Tuesday, October 18, 2011  These pictures are from renovations/upgrading of the PATCO city hall station in Camden City, NJ.
Concrete fills in the exit however the steps still exist.
This can cause a major problem during evacuations.
Firefighters will run into major issues with searches. Problems would also exist due to fire, or terrorist attack circumstances.
 

 

Saturday, October 1, 2011  In the past few days, the Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) observed that fire and police stations were attacked by gun fire. Although no one was injured, these incidents raise concern about physical and personnel security at facilities occupied by emergency responder departments and agencies. 
To address this concern, the EMR-ISAC examined various sources to identify the basic measures of a time-efficient, cost-effective, and common-sense approach to bolster security in and around first responder stations. The following is a summary of preventive actions for the consideration of Emergency Services Sector leaders responsible for personnel and any type of physical location: 

• Inspect randomly the security and condition of all facilities and storage areas.
• Keep all doors and windows closed and locked as much as practicable.
• Use appropriate locking systems for all station access points.
• Obtain a monitored intrusion detection system for locations not always occupied and in regular use.
• Prohibit sharing security codes or combinations with unauthorized persons.
• Change security codes or combinations at frequent intervals.
• Guarantee vehicles, apparatus, and equipment at exterior sites are always locked when unattended.
• Initiate and enforce a reliable identification system for department personnel and property.
• Screen all visitors and vendors and deny entry to anyone who refuses inspection.
• Develop inspection practices for incoming deliveries including postal packages and mail.
• Require personnel within the station to be vigilant for unauthorized persons and unusual activities.
• Prepare and enforce an SOP containing physical and personnel security measures at facilities. 

For more information, see the Five Step Process and the crucial principles (deterrence, detection, delay, response, recovery, and re-assessment) at the Integrated Physical Security Handbook. Another pertinent source is the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (PDF, 1.3 Mb)
 

Tuesday, September 27, 2011  At 2106 hours E61 was dispatched to the McDonalds Restaurant at 3323 North 24th Street for a fall injury. E61 found the patient, who was a McDonald’s employee, at the top of a stairwell that leads to the basement storage area. E61 began the regular line of questioning and treatment for what seemed to be a standard medical call. The patient was a 24 YOF who was pregnant. The patient stated that she was going into the basement to check on something and became lightheaded and fell. One of the other employees heard the fall and went to the stairwell to help the patient. Both employees exited the stairwell and called 911 to report the “fall injury”. As the Captain from E61 was questioning the patient and one FF was checking vitals, the other FF and the Engineer went into the basement to see if the patient had tripped or slipped on something. Shortly after entering the basement both members of E61 became lightheaded and exited the basement. Upon exiting the basement, the Engineer fell and both members reported dizziness and a bitter taste in their mouths. E61’s Captain immediately called for a Hazardous Assignment and evacuated everyone out of the building.

At 2117 hours the Haz Assignment was dispatched. One thing to note was that the PTI on the MCT still only had the info from the initial fall injury. I’m not sure how this could have been fixed, but updated PTI would have been helpful enroute. BC2 assumed command and assigned E4 to Haz Sector. E4 and Squad 8 made entry into the building in turnouts and SCBAs. The goal of the entry was to meter the basement for what was suspected to be a Co2 leak. The manager of the restaurant told the crews that they had just had the Co2 tank filled a couple of hours prior
to the call. The crews made entry with 2 CGI meters and 2 Gas Ranger meters. As the crews descended the basement stairwell they started to get decreased O2 readings and slightly increased VoC readings on the CGI meters. As the crews continued into the basement the O2 readings continued to decrease (the lowest reading was 17.5%). One of the many interesting things about this call was the readings the crews were getting on the Gas Rangers. The Rangers were reading 100% LEL. When switched to % gas the readings were 25%. The readings were obtained at ground level and at ceiling level. These reading prompted Haz Sector to exit the building and start to mitigate the potential hazards. They shut off the gas at the meter and attempted to shut down the power from the exterior.
It was determined that another entry was necessary to shut off the power to the building, and investigate the Co2 tank. Haz Sector made a second entry into the building and secured the power to the building while monitoring the air to assure there was no risk of a spark causing ignition. Haz Sector then re‐entered the basement to investigate the Co2 tank. They found a broken line on the tank and were able to shut down the tank to mitigate the hazard. After exiting the building, Haz Sector made a plan to ventilate the building. A confined space fan and flexible ducting were used off of SQ8. This method of ventilation was chosen due to the heavier than air gas in a below grade location. The ventilation was complete after about 30 minutes.
Haz Sector did a final entry and obtained Zero readings on all the meters.
A few things to note about this call:
‐ The 2 members off of E61 were transported to the hospital for further evaluation. This can truly be deemed a “near miss”
‐ Statistics say that the majority of fatalities in these situations are would be
rescuers
‐ Jeff Zientek will contact the manufacturer of our Gas Rangers to inquire about
the Co2 readings on what is supposed to be a natural gas specific meter
‐ Jeff will also check to see if we can use our Manning meters with the sensors
we have, and do a conversion for Co2
‐ The on-site Co2 monitors at the restaurant didn’t function
‐ Some McDonalds locations have basements
‐ The gas hot water heater was located in the basement so the potential for a gas
leak and source of ignition existed
‐ The ventilation profile was difficult because of a heavier than air gas in a
basement
‐ SWG initial responder had to be told more than once to exit the hot zone (hot
zone mgmt. is challenging on such a large scale scene)

The total FD response to the incident included:
E61, BC2, SQ8, E4, L4, HM4, L9, E9, R9, E5, E11, R11 C957N&S, SDC, NDC, PI3, C959, C99, R17,
and U29.
E61 did a great job of identifying the hazard, evacuating the building, and calling for the appropriate response. Crews did a great job of investigating and mitigating the hazard.
****Always suspect a potentially toxic environment when responding to any restaurant,
convenience store, or any structure that has these systems in place…especially in basement
areas.****

 

Monday, September 26, 2011  This is a church under construction.

In the photos you can see the use of TGI Beams used as trusses. It is the first time that I have seen them used in this application. We have become accustomed to seeing them used as floor joists, but I have not seen them used as unprotected roof trusses.

Is it any wonder why Church fires kill firefighters? Remember: The Occupancy Type coupled with the Time of Day make up the Life Hazard. WHEN it falls, don’t be under it.
 

 

Wednesday, June 29, 2011  A medic woke up during the night with diarrhea and low and behold, the station was full of carbon monoxide. The heater was cycling on and off to try and get rid of humidity and some how pumped the building full of CO. The CO detector was designed to chirp at 40ppm, but not to go into alarm until 400ppm. The alarm was chirping when the medic woke up, so it was obviously somewhere in that range. The entire shift (5 personnel) ended up being transported to the hospital to be checked out.
LESSONS LEARNED: Just because we are emergency personnel, doesn't mean we are immune to emergencies! Make sure you have working detectors in your station and make sure they are set at good levels! My department had a CO incident 6-8 months ago as well. The CO alarm at Station 1 was sounding, so the dorm resident had the FD duty officer come check it out. Sure enough, CO levels were high. It was due to a combination of an ambulance left running and heater issues. After this incident, CO detectors were purchased and placed in all 4 of our stations.
 

Wednesday, May 25, 2011  Thanks to www.StudentoftheFireService.com for sharing this CloseCall with us:

As a firefighter, proper knowledge of your SCBA is necessary to help provide a safe working environment. We as firefighters should be familiar with every square inch of our LIFELINE. If you do not properly check your SCBA's you will be inviting a dangerous situation upon yourself and your fellow brothers and sisters on the front lines with you. The fireground is not the time to find an overlooked mistake. Making sure your SCBA is in proper working condition is a part of being a good firefighter. Proper inspection of your SCBA should include you checking the overall condition of the pak. That means making sure all the straps, hoses harness and regulator are all in good shape. It also includes checking your gauges and making sure there is plenty of the good stuff ("Air ain't no big thing, til you ain't got none" -fellow brothers words), activate your pass device and make sure it is in good working condition, always check the facepiece for cleanliness and a good fit, and make sure the buckles are in proper working condition. And don't forget to check your by-pass valve. This comes natural to great firefighters, but we need to remember the steps and constantly make sure our pak is ready to go.


Trust me SCBA checks pay off! Here are some photos I took after my inspection and finding something disturbing. You can call this a "Close Call" or you can say it would have been found before becoming a close call. Let me remind you this did not happen by throwing a hot pak back on the engine. 

Apparently the protective coating over the wires inside the braided stainless steel wire was exposed at the bend near the top left shoulder. The line was heated, heating up the air line running to the gauge as well. I found the left shoulder strap to be melted to our dri-deck material in the compartment. After I opened the cylinder there was no air leakage, but I went to moving the exposed wire and found the air hose melted which could've made for a bad day for a fellow firefighter or myself. I consider this a close call because if we would've had a structure fire the night before my inspection someone might've overlooked what I found and continued on. 


Scott has been notified on the issue, and I will be sharing this with numerous fire service brothers to get the word out. If you have any information on past events or similar finding please contact me via e-mail at Blane2469@gmail.com

 

 

Monday, May 2, 2011  Some Brain Surgeon thought it was a good idea to run wires UNDER the FIRE ESCAPE!!!

 

Thursday, February 3, 2011  The oldest Heber Springs (Alabama) manufacturing company has sadly shut down after being there 59 years following significant safety issues and burns related to their gloves. The now out of business Glove Corporation manufactured about 10 different types of firefighting gloves and closed it's doors Monday night. When workers came in on Tuesday, they found a note on the front door telling them they no longer had a job. About 65 people were directly affected. The Gov. Work task force is helping to relocate those without jobs in other industries, as well as provide other assistance.
 
PREVIOUS NOTICE INFORMATION:
 
Thursday, January 27, 2011 The Glove Corp issued a Safety Notice regarding its "Blaze Fighter" firefighting glove but then went out of business.  The Blaze Fighter is currently certified to NFPA 1971-2007 HOWEVER during recent testing, one style of gloves encountered issues with the performance of the conductive heat resistance test. The back of the hand area of the glove did not meet the prescribed performance threshold, as outlined in Section 7.7.5 of the NFPA 1971-2007 Standard. The Blaze Fighter style exhibited issues with test values that were below the minimum performance requirements.

The Blaze Fighter meets the Thermal Protection Performance (TPP) and flame resistance requirements and all other applicable performance requirements of the NFPA 1971-2007 Standard. These gloves were produced from December 2009 through December 2010. The label in the glove will indicate the manufacture date with lot numbers of 12109 through 12310.

While the majority of these gloves have performed satisfactorily in the field, The Glove Corporation has received reported cases of back of hand burns with a few pairs of this glove model.
 

Thursday, January 27, 2011  The Glove Corp has issued a Safety Notice regarding its "Blaze Fighter" firefighting glove.  The Blaze Fighter is currently certified to NFPA 1971-2007.  During recent testing, one style of gloves encountered issues with the performance of the conductive heat resistance test. The back of the hand area of the glove did not meet the prescribed performance threshold, as outlined in Section 7.7.5 of the NFPA 1971-2007 Standard. The Blaze Fighter style exhibited issues with test values that were below the minimum performance requirements.

The Blaze Fighter meets the Thermal Protection Performance (TPP) and flame resistance requirements and all other applicable performance requirements of the NFPA 1971-2007 Standard. These gloves were produced from December 2009 through December 2010. The label in the glove will indicate the manufacture date with lot numbers of 12109 through 12310.
While the majority of these gloves have performed satisfactorily in the field, The Glove Corporation has received reported cases of back of hand burns with a few pairs of this glove model. The Glove Corporation is recommending that you use the contact information below to discuss possible replacement of your model Blaze Fighter glove that was manufactured within the timeframe referenced above.

View the Original Safety Notice
 

Wednesday, January 12, 2011  There are currently some aftermarket SCBA bottle makers selling spare or replacement bottles. Purchase of these bottles though leads to the SCBA ensamble not being NIOSH approved. Entire warning document attached.  

Tuesday, November 23, 2010  Ok, so as I am driving around on appointments today I passed this building.... and see a building... Inside this building being built.

In picture 1 you can see the building inside, #2 is a close up, and #3 shows the basement sliding glass door still existent in the photo.

This is in an urban area that has strict building codes. Allowing construction methods as such make you wonder, and really wake to be mindful of the crazy shit you can run into.
 

 

Friday, October 29, 2010  WARNING: This is the "shake and bake" portable meth lab. The problem is not only the real possibility of exploding, but once they are done, they throw the bottle out (usually out of a car window) and it become a toxic hazmat event when eventually found. 

The bottom contains sodium chrystals, the fluid is muriatic acid, and the metal is lithium. The mixture is extremely volatile and may be explosive. This may be found in common vehicles driving around so that fumes may be dissipated and not associated with a particular address.
 

 

Thursday, October 14, 2010  Here are some photos of what happens when transmission failures occur in
windmills.

To date no gear oil has been invented to withstand the pressures produced
within these Transmissions. Most recently, the government gave Dow-Corning a big grant
to work on it.Previously, many others had tried and failed.
 

 

Thursday, September 9, 2010  On Thursday September 2, 2010, the Office of Fire Prevention and Control (OFPC) was notified by the Massachusetts State Fire Marshal s Office that they had discovered DCP Midstream s propane facility in Westfield, Massachusetts had possibly supplied non-odorized and/or under odorized propane to multiple distributors throughout New England and New York.

This Safety Alert has been prepared in cooperation with the Department of State Division of Code Enforcement and Administration and is distributed to notify the fire service, propane suppliers, and the general public on the issues associated with propane and safeguards to ensure that the threat is minimized.

General Facts:

Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG, commonly referred to as propane) is an odorless gas that, without the mixture of an odorizer, is difficult to detect without meters or alarms. LPG is flammable at a minimum of 2% mixture with air, can displace oxygen in high quantities, and is heavier than air

The subject LPG facility has been distributing LPG since May 7, 2010.

LPG initially purchased from other locations is not currently subject to this Safety Alert.

The subject LPG facility does not conduct retail sales to the general public. Rather, it provides product to other dealers that then either resell the LPG to retail suppliers or to the general public.

The New York State Propane Gas Association is working proactively to inform interested parties of the situation, and advising them to analyze their existing LPG supplies.

For Fire Departments:

The distinctive odor of LPG may not be present, or may be diminished, thereby making recognition that LPG is actually present within a particular situation (I.E. a pilot light out or a pipe leak) difficult.
However, the lack of, or reduction in, odorant, should not have any impact on a properly calibrated meter. Fire Departments should review their meter operations manual on proper calibration and conversion factors for combustible gas monitoring specific to LPG.

Fire departments are advised to treat all LPG emergencies as high-concentration leaks, wearing full PPE and SCBA with appropriate firefighting equipment until the leak can be quantified with properly calibrated meters.

Due to the varying uses of the gas and quantities of consumers, LPG that may lack the proper level of odorant

may be in consumer fixed and portable tanks for the foreseeable future.
This is not a condition that will go away in a finite amount of time.

For Code Enforcement Officials:

Ensure that LPG suppliers within your jurisdiction are aware of this Safety Alert.

In cases where LPG suppliers within your jurisdiction have non-odorized or under odorized LPG, distribution must cease from that location until the LPG can be odorized in accordance with the Fire Code of New York State and NFPA 58, Chapter 4. Testing for the appropriate levels of odorant (ethyl mercaptan) is done qualitatively by a sniff test and/or quantitatively by a stain tube test.

In cases were non-odorized product is identified and voluntary compliance is not achieved, facility closure requirements are found within Chapter 27 of the Fire Code of New York State and the situation may qualify for revocation of the operating permit if so issued by the local jurisdiction.

Questions or concerns regarding code enforcement practices may be directed to the Department of State, Division of Code Enforcement and Administration at (518) 474-4073.

 

Tuesday, July 20, 2010  On Wednesday, July 14, 2010 the Collingswood Fire Department responded to several incidents due to flash flooding. We had assisted numerous stranded motorists that had been caught in the flooding. Our tactics were different depending on the situation.

During one of the assists we came across a female stranded in her vehicle in knee high water. We made verbal contact and determined the best way to remove her from the hazard was to manually push her vehicle approximately 20’ in reverse to higher ground. We had her place the vehicle in neutral with the ignition off. Three firefighters took placement on the hood of the vehicle and I placed my hand on the driver’s side ‘B’ post to push the car from that point. The vehicle was a 2009 Mitsubishi Galante. Due to the height of the vehicle this placed the left side of my head even with the opened window. We began to push the vehicle and almost immediately the driver’s steering wheel air bag had deployed. This created a loud noise and stunned me, which caused me to stumble back off of the vehicle. I immediately had ringing and hearing loss in my left ear. The driver of the vehicle was assessed and found to have no injuries by my crew. I was assessed at the ER and had a follow up with a specialist the following day. It was determined that I only had temporary hearing loss from the “explosion”, and it should return in a short period of time.

We, as emergency responders, go through countless hours of training on the new technology of vehicles for fires and extrication and the dangers present from unintentional airbag deployment. To date I have never heard of air bags deploying due to water damage and have not seen any information to the emergency services community. After this incident it has caused us to do some research to see why this airbag deployed. There was no impact onto the vehicle at any time.

Through our findings it was found that the Air Bag Control Unit (ABCU), which reads the air bag sensors and triggers the ignition of a gas generator propellant to rapidly inflate the airbags, is commonly located under the driver’s seat or floor boards. This places the unit at a very low point in the vehicle which subjects it to water damage. Once subjected to water the ABCU can trigger the pyrotechnic device and cause the air bags to activate. This can happen instantaneously or even days after the flooding. There have been several documented cases as to this happening.

The pyrotechnic device which causes the air bags to activate is commonly an electrical conductor wrapped in a combustible material. The conductor becomes hot and ignites the combustible material and initiates a gas generator. This causes a loud explosion that can reach 165 to 175dB. The air bag can deploy 3,000 to 4,000 lbs per square inch of force. This “explosion” has caused several injuries to occupants and emergency responders. There have been several documented cases of hearing injuries of passengers when the air bag deploys. Injuries include ruptured ear drums, inner ear damage and permanent hearing loss. This is most common in the passenger of the vehicle who is next to the air bag.

I felt compelled to share this incident with the emergency services community to hopefully avoid any further injuries or even worse. I was very fortunate not to be struck with the air bag and not sustain any permanent hearing damage. We were also fortunate that the occupant of the vehicle was not injured. Manufactures recommendations are that, any time a vehicle is involved in a flood or has significant water damage, the vehicle’s battery be disconnected and the vehicle towed. We are changing our Department Policy to avoid this incident from happening in the future. We will be following the manufactures recommendations with disconnecting the battery and having the vehicle towed and also removing the occupants from the vehicle as soon as possible.