival	Side D shortly after E121 arrival

2 Means of Evac'ing Firefighters Fail at House Fire

Saturday, June 12, 2010  While operating at a structure fire in a 3 story single family dwelling, we initiated an interior attack on what was, at the time, a room and contents fire on the C-D corner of the 1st floor. After battling the blaze for several minutes, the IC noted that due to balloon construction, the fire had spread to the 2nd and 3rd floors, as well as the attic, and the roof was in danger of collapse. The IC ordered an evacuation of the structure. Search teams on the 2nd and 3rd floor evacuated immediately, but due to radio problems, the attack team on the 1st floor didn't hear the call. After approximately two minutes, the IC ordered the attack engine to sound three blasts on the air horn, our local back-up evac command. It was then realized that the air horn on the attack engine was inoperable. Sirens were then activated, and the interior attack team evacuated safely. The fire was knocked down from an exterior attack, and mopped up successfully without collapse. LESSONS LEARNED: Full and frequent testing of all equipment, including radios and audible warning devices is vital to firefighter safety. As demonstrated here, if it were not for the driver/operators quick thinking to activate the siren, there very well could have been injury/loss of life from a collapse, had the firefighters not been able to evacuate.

CLOSE CALL - MAYDAY ISSUED FOR TWO FF's THROUGH THE FLOOR...OR SO WE THOUGHT

Wednesday, June 2, 2010  21 March 2010 / Brighton Township Michigan
 
The Brighton Area Fire Department received an alarm at 0216 Sunday morning for a working structure fire in the 5000 block of Kensington Rd. The 911 caller was from the neighboring house and was reporting fire through the roof
 
A full alarm assignment was struck along with AMA (automatic mutual aid) engine from Green Oak Fire Department. Chief 31 was the first arriving officer on the scene and confirmed a working fire. His size up was a single story residential with a walk-out with fire working in the basement, first floor and attic space. The neighbor indicated to Chief 31 that the house has been in foreclosure for over a month and was vacant. Chief 31 then advised dispatch that he would like a second alarm since the closest hydrant was 2 miles away. This also allowed for stand-by coverage.
 
Green Oak Fire Department Chief 802 was second on the scene and assigned IC by Chief 31. The decision was made early that this was going to be a defensive attack due the nature of the structure and 50% fire involvement. The IAP (incident action plan) was announced to all incoming units that this was a defensive attack and no companies were to make entry into the structure. 
 
The structure was ranch with a mid to late 70’s design. Components of the home indicated that cosmetic and structural updates had been done through the years. The square footage of the home was estimated at approximately 3,000 ft2, but soon doubled to 6,000 ft2 with realization of a fully finished walk-out basement and wing. The exterior was completely finished in brick masonry, with energy efficient windows and an asphalt roof. The roof pitch was approximately 6/12 with a single ridge. The walk-out portion of the structure covered half of the C side with two siding doorways on the ground level.  
 
E31 was the first apparatus on scene and laid in 200’ of LDH from the roadway setting up for a rural hitch. E31’s crew was presented with fire venting out of the roof at the entry way and one front window. (It was later discovered, that the fire did not traditionally vent, but that two skylights had failed.) The company officer ordered the 2.5” attack line with a smooth bore nozzle to the front of the structure, and for crews to force the front door for a direct attack. E33 arrived second and sent it’s water to E31, and its remaining crew was sent forward to establish a second attack line. E32 was third on and also sent its water forward, with crew assignment to pull another attack line to the C side. E31 assumed A sector and E32 assumed C sector with Capt 32 assuming operations. The following command functions were also filled as apparatus arrived on scene; RIT, safety, water supply, and staging.
 
As the fire was knocked down and the scene transitioned into the overhaul phase, there became the need to enter the structure from the walk-out ground level to knock down hot spots unreachable from the exterior. The walkout portion appeared to have no fire damage and was structurally sound.
 
The C sector officer met with the IC, RIT and Safety to advise them of a plan to enter the structure through the wing on the C side and for hose teams to make their way around to the B / C corner. Two, three person crews were assembled and briefed to work slowly and attentively. The experience levels of all the crew members ranged from one to thirteen years. For one of the firefighters, it was his first interior operation. The first crew cleared the glass from the siding doorway and probed the floor approximately 3’ in. The floor was sound, as would be expected. Prior to entry, the room was scanned with a TIC and no fire extension was reported. The smoke was light gray and laminar, zero visibility and minimal heat conditions.  
 
The firefighter with the TIC entered the structure, followed by the second firefighter who had control of the knob maintaining positive contact with the first. A third firefighter was positioned at the door assisting with hose advancement. As the first initial firefighter made his way into the room, he was standing upright. On his third step, the floor disappeared from under him. As the second firefighter lost contact with the first, he was in the crouched position. He went to his knees to reach out, and the floor also disappeared from under him. When the two firefighters landed, they quickly made contact and checked each other’s condition. Both were uninjured, had greater than a half tank of SCBA air, and were still wearing all PPE. The door and another outside firefighter noticed the hose line drop sharply off and could hear one of the two firefighters trying the call out a MAYDAY over the radio. The door firefighter crawled in until he reached the edge of the drop off and made contact with the two in the hole. He was still able to maintain contact with the doorway and called back out the firefighters standing outside, “Two through the floor”.
 
The initial reaction for all firefighters in the vicinity was to charge the doorway to assist. The Operation officer issued a MAYDAY across the fire ground frequency, “MAYDAY, MAYDAY. Priority traffic, two firefighters through the floor on C side, activate RIT, activate EMS. ” Command acknowledged, activated the evacuation tones, called for a third alarm, and an additional EMS unit. When RIT arrived, there were three firefighters in the structure working to extract the two from the hole. One of the trapped firefighters was able to jump up and get his upper body on to the ledge but could not pull himself out.  The RIT officer was able to make entry and grab this firefighter by the SCBA bottle and pull him up out of the hole and then through the door way in to the back yard. The other firefighter was not able to pull himself up, nor were the two firefighters able to pull him out using brut strength. An attic ladder was requested and put in the hole for the fire fighter to climb, but the crews noticed the ladder would not stand upright. Once both firemen were removed from the structure, care was taken over by Livingston County EMS. One fireman was cleared on scene, while the other was transported to Providence Novi Hospital with knee pain.
 
In trying to figure out what went wrong, the Operation officer located the TIC and scanned the room from the entry point. It was then discovered this room contained an empty in-ground pool. The next question was why the pool was not discovered with the TIC when the room was initially scanned. It is surmised that the TIC strap was draped across the front of the TIC lense. The firefighter using the TIC had limited experience using the device. The young firefighter likely saw the gray and believed that was the appropriate image without a flame.  When the C sector officer looked over the room with the TIC, every detail of the pool could be made out. The steps in the shallow end, the diving board, the edge, and the tile flooring that surrounded it. Another complicating issue was that the outside of the structure gave no indication of an in-ground pool. The windows were identical to the ones in the home along with no exterior pool pump, sky lights, or additional vents.
 
The fire is currently under investigation by the Brighton Area Fire Marshal Division and the Livingston County Sheriff Department.
 
Investigation points
Ä When the doorway glass was cleared, the firefighter probed the floor with the tool to make sure it was solid but was only able to reach in about 3’. The edge of the pool was at the 4’ 8” mark.
Ä Going into the structure at grade level gave a false sense of security, thus the first man in was standing upright.
Ä Both firefighters went into the pool at the 6’ deep mark. Thus crews from above were able to make physical contact with them.
Ä The pool was 9’ + at the deepest point
Ä The ladder had to be held upright due to the slope of the pool but neither firefighter remember there being a slope
Ä MAYDAY was not issued by the firefighters over the radio. It was done by an outside officer. This was due to the remainder of the crew making  quick contact.
Ä The broken glass from the doorway was covering the tile floor right the edge of the pool.  This tempered glass acted like marbles on the tile, thus making it difficult for the crews that were trying to extricate the firefighters.
 
Lessons learned
Ä Even though the younger firefighters are trained and may possess one to three years on the job, they may have zero time being the lead on an interior assignment. Make sure a tenured firefighter or officer is watching over them during this time period until they get some proven time “working” at a job
Ä TIC’s are great tools for interior attacks, but the basics cannot be forgotten. Stay low on all fours, or crab / duck walk feeling the floor in front of you.
Ä Understand the tool that you are using. If your people have not had much time with a TIC in smoky conditions, get them the training. Most of the time it is the officer with the TIC, but that was not the case this ti... [ more ]

TJI Close Call Found After Fire

Saturday, May 22, 2010  At 0521 this morning the Aurora, OH Fire Department responded to an automatic fire alarm at 521 Brighton Dr. The first arriving units found heavy smoke showing with the occupants of the house evacuated. After confirming that everyone was out and completing a 360 of the structure crews entered the structure through the front door to attempt to locate the fire. They observed fire from a hallway wall and extinguished it moving forward into the kitchen and then into the basement where more fire was found. After extinguishing the fire in the basement they returned upstairs through the kitchen and found that the floor was unstable. When the smoke cleared they observed that the floor had dropped approximately three inches due to the failure of the OSB floor joists. Some were completely burnt and others were missing some of the OSB which allowed the fire to enter the cold air return and spread to the second floor. An additional layer of plywood under a marble floor in the kitchen may have helped to support the weight and prevented total failure.

The first picture shows the kitchen floor with a 1.75" hose going across the sagging floor and under the wall.
The second picture shows the OSB joists.
 

Master Stream Close Call - Chief Without PPE Gets Hit!

Courtesy of Stamford Fire Media Saturday, May 22, 2010  The following video was taken from a fire in Long Ridge Volunteer Fire District in North Stamford (CT) on May 10, 2010. The video catches a Fire Chief getting a direct-contract blast from a master stream. The Fire Chief had no protective clothing and was only wearing a reflective rain jacket and bell cap. Fortunately, he was not seriously injured, but this should serve as a training tool to always wear your proper gear and expect the unexpected!

Building Walk-Thru Leads to Some Interesting Finds

Friday, May 21, 2010  Recently my crew went out inspecting on a inspection of a building that has been under renovation for approximately 2+ years. This was the first time that I was in the building in the last 3 1/2 years that I worked for this department. As we walked through the door, I immediately asked one of the guys to go back to the truck to retrieve the digital camera.

As you can see from the pictures the sprinkler system runs through the trusses on half of the building and under the trusses of the building which supports the second floor.

The large concrete pad that is supported by the 4 columns is what really caught my eye. Upon a closer inspection, one of the 5 original concrete columns had been removed. I don't think we would have ever expected this to be in a building such as this. This could create a huge problem for us if we were to ever enter the building under fire conditions.

New stairwells have been added approximately a 12" void space between the wall and the staircase.After a little further investigation in the building, it was found that all of the walls have been constructed this way.

From the interior of the second floor it, appears that the building at one time had a flat roof, due to the span-crete above the second floor. However from the outside, all we see is a pitched roof.

The ladder on the three pieces of wood over the stairwell really seem to add to this inspection.

We though we would pass this on. Even though this building may be one of a kind, there is that chance that someone else may have something similar in their area and prevent them from getting hurt.

 

Engines Runs Out of Water 1st, then Fuel - WOW!

Thursday, May 20, 2010  We responded on a mutual aid house fire with a neighboring county. They were understaffed as they pulled up to a 1 story woodframe with working fire. Just prior to our tanker arriving they ran out of water. Before we could charge their supply line their engine ran out of fuel. Then their generator ran out of gas. All crews had to be pull out briefly so out tanker could take over primary duties as well as another mutual aid engine company. LESSONS LEARNED: Truck checks truck checks truck checks. And every driver/officer should be prepared for the unexpected and be ready to adapt to any situation without hesitation.